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Cryptography today has evolved far beyond its traditional goal of secure message
transmission. Through the notion of secure computation, a set of mutually dis-
trustful agents can collaborate to accomplish a common goal while preserving each
agent's privacy to a maximal extent. In the seminal works of Yao and Goldreich,
Micali and Wigderson, it was shown that any computational task can be securely
implemented through a protocol. Traditionally, the rules governing privacy for
these protocols have been designed to work only when a single execution running
in isolation. However, with the advent of the Internet, many transactions occur
simultaneously, and the protocols designed for the single execution setting fail to
remain secure in a concurrent setting.
While both the need and deﬁnitions for concurrent security were realized in
the early 90's, practical protocols that are concurrently secure are lacking. The
protocols designed for concurrent security, thus far, have mostly relied on having
a trusted setup or a relaxed deﬁnition of security.
In this thesis, we put forward a uniﬁed framework for the construction of con-
currently secure protocols both with and without trusted set-up. This framework
not only provides a conceptually simple solution for essentially all previous re-
sults, but also signiﬁcantly improves eﬃciency and reduces the requirements on
the trusted setup used in these works. Moreover, in several setup models, our
constructions are tight with respect to computational assumptions and eﬃciency.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
The author was born in Tirunelveli, a small district located in the south of Tamil
Nadu, India on August 8, 1982. His parents, Venkitasubramaniam and Kanthi-
mathi, named him Nagaraj after the Hindu God worshipped in a temple at Man-
narsalai, Kerala. As per family tradition, his oﬃcial name was to be his maternal
grandfather's, Muthuramakrishnan.
Muthu spent a great deal of his childhood learning tennis and computers from
his father and a ton of mathematics from his mother. His childhood memories in-
clude coding in Basic on an Intel-8086 based IBM-PC and watching Tamil, Hindi
and Malayalam movies. He attended high-school in Chennai, where he developed
passion for mathematics and programming. He was exposed to a lot of non-routine
problem-solving when he attended the training camp for the International Mathe-
matical Olympiad in Mumbai, India. In the meanwhile, he spent several sleepless
nights, diligently preparing for the Indian Institute Of Technology, Joint Entrance
Examination. Securing 21st rank in the examination allowed him to pursue Com-
puter Science at IIT-Madras where he gained interest in Theoretical Computer
Science, a ﬁeld that allowed him to combine his passions. Four years later, he
graduated with a bachelors degree. Drawn to theoretical research, owing to his
fascinating mentor at IIT, Pandu Rangan, he joined the Ph.D. program at Cornell
University in fall 2004, where he spent six beautiful years working on theoretical
research under the supervision of Rafael Pass.
iii
This thesis is dedicated to my wife who has always been supportive and loving.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Rafael Pass, my advisor and mentor.
With his enthusiasm, his inspiration, and his great eﬀorts to explain things clearly
and simply, he helped make cryptography fun for me. I am deeply grateful to him
for his ability to understand me and help me harness my strengths and bolster
my conﬁdence, while at the same time, in critical moments, providing sincere
and determined opinions, helping me making the right decisions. I am also very
grateful to him for investing a great number of hours in teaching me the spirit of
good research.
During my initial years at Cornell, I had the fortune of interacting with Jo-
hannes Gehrke and Dexter Kozen, from whom, I learned a great deal about critical
thinking and understanding the principles of scientiﬁc research. I also beneﬁted a
lot from the fantastic courses taught by Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg, Dexter
Kozen, David Shmoys, Eva Tardos, and, David Williamson.
I am indebted to my many student colleagues for providing a stimulating and
fun environment in which to learn and grow. I am especially grateful to Huijia Lin
and Wei-lung Dustin Tseng for our countless discussions and mutual exchange of
ideas on all topics. Both of them have had a strong impact on the research in this
thesis and are both dear friends.
Other researchers that have deeply inﬂuenced my research include Ran Canetti,
Rosario Gennaro, Dov Gordon, Hugo Krawczyk, Tal Rabin, and, Vinod Vaikun-
tanathan. I am very grateful for my discussions with them.
I wish to thank my wife, Shravya Markandeya, for supporting, encouraging and
most of all, being patient and accomodating, especially during the ﬁnishing stages
of my Ph.D. I also wish to thank my best friends Bistra Dilkina, Tudor Marian,
and, Anton Morozov, for helping me get through some diﬃcult times, and for all
v
the entertainment they provided.
My understanding of the topics in this thesis have beneﬁted from discussions
with Thanh Nguyen, Ian Kash, Yogeshwer Sharma, Yeejiun Song, Smita Shankar,
Linga Prakash, and, Daria Sorokina whose comments has had an important impact
on this thesis. I am grateful to the secretaries in the computer science department,
for helping the departments to run smoothly and for assisting me in many diﬀerent
ways. Becky Stewart and Stephanie Meik, deserve special mention.
Finally, my parents Venkitasubramaniam and Kanthimathi who have given me
the opportunity of an education from the best institutions.
Please forgive me for any omissions.
vi
CONTENTS
Biographical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 A Uniﬁed Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Preliminaries 10
2.1 Basic Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.1 General Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2 Protocol Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Basic Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Basic Complexity Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.2 Indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.3 Interactive Proofs and Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.4 Witness Indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.5 Zero-Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.6 Commitment Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3 General Framework for Secure Computation 22
3.1 Traditional UC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 A Generalized Version of UC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Main Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 UC-puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4 Strong Non-Malleable Witness Indistinguishable Proofs 30
4.1 Deﬁnition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 SNMWI from Simulation-Extractability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 SNMWI from any Non-Malleable Commitment . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3.1 Non-malleable commitment schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.2 SNMWI Argument of Knowledge Protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉 . . . . 36
4.4 Robust SNMWI Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.5 Sequential composition of SNMWI Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5 Proof of the Main Theorem 54
5.1 IdealZK Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.2 Oblivious Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.3 The Puzzle Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.1 Step 1: Simulating puzzle interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
vii
5.3.2 Step 2: Simulating Zero-Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6 Applications of the General Framework 85
6.1 Non-Uniform UC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.2 Quasi-Polynomial UC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.3 UC in the Common Reference String model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.4 UC in the Uniform Reference String model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.5 UC in the Key Registration model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6.6 UC in the Sunspots model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.7 UC in the Tamper-Proof Hardware Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.8 Stand-alone Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7 Lower Bounds for Non-Uniform UC-Security 106
7.1 On Existence of Evasive Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
8 Eﬃcient Concurrent Zero-Knowledge 116
8.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.2 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.3 Open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
8.4 Black-Box Concurrent Zero-Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
8.5 Description of the protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
8.6 Warm-up: Simulating Static Non-Aborting Adversaries . . . . . . . 125
8.7 The Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
8.8 Analysis of the Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
8.9 Concurrent Computational ZK Proof for NP . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.10 Concurrent ZK Arguments from OWFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.11 Concurrent Perfect ZK Proofs for languages in NP . . . . . . . . . 144
8.12 Unconditional WI Proof of Knowledge for Speciﬁc Languages . . . 145
8.13 Concurrent Perfect ZK Proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism . . . . . 146
Bibliography 147
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
4.1 Strongly Non-Malleable WI Argument of Knowledge for NP . . . 37
4.2 The two cases in a man-in-the-middle execution of 〈Ps, Vs〉 with
adversary A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3 The two cases E1 and E2 in a man-in-the-middle execution of
〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 with adversary A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.1 Uniform Reference String functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.2 Key Registration functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.3 The Sunspots functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.4 Wrap functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.5 The Synchronous Communication functionality . . . . . . . . . . . 102
7.1 Ideal Bit Commitment Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
8.1 Concurrent Perfect ZK Argument for NP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
8.2 Simulator for Perfect Concurrent Zero-Knowledge Argument 〈P, V 〉 130
8.3 Computational ZK Proof for NP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.4 WI Proof of Knowledge for 1of2GraphIso . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.5 Perfect Concurrent ZK Proof for GraphNonIso . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
ix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The notion of secure multi-party computation allows m mutually distrustful
parties to securely compute a functionality f(x¯) = (f1(x¯), ..., fm(x¯)) of their cor-
responding private inputs x¯ = x1, ..., xm, such that party Pi receives the value
fi(x¯). Loosely speaking, the security requirements are that the parties learn noth-
ing more from the protocol than their prescribed output, and that the output of
each party is distributed according to the prescribed functionality. This should
hold even in the case that an arbitrary subset of the parties maliciously deviates
from the protocol.
The above security guarantees are traditionally formalized using the simulation
paradigm [37, 38]. The basic idea, which originates in [34], is to say that a protocol
pi securely realizes f if running pi emulates an ideal process where all parties secretly
provide inputs to an imaginary trusted party that computes f and returns the
outputs to the parties; more precisely, any harm done by a polynomial-time
adversary in the real execution of pi, could have been done by a polynomial-time
simulator in the ideal process.
Shortly after its conceptualization, strong results were established for se-
cure multi-party computation. Speciﬁcally, it was shown that any probabilistic
polynomial-time computable multi-party functionality can be securely computed,
assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations [77, 34]. The original
setting in which secure multi-party protocols were investigated, however, only al-
lowed the execution of a single instance of the protocol at a time; this is the so
called stand-alone setting. A more realistic setting, is one which allows the concur-
rent execution of protocols. In the concurrent setting, many protocols are executed
at the same time. This setting presents the new risk of a coordinated attack in
which an adversary interleaves many diﬀerent executions of a protocol and chooses
its messages in each instance based on other partial executions of the protocol. The
strongest (but also most realistic) setting for concurrent securitycalled Univer-
sally Composable (UC) security [12, 69, 24], or environmental-securityconsiders
the execution of an unbounded number of concurrent protocols, in an arbitrary,
and adversarially controlled, network environment. Unfortunately, security in the
stand-alone setting does not imply security in the concurrent setting. In fact,
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without assuming some trusted set-up, the traditional simulation-based notion of
concurrent security, and in particular UC security, cannot be achieved in general
[15, 18, 52].
To circumvent the broad impossibility results, two distinct veins of research
can be identiﬁed in the literature.
Trusted set-up models: A ﬁrst vein of work initiated by Canetti and Fischlin
[15] and Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky and Sahai [19] (see also e.g., [2, 14,
44, 20]) considers constructions of UC-secure protocol using various trusted
set-up assumptions, where the parties have limited access to a trusted entity.
(See [13] for a recent survey of various diﬀerent set-up assumptions.) In many
situations, however, trusted set-up is hard to come by (or at least expensive).
An important question is to identify the weakest possible set-up that allows
us to obtain general feasibility results for UC security.
Relaxed models of security: In some situations, trusted set-up is not only
expensive, but might not even exist. It is thus imperative to have a notion
of concurrent security that can be realized without trusted set-up. Another
vein of work considers relaxed models of security such as quasi-polynomial
simulation [63, 71, 6] or input-indistinguishability [57]. These works, however,
only provide weak guarantees about the computational advantages gained by
an adversary in a concurrent execution of the protocol. As such, currently,
there are no known protocolswithout trusted set-upthat can be used
to securely compute computationally-sensitive functionality (such as e.g.,
private data-base queries, proof-of-work protocols [26, 28], or player bridge
or poker on the Internet [34]) in a fully concurrent setting.1
In this work we address both of the above research goals by presenting a uniﬁed
framework for the construction of UC secure protocolsboth with, and without,
trusted set-up. This framework not only provides a conceptually simpler solution
for essentially all general UC-feasibility results (e.g., [19, 14, 2, 44, 20, 45, 41]), but
also allows us to (often signiﬁcantly) improve the round-complexity and complex-
ity theoretic assumptions. Interestingly, our new results even improve the round
complexity of stand-alone secure computation. As far as we know this is the ﬁrst
1Yet another vein of work considers relaxed notions of concurrency, such as bounded con-
currency [1, 66, 53, 64]. In this work, we, however, focus only on full concurrency, where no
restrictions on the number of concurrent executions are made.
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improvement to the original work of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [34], assum-
ing only trapdoor permutations.) More importantly, this framework allows us to
consider weaker trusted set-up models (e.g., the existence of a single imperfect
reference string, or an unrestricted timing model) and new relaxed models of
security. In particular, we present a new model of concurrent security, called Non-
Uniform UC, which allows us to achievewithout any trusted set-upthe ﬁrst
fully-concurrent secure computation protocol that provides strong guarantees
about the computational advantages gained by an adversary. We also complement
our positive results with new lower bounds, showing that our results (both with
and without trusted set-up) are essentially tight (often optimal)both in terms of
round complexity and in terms of complexity-theoretic assumptions. As such, our
framework helps in characterizing models in which UC security is realizable, and
also at what cost.
We start by outlining our framework, and then state our main result followed
by some applications.
1.1 A Uniﬁed Framework
Earlier results on UC secure computation all rely on quite diﬀerent techniques.
Roughly speaking, to prove that a protocol is concurrently secure, one needs to
show two diﬀerent properties: 1) concurrent simulation, and 2) concurrent non-
malleability. Intuitively, concurrent simulation amounts to providing the simulator
with a trapdoor that allows it to emulate players without knowing their inputs.
On the other hand, concurrent non-malleability, requires showing that an adver-
sary cannot make use of messages received in one execution to cheat in another
execution; this is often achieved by providing a technique which enables the sim-
ulator to have diﬀerent trapdoors for each player (in a sense an identity-based
trapdoor using the terminology of [14]), and showing that the trapdoor for one
player does not reveal a trapdoor for another.
The simulation part is usually easy to achieve. Consider, for instance, the
Common Reference String modelwhere the players have access to a public ref-
erence string that is ideally sampled from some distribution. In this model it is
easy to provide the simulator with a single trapdoor; it could, for instance, be the
3
inverse of the CRS through a one-way function. However, achieving concurrent
non-malleability is signiﬁcantly harder. In this particular case, [19] solve the prob-
lem by embedding the public-key of a CCA-secure encryption scheme in the CRS,
but in general, quite diﬀerent techniques are employed in each model. Yet the
same phenomena persists: concurrent simulation is easy to achieve, but concur-
rent non-malleability requires signiﬁcantly more work, and often stronger set-up
and/or stronger computational assumptions and/or larger round-complexity.
In this work, we provide a technique showing that concurrent simulation is
suﬃcienti.e., it is suﬃcient to provide the simulator with a single trapdoor. In
a nutshell, once such a trapdoor is established, concurrent non-malleability (and
thus full UC-security) can be achieved by further relying on a stand-alone secure
non-malleable commitment scheme[25].
To formalize concurrent simulation we deﬁne the notion of a UC-puzzle
which, intuitively, is a protocol with the property that no adversary can successfully
complete the puzzle and also obtain a trapdoor, but there exists a simulator who
can generate (correctly distributed) puzzles together with trapdoors.
A commitment scheme, often described as the digital analogue of sealed en-
velopes, enables a sender to commit itself to a value while keeping it secret from
the receiver. A commitment scheme, is said to be stand-alone non-malleable, if it
is infeasible for an adversary to maul a commitment to a value v into a commit-
ment to a related value v˜. To achieve concurrent non-malleability, we will in fact,
rely on a non-malleable commitment that satisﬁes an additional property, referred
to as robustness, which requires the commitment to also be non-malleable w.r.t
arbitrary k-round protocols. However, as it turns out, essentially all non-malleable
commitments satisfy this property.
Finally, we rely on stand-alone secure semi-honest oblivious transfer. This as-
sumption, as we already know, is necessary even when considering stand-alone
secure computation. Informally, oblivious transfer[72], enables a receiver to pri-
vately select and obtain one (and at most one) out of two values submitted by a
sender. Semi-honest oblivious transfer considers adversarial senders (or receivers)
that try to learn as much as possible from the messages while following the pre-
scribed protocol.
The main result that we obtain in this work is the following:
4
Theorem 1 (Informally stated). Assume the existence of a t1(·)-round UC-secure
puzzle Σ using some set-up T , the existence of t2(·)-round robust non-malleable
commitments and the existence of t3(·)-round stand-alone secure semi-honest
oblivious-transfer protocol. Then, for every m-ary functionality f , there exists
a O(t1(·) + t2(·) + t3(·))-round protocol Πusing the same set-up Tthat UC-
realizes f .
Since, the best known construction of non-malleable commitment requires only
O(1)-rounds [50] and can be based on any one-way function which in turn are
implied by the existence of semi-honest oblivious transfer protocols, we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Informally stated). Assume the existence of a t1(·)-round UC-secure
puzzle Σ using some set-up T , and the existence of t3(·)-round stand-alone secure
semi-honest oblivious-transfer protocol. Then, for every m-ary functionality f ,
there exists a O(t1(·) + t3(·))-round protocol Πusing the same set-up Tthat
UC-realizes f .
In fact, as we show in several set-ups, the UC-puzzles are not only suﬃcient,
but are also necessary. Since oblivious-transfer is necessary to achieve secure com-
putation, in models where we prove that our UC-puzzles are necessary, we obtain
tight feasibility conditions.
As such, UC-puzzles fully characterize in what set-up models UC security is
possible. This characterization not only gives insight into what is needed to es-
tablish UC security, as we shall see, in previously studied models, O(1)-round
UC-puzzles are easy to construct. As such, Theorem 1 provides a conceptually
simple and uniﬁed proof of known results, while at the same time reducing the
trusted set-up, the computational assumptions and/or the round-complexity. We
brieﬂy highlight some results obtained by instantiating our framework with known
constructions of non-malleable commitments [25, 67, 51, 49, 50, 40].2 In all the
results below we focus only on static adversaries.
UC in the imperfect string model. Canetti, Pass and Shelat [20] consider
UC security where parties have access to an imperfect reference string
2Interesting, for many of our results, we get quite substantial improvements already by
relying on the original DDN-construction [25].
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called a sunspotthat is generated by any arbitrary eﬃcient min-entropy
source (obtained e.g., by measurement of some physical phenomenon). The
CPS-protocol, however, requires m communicating parties to share m refer-
ence strings, each of them generated using fresh entropy.
Our results show that, somewhat surprisingly, a single imperfect reference
string is suﬃcient for UC security. This stands in sharp contrast to the
general study of randomness extraction, where single-source extraction from
arbitrary eﬃcient sources is impossible, but extraction from multiple sources
is feasible!3
UC in the timing model. Dwork, Naor and Sahai [27] introduced the timing
model, where all players are assumed to have access to clocks with a certain
drift. In this model, they rely on delays and time-outs to obtain a O(1)-
round concurrent zero-knowledge protocol. Kalai, Lindell and Prabhakaran
[44] subsequently presented a concurrent secure computation protocol in the
timing model; whereas the timing model of [27] does not impose a maximal
upper-bound on the clock drift, the protocol of [44] requires the clock-drift
to be small; furthermore, it requires ω(n) rounds and an extensive use of
delays (roughly n∆, where ∆ is the latency of the network).
Our results establish that UC security is possible also in the unrestricted
timing model (where the clock drift can be large); additionally, we reduce
the use of delays to only O(∆), and only require an O(1)-round protocol; in
fact, we also establish lower bounds showing that the run time (and thus the
use of delays) of our protocol is optimal up to a constant factor. This model
however requires a slight modiﬁcation of the framework to incorporate delays
and time-outs and is beyond the scope of the thesis.
UC with quasi-polynomial simulation. Pass [63] proposed a relaxation of
the standard simulation-based deﬁnition of security, allowing for a super
polynomial-time, or Quasi-polynomial simulation (QPS). Prabhakaran and
Sahai [71] and Barak and Sahai [6] recently obtained general multi-party
protocols that are concurrently QPS-secure without any trusted set-up, but
rely on strong complexity assumptions.
3Note that the results of Trevisan and Vadhan [76] only show that extraction from sources
with size bounded by some ﬁxed polynomial is possible. In contrast, traditional techniques show
that extraction from sources with arbitrary polynomial running-time is impossible.
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Our results show how to construct using optimal complexity assumptions,
while at the same time achieving a stronger (and more meaningful) notion
of security, which (in analogy with [63]) requires that indistinguishability
of simulated and real executions holds also for all of quasi-polynomial time;
in contrast, [6] only achieves indistinguishability w.r.t distinguishers with
running-time smaller than that of the simulator.4 We complement this result
by a lower bound showing that our complexity assumptions, in essence, are
necessary to achieve QPS security.
Stand-alone secure multi-party computation. The original construction of
stand-alone securem-party computation by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson
relies only on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations, but requires
O(m)-communication rounds. We obtain the ﬁrst (asymptotic) improvement
to the round complexity of this results without strengthening the underlying
assumption. By relying on the original DDN construction of non-malleable
commitments [25] (see also [51]) we already obtain a log logm-round secure
computation protocol. If instead relying on the recent construction from
[50, 40], we obtain a O(1) round protocol.5
Our results also establishes that, on top of stand-alone semi-honest oblivious-
transfer protocol, no further assumptions are necessary to establish UC secure
computation in e.g., the uniform random string (URS) model [19] or the multi-
CRS model [41]; earlier results required additional assumptions (e.g., dense crypto
systems).
1.2 Techniques
By relying on previous results [64, 66, 52, 19, 34] the construction of a UC pro-
tocol for realizing any multi-party functionality reduces to the task of construct-
4In essence, this means that anything an attacker can learn on-line (in poly-time) can be
simulated oﬀ-line (in qpoly-time) in a way that is indistinguishable also oﬀ-line. In this
language, [6] only achieves on-line indistinguishability.
5Earlier results improve the round-complexity by making stronger assumptions: (1) assuming
dense crypto systems, Katz, Ostrovsky and Smith [46] achieved O(logm) rounds; (2) assuming
collision-resistant hash-function, and additionally relying on non-black box simulation [1], Pass
[64] achieved O(1) rounds. Our results only use black-box simulation; as such they are a signif-
icant improvement also over any known protocol using black-box simulation (and in particular
[46]).
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ing a zero-knowledge protocol that is concurrently simulatable, and concurrently
simulation-sound [75]namely, even if an adversary receives multiple concurrent
simulated proofs, it will not be able to prove any false statements. Concurrent sim-
ulation is easy to achieve in any model where we have a UC-puzzle. The tricky part
is to obtain a zero-knowledge proof that is simultaneously straight-line extractable
and simulation-sound.
To achieve this we introduce a new notion of non-malleability for interactive
proofs, called strong non-malleable witness indistinguishable (SNMWI). Infor-
mally, SNMWI extends the notion of strong witness indistinguishability [31] to
a man-in-the-middle setting: consider a man-in-the-middle attacker (MIM) that is
participating in two interactions, a left interaction where it is acting as a veriﬁer,
and a right interaction where it is acting as a prover. SNMWI requires that
whenever the common inputs in the left interaction are indistinguishable, so are
the views of and witnesses used by the MIM. SNMWI is related to (and inspired
by) the notion of non-malleable witness indistinguishability, recently introduced
by Ostrovsky, Persiano and Visconti [61], but the actual security requirements are
quite diﬀerent.
As we show, SNMWI is a relaxation of the notion of simulation-extractability
[25, 67], and, as such, potentially easier to achieve. In particular, one of our main
technical contributions is a construction of SNMWI arguments of knowledge
from any robust non-malleable commitment (with only constant overhead in round-
complexity).
1.3 Overview
The main contribution of the thesis is a uniﬁed framework to securely realize any
computational task in an arbitrary set-up infrastructure. Along the way, we intro-
duce a new notion of strong non-malleable witness indistinguishability and con-
struct protocols for the same. As an aside, we also show how to construct eﬃcient
protocols for the basic task of zero-knowledge in a slightly restricted concurrent
setting.
Chapter 2 - PreliminariesWe introduce basic notation and recall basic notions
that will be used throughout the thesis.
8
Chapter 3 - General Framework for Secure Computation We recall the
basic deﬁnition of concurrent or universal composable security (UC) and show how
to extend it to any general set-up model or relaxed-security model. We introduce
the notion of a UC-puzzle that characterizes when concurrent security is achievable
in a model. Then we state our main feasibility theorem.
Chapter 4 - Strong Non-Malleable Witness Indistinguishable Proofs. We
introduce a new notion of strong non-malleable witness indistinguishability and
show how it can be constructed based on any non-malleable commitment. In this
journey, we discuss sequential repetition and the notion of robustness, analogous
to [49], for SNMWI protocols.
Chapter 5 - Proof of the Main Theorem In this chapter, we show how to
UC-realize any functionality in any generalized UC-model where there exists a
UC-puzzle. Using previous works, this essentially boils down to realizing the Ideal
Zero-Knowledge (IdealZK) functionality. The core lemma that we show is that the
IdealZK-functionality can be realized using a UC-puzzle, stand-alone secure SH-OT
and a SNMWI protocol.
Chapter 6 - Applications of General Framework Using our framework, we
show essentially, how to obtain all previous known UC-feasibility results with im-
proved round-complexity and computational assumptions. Additionally, we con-
sider a new model of security and show how to achieve feasibility in the model.
Chapter 7 - Lower Bounds In this chapter we establish lower bounds for the
Non-Uniform UC-model.
Chapter 8 - Eﬃcient Concurrent Zero-Knowledge As an aside, we investi-
gate how to construct eﬃcient zero-knowledge protocols that are secure under a
restricted concurrent setting. More precisely, we construct very eﬃcient concur-
rent zero-knowledge proofs and arguments, by slightly modifying the deﬁnitions of
security.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Basic Notation
2.1.1 General Notation
We employ the following general notation.
Integer and String representation. We denote by N the set of natural
numbers: 0, 1, 2, . . .. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, a natural number is presented in
its binary expansion (with no leading 0s) whenever given as an input to an algo-
rithm. If n ∈ N, we denote by 1n the unary expansion of n (i.e., the concatenation
of n 1's). We denote by {0, 1}n the set of n-bit long string, by {0, 1}∗ the set of
binary strings, and by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}.
We denote the concatenation of two strings x and y by x|y (or more simply by
xy). If α is a binary string, then |α| denotes α's length and α1 · · ·αi denotes α's
i-bit preﬁx.
Probabilistic notation. We employ the following probabilistic notation from
[39]. We focus on probability distributions X : S → R+ over ﬁnite sets S.
Probabilistic assignments. If D is a probability distribution and p a predicate,
then x
R← D denotes the elementary procedure consisting of choosing an
element x at random according to D and returning x, and x
R← D | p(x)
denotes the operation of choosing x according to D until p(x) is true and
then returning x.
Probabilistic experiments. Let p be a predicate and D1, D2, . . . probability distri-
butions, then the notation Pr
[
x1
R← D1; x2 R← D2; . . . : p(x1, x2, . . .)
]
de-
notes the probability that p(x1, x2, . . .) will be true after the ordered execu-
tion of the probabilistic assignments x1
R← D1; x2 R← D1; . . .
New probability distributions. If D1, D2, . . . are probability distributions, the
notation {x R← D1; y R← D2; · · · : (x, y, · · · )} denotes the new probability
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distribution over {(x, y, · · · )} generated by the ordered execution of the prob-
abilistic assignments x
R← D1, y R← D2, · · · .
Probability ensembles. Let I be a countable index set. A probability ensemble
indexed by I is a vector of random variables indexed by I: X = {Xi}i∈I .
In order to simplify notation, we sometimes abuse of notation and employ the
following short-cut: Given a probability distribution X, we let X denote the
random variable obtained by selecting x← X and outputting x.
Algorithms. We employ the following notation for algorithms.
Deterministic algorithms. By an algorithm we mean a Turing machine. We
only consider ﬁnite algorithms, i.e., machines that have some ﬁxed upper-
bound on their running-time (and thus always halt). If M is a determinis-
tic algorithm, we denote by stepsM(x) the number of computational steps
taken by M on input x. We say that an algorithm M has time-complexity
timeM(n) = t(n), if ∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗ stepsM(x) ≤ t(|x|). (Note that time com-
plexity is deﬁned as an upper-bound on the running time ofM independently
of its input.)
Probabilistic algorithms. By a probabilistic algorithms we mean a Turing machine
that receives an auxiliary random tape as input. If M is a probabilistic
algorithm, then for any input x, the notation Mr(x) denotes the output of
the M on input x when receiving r as random tape.
Oracle algorithms. Given two algorithms M,A, we let MA(x) denote the output
of the algorithm M on input x, when given oracle access to A.
Emulation of algorithms. In counting computational steps, we assume that an
algorithm M , given the code of a second algorithm A and an input x, can
emulate the computation of A on input x with only linear overhead.
Negligible functions. The term negligible" is used for denoting functions
that are asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any ﬁxed polynomial. More
precisely, a function ν(·) from non-negative integers to reals is called negligible if
for every constant c > 0 and all suﬃciently large n, it holds that ν(n) < n−c.
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2.1.2 Protocol Notation
We assume familiarity with the basic notions of an Interactive Turing Machine
[38] (ITM for brevity) and a protocol. Brieﬂy, an ITM is a Turing Machine with a
read-only input tape, a read-only auxiliary input tape, a read-only random tape, a
read/write work-tape, a read-only communication tape (for receiving messages) a
write-only communication tape (for sending messages) and ﬁnally an output tape.
The content of the input (respectively auxiliary input) tape of an ITM A is called
the input (respectively auxiliary input) of A and the content of the output tape of
A, upon halting, is called the output of A.
A protocol (A,B) is a pair of ITMs that share communication tapes so that
the (write-only) send-tape of the ﬁrst ITM is the (read-only) receive-tape of the
second, and vice versa. The computation of such a pair consists of a sequence of
rounds 1, 2, .... In each round only one ITM is active, and the other is idle. A round
ends with the active machine either halting in which case the protocol ends or
by it entering a special idle state. The stringm written on the communication tape
in a round is called the message sent by the active machine to the idle machine.
In this thesis we consider protocols (A,B) where both ITMs A,B receive the
same string as input (but not necessarily as auxiliary input); this input string will
be denoted the common input of A and B.
We make use of the following notation for protocol executions.
Rounds. In a protocol (A,B), a round r ∈ N is denoted an A-round (respectively
B-round) if A (respectively B) is active in round r in (A,B). We say that a
protocol has r(n) rounds (or simply is an r(n)-round protocol) if the protocol
(A,B) consists of r(n)-rounds of communication between A and B when
executed on common input x ∈ {0, 1}n.
Executions, transcripts and views. Let MA,MB be vectors of strings MA =
{m1A,m2A, ...}, MB = {m1B,m2B, ...} and let x, r1, r2, z1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}∗. We say
that the pair ((x, z1, r1,MA), (x, z2, r2,MB)) is an execution of the protocol
(A,B) if, running ITM A on common input x, auxiliary input z1 and random
tape r1 with ITM B on x, z2 and r2, results in m
i
A being the i'th message
received by A and in miB being the i'th message received by B. We also
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denote the above execution by 〈A(z1), B(z2)〉(x) for uniformly chosen r1 and
r2.
If ((x, z1, r1,MA), (x, z2, r2,MB)) is an execution, we refer to the tuple
(MA,MB) as the transcript of the execution. We say that (MA,MB) is con-
sistent w.r.t A on input x, if there exists auxiliary input z1 and random tape
r1 such that when A is fed m
i
A as the i'th message from B results in m
i
A
being the i'th message sent by A.
In an execution ((x, z1, r1,MA), (x, z2, r2,MB)) = (VA, VB) of the protocol
(A,B), we call VA the view of A (in the execution), and VB the view
of B. We let viewA[〈A(z1), B(z2)〉(x)] denote A's view in the execution
〈A(z1), B(z2)〉(x) and viewB[〈A(z1), B(z2)〉(x)] B's view in the same exe-
cution. (We occasionally ﬁnd it convenient referring to an execution of a
protocol (A,B) as a joint view of (A,B).)
Outputs of executions and views. If e is an execution of a protocol 〈A1, A2〉 we
denote by outputi(e) the output of Ai, where i ∈ {1, 2}. Analogously, if v
is the view of A, we denote by output(v) the output of A in v.
Counting ITM steps. Let A be an ITM and v = (x, z, r, (m1,m2, ..mk)). Then by
stepsA(v) we denote the number of computational steps taken by A running
on common input x, auxiliary input z, random tape r, and letting the ith
message received be mi.
Time Complexity of ITMs. We say that an ITM A has time-complexity
timeA(n) = t(n), if for every ITM B, every common input x, every aux-
iliary inputs za, zb, it holds that A(x, za) always halts within t(|x|) steps in
an interaction with B(x, zb), regardless of the content of A and B's random
tapes). Note that time complexity is deﬁned as an upper bound on the run-
ning time of A independently of the content of the messages it receives. In
other words, the time complexity of A is the worst-case running time of A
in any interaction.
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2.2 Basic Notions
2.2.1 Basic Complexity Classes
We recall the deﬁnitions of the basic complexity classes P,NP and BPP.
The Complexity Class P. We start by recalling the deﬁnition of the class P,
i.e., the class of languages that can be decided in (deterministic) polynomial-time.
Deﬁnition 1 (Complexity Class P). A language L is recognizable in (deterministic)
polynomial-time if there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm M such
that M(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈ L. P is the class of languages recognizable in
polynomial time.
The Complexity Class NP. We recall the classNP, i.e., the class of languages
for which there exists a proof of membership that can be veriﬁed in polynomial-
time.
Deﬁnition 2 (Complexity Class NP). A language L is in NP if there exists a
Boolean relation RL ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ and a polynomial p(·) such that RL is
recognizable in polynomial-time, and x ∈ L if and only if there exists a string
y ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that |y| ≤ p(|x|) and (x, y) ∈ RL.
The relation RL is called a witness relation for L. We say that y is a witness
for the membership x ∈ L if (x, y) ∈ RL. We will also let RL(x) denote the set of
witnesses for the membership x ∈ L, i.e.,
RL(x) = {y : (x, y) ∈ L}
We say a language has unique witness (called a unique-witness language), if for
every statement in the language, there is only one witness associated with it, i.e.
|RL(x)| = 1 for all x ∈ L.
We let co-NP denote the complement of the class NP, i.e., a language L is in
co-NP if the complement to L is in NP.
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The Complexity Class BPP. We recall the class BPP, i.e., the class of
languages that can be decided in probabilistic polynomial-time (with two-sided
error).
Deﬁnition 3 (Complexity Class BPP). A language L is recognizable in probabilis-
tic polynomial-time if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M such
that
• ∀x ∈ L,Pr [M(x) = 1] ≥ 2/3
• ∀x 6∈ L,Pr [M(x) = 0] ≥ 2/3
BPP is the class of languages recognizable in probabilistic polynomial time.
2.2.2 Indistinguishability
We rely on a generalization of the notion of indistinguishability [37], which con-
siders T (n)-bounded distinguishers and require the indistinguishability gap to be
smaller than 1
poly(T (n))
.
Deﬁnition 4 (Strong T (·)-indistinguishability[63]). Let X and Y be countable sets.
Two ensembles {Ax,y}x∈X,y∈Y and {Bx,y}x∈X,y∈Y are said to be indistinguishable in
time T (·) over x ∈ X, if for every probabilistic distinguishing algorithm D with
running time T (·) in its ﬁrst input, and every x ∈ X, y ∈ Y it holds that:
|Pr [a← Ax,y : D(x, y, a) = 1]− Pr [b← Bx,y : D(x, y, b) = 1]| < 1
poly(T (|x|))
Deﬁnition 5 (Computational indistinguishability w.r.t C). Let X and Y be count-
able sets. Two ensembles {Ax,y}x∈X,y∈Y and {Bx,y}x∈X,y∈Y are said to be indistin-
guishable w.r.t C over x ∈ X, if A,B are q(·)-indistinguishable for every function
q(·) ∈ C.
Standard indistinguishability can be obtained by setting C to be the class of all
polynomials.
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2.2.3 Interactive Proofs and Arguments
Given a pair of interactive Turing machines, P and V , we denote by 〈P, V 〉(x) the
random variable representing the (local) output of V when interacting with ma-
chine P on common input x, when the random input to each machine is uniformly
and independently chosen.
Deﬁnition 6 (T (·)-sound Interactive Proof System). A pair of interactive ma-
chines 〈P, V 〉 is called T (·)-sound interactive proof system for a language L if ma-
chine V is polynomial-time and the following two conditions hold :
• Completeness: For every x ∈ L, Pr [〈P, V 〉(x) = 1] = 1
• Soundness: For every x 6∈ L, and every interactive machine B,
Pr [〈B, V 〉(x) = 1] ≤ 1
T (|x|)
In case that the soundness condition holds only with respect to a T (n)-bounded
prover, the pair 〈P, V 〉 is called an T (·)-sound interactive argument.
For any class of functions C, we say that 〈P, V 〉 is an interactive proofs (inter-
active argument) w.r.t. C if for all T (·) ∈ C the protocol is a T (·)-sound interactive
proof (T (·)-sound interactive argument).
2.2.4 Witness Indistinguishability
An interactive proof is said to be witness indistinguishable (WI) if the veriﬁer's
view is computationally independent" of the witness used by the prover for proving
the statementi.e. the view of the Veriﬁer in the interaction with a prover using
witness w1 or w2 for two diﬀerent witnesses are indistinguishable [30].
Deﬁnition 7 (Witness-indistinguishability w.r.t C). Let 〈P, V 〉 be an interac-
tive proof system for a language L ∈ NP. We say that 〈P, V 〉 is C-witness-
indistinguishable for RL, if for every probabilistic interactive machine V
∗ running in
time q(·) for some q(·) ∈ C and for every two sequences {w1x}x∈L and {w2x}x∈L, such
that w1x, w
2
x ∈ RL(x) for every x ∈ L, the following ensembles are computationally
indistinguishable w.r.t C over x ∈ L:
16
• {viewV ∗ [〈P (w1x), V ∗(z)〉(x)]}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
• {viewV ∗ [〈P (w1x), V ∗(z)〉(x)]}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
We say that the proof system is perfectly witness indistinguishable (Perfect-
WI) if the corresponding views are identically distributed. Often when using WI
proofs in protocols, additional properties such as proof of knowledge and special-
soundness are desirable. We formally deﬁne these below.
Proofs (arguments) of knowledge: Loosely speaking, an interactive proof
is a proof of knowledge if the prover convinces the veriﬁer that it possesses, or
can feasibly compute, a witness for the statement proved. The notion of a proof
of knowledge is essentially formalized as follows: an interactive proof of x ∈ L
is a proof of knowledge if there exists a probabilistic expected polynomial-time
extractor machine E, such that for any prover P , E on input the description of P
and any statement x ∈ L readily outputs a valid witness for x ∈ L if P succeeds
in convincing the Veriﬁer that x ∈ L. Formally,
Deﬁnition (Proof of knowledge [31] ). Let (P, V ) be an interactive proof system
for the language L. We say that (P, V ) is a proof of knowledge for the witness
relation RL for the language L it there exists an probabilistic expected polynomial-
time machine E, called the extractor, and a negligible function ν(n) such that for
every machine P ∗, every statement x ∈ {0, 1}n, every random tape r ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
every auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗,
Pr [〈P ′r(z), V 〉(x) = 1] ≤ Pr
[
EP
′
r(x,z)(x) ∈ RL(x)
]
+ ν(n)
An interactive argument system 〈P, V 〉 is an argument of knowledge if the above
condition holds w.r.t. probabilistic polynomial-time provers.
Special-sound WI proofs[21]: A 3-round public-coin interactive proof for the
language L ∈ NP with witness relation RL is special-sound with respect to RL,
if for any two transcripts (α, β, γ) and (α′, β′, γ′) such that the initial messages
α, α′ are the same but the challenges β, β′ are diﬀerent, there is a deterministic
procedure to extract the witness from the two transcripts that runs in polynomial
time. A 4-round protocol is special sound if a witness can be extracted from any
two transcripts (τ, α, β, γ) and (τ ′, α′, β′, γ′) such that τ = τ ,α = α′ and β 6= β′.
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For simplicity, we use 3-round special-sound proofs in our protocols though our
proof works also with 4-round proofs.
Special-sound WI proofs for languages in NP can be based on the existence
of non-interactive commitment schemes, which in turn can be based on one-way
permutations[11, 30]. Assuming only one-way functions, 4-round special-sound
WI proofs for all of NP exists.
2.2.5 Zero-Knowledge
An interactive proof is said to be zero-knowledge (ZK) if it yields nothing beyond
the validity of the assertion being proved. This is formalized by requiring that
the view of every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary V ∗ interacting with the
honest prover P can be simulated by a probabilistic polynomial-time machine S
(a.k.a. the simulator). The idea behind this deﬁnition is that whatever V ∗ might
have learned from interacting with P , he could have actually learned by himself (by
running the simulator S). The notion of ZK was introduced by Goldwasser, Micali
and Rackoﬀ [38]. To make ZK robust in the context of protocol composition,
Goldreich and Oren [41] suggested to augment the deﬁnition so that the above
requirement holds also with respect to all z ∈ {0, 1}n, where both V ∗ and S
are allowed to obtain z as auxiliary input. The veriﬁer's view of an interaction
consists of the common input x, followed by its random tape and the sequence of
prover messages the veriﬁer receives during the interaction. The same deﬁnition
generalizes when we consider eﬃcient adversaries to be an arbitrary complexity
class C.
Deﬁnition 8 (Zero-Knowledge w.r.t. C). Let 〈P, V 〉 be an interactive proof system.
We say that 〈P, V 〉 is zero-knowledge w.r.t. C, if for every probabilistic interactive
machine V ∗ running in time q(·) for some q(·) ∈ C, there exists a probabilistic
algorithm Sq that runs in time polynomial in (q(|x|), |x|) such that the following
ensembles are indistinguishable over x ∈ L w.r.t C:
• {viewV ∗ [〈P, V ∗(z)〉(x)]}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
• {S(x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
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A stronger variant of zero-knowledge is one in which the output of the simulator
is statistically close to the veriﬁer's view of real interactions. We focus on argument
systems, in which the soundness property is only guaranteed to hold with respect
to polynomial time provers.
2.2.6 Commitment Schemes
Commitment schemes are the digital equivalent of physical envelopes. They enable
a ﬁrst party, referred to as the sender, to commit itself to a value while keeping it
secret from a second party, the receiver; this property is called hiding. Furthermore,
the commitment is binding, and thus in a later stage when the commitment is
opened, it is guaranteed that the opening can yield only a single value determined
in the committing phase. The opening phase traditionally consists of the sender
simply sending the receiver the value v it committed to, as well as the random
coins r it used. The receiver accepts the opening to v if the messages it received
during the committing phase are produced by running the honest sender algorithm
on input v and the random tape r.
Commitment schemes come in two diﬀerent ﬂavors, perfectly-binding and
perfectly-hiding.
Perfect-binding. In a perfectly-binding commitments, the binding property
holds against unbounded adversaries, while the hiding property only holds against
computationally bounded adversaries. Loosely speaking, the perfectly-binding
property asserts that the transcript of the interaction fully determines the value
committed to by the sender. The computational-hiding property guarantees that
commitments to any two diﬀerent values are computationally indistinguishable;
actually, in most applications (and in particular for the construction of zero-
knowledge proofs) we require that the indistinguishability of commitments holds
even when the distinguisher receives an auxiliary advice string (this is sometimes
called non-uniform computational hiding).
For simplicity, we present a deﬁnition of a commitment scheme for enabling a
sender to commit to a single bit.
Deﬁnition 9 (Perfectly-binding commitment). A perfectly-binding bit commit-
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ment scheme is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machines (S,R)
satisfying the following properties:
• Perfect Binding: For every malicious sender S ′ and auxiliary input z, it
holds that viewR[〈S ′(z), R〉(1n)] is consistent w.r.t at most one input b for
the honest Sender S.
• Computational Hiding: For every probabilistic polynomial-time ITM R′ the
following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over n ∈ N

{
viewR′ [〈S(0), R′(z)〉(1n)]
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗

{
viewR′ [〈S(1), R′(z)〉(1n)]
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
Above, the variable n is a parameter determining the security of the commitment
scheme.
Perfect-hiding. In perfectly-hiding commitments, the hiding property holds
against unbounded adversaries, while the binding property only holds against com-
putationally bounded adversaries. Loosely speaking, the perfectly-hiding property
asserts that commitments to any two diﬀerent values are identically distributed.
The computational-binding property guarantees that no polynomial time adversary
algorithm is able to construct a commitment that can be opened in two diﬀerent
ways; again, for our applications, we actually require that the binding property
holds also when providing the adversary with an advice string (this property is
sometimes called non-uniform computational binding). We omit a formal deﬁnition
of perfectly-hiding commitments and refer the reader to [31].
Statistical Binding/Hiding. We mention that it is often convenient to relax
the perfectly-binding or the perfectly-hiding properties to only statistical bind-
ing or hiding. Loosely speaking, the statistical-binding property asserts that with
overwhelming probability (instead of probability 1) over the coin-tosses of the re-
ceiver, the transcript of the interaction fully determines the committed value. The
statistical-hiding property asserts that commitments to any two diﬀerent values
are statistically close (i.e., have negligible statistical diﬀerence, instead of being
identically distributed).
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Existence of Commitment Schemes. Non-interactive perfectly-binding com-
mitment schemes can be constructed using any 11 one-way function (see Sec-
tion 4.4.1 of [31]). Allowing some minimal interaction (in which the receiver
ﬁrst sends a single message), statistically-binding commitment schemes can be ob-
tained from any one-way function [59, 43]. Perfectly-hiding commitment schemes
can be constructed from any one-way permutation [60]. However, constant-round
schemes are only known to exist under stronger assumptions; speciﬁcally, assuming
the existence of a collection of certiﬁed clawfree permutations [32] (see also [31],
Section 4.8.2.3). Constant-round statistically-hiding commitments can be con-
structed under the potentially weaker assumption of collision-resistant hash func-
tions [23, 42].
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CHAPTER 3
GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE COMPUTATION
In this section, we present a generalization of the UC notion of security introduced
by Canetti [12]. We ﬁrst brieﬂy recall the basic deﬁnition of secure computation in
the UC model [36, 7, 58, 12], and then provide a brief description of the generalized
model. We here focus only on static adversariesi.e., players are corrupted upon
invocation only.
3.1 Traditional UC
Environment. The model of execution includes a special entity called the UC-
environment (or environment) Z. The environment manages the whole execution:
it invokes all the parties at the beginning of the execution, generates all inputs
and reads all outputs, and ﬁnally produces an output for the whole concurrent
execution. Intuitively, the environment models the larger world in which the
concurrent execution takes place (e.g., for a distributed computing task over the
Internet, the environment models all the other activities occurring on the Internet
at the same time).
Adversarial behavior. The model of execution also includes a special entity
called the adversary, that represents adversarial activities that are directly aimed
at the protocol execution under consideration. We consider a static adversary;
that is, whenever a party is invoked, the adversary is notiﬁed by the environment
whether the party is corrupted or not1. When a party is corrupted, it shares all
its tapes with the adversary and follows the instructions from the adversary for all
its future actions.
While honest parties only communicate with the environment through the in-
put/output of the functions they compute, the adversary is also able to exchange
messages with the environment in an arbitrary way through out the computation2.
1In contrast, an adaptive adversary may corrupt a party during its computation, and as a
function of what it sees.
2Through its interaction with the environment, the adversary is also able to inﬂuence the
inputs to honest parties indirectly.
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Furthermore, the adversary controls the scheduling of the delivery of all messages
exchanged between parties (messages sent by the environment is delivered directly).
Technically, this is modelled by letting the adversary read the outgoing message
tapes of all parties and decide whether or not and when (if at all) to deliver the
message to the recipient, therefore the communication is asynchronous and lossy.
However, the adversary cannot insert messages and claim arbitrary sender identity.
In other words, the communication is authenticated.
Protocol execution. The execution of a protocol pi with the environment Z,
adversary A and trusted party G proceeds as follows. The environment is the ﬁrst
entity activated in the execution, who then activates the adversary, and invokes
other honest parties. At the time an honest party is invoked, the environment
assigns it a unique identiﬁer, and inquiries the adversary whether it wants to
corrupt the party or not. To start an execution of the protocol pi, the environment
initiates a protocol execution session, identiﬁed by a session identiﬁer sid, and
activates all the participants in that session. An honest party activated starts
executing the protocol pi thereafter and has access to the trusted party G. We
remark that in the UC model, the environment only initiates one protocol execution
session.
Invoking parties. The environment invokes an honest party by passing input
(invoke, Pi) to it. Pi is the globally unique identity for the party, and is
picked dynamically by the environment at the time it is invoked. Immediately
after that, the environment notiﬁes the adversary of the invocation of Pi by
sending the message (invoke, Pi) to it, who can then choose to corrupt the
party by replying (corrupt, Pi). Note that here as the adversary is static,
parties are corrupted only when they are born (invoked).
Session initiation. To start an execution of protocol pi, the environment selects
a subset U of parties that has been invoked so far. For each party Pi ∈ U , the
environment activates Pi by sending a start-session message (start-session, Pi,
sid, ci,sid, xi,sid) to it, where sid is a session id that identiﬁes this execution.
We remark that in the UC model, the environment starts only one session,
and hence all the parties activated have the same session id.
Honest party execution. An honest party Pi, upon receiving (start-session, Pi,
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sid, ci,sid, xi,sid), starts executing its code ci,sid input xi,sid. During the exe-
cution,
• the environment can read Pi's output tape and at any time may pass
additional inputs to Pi;
• according to its code, Pi can send messages (delivered by the adversary)
to other parties in the session, in the format (Pi, Pj, s, content)
3, where
Pj is the identity of the receiver;
• according to its code, Pi can send input to the trusted party in the
format (Pi, F , s, input).
Adversary execution. After activation, the adversary may perform one of the
following activities at any time during the execution.
• The adversary can read the outgoing communication tapes of all honest
parties and decides to deliver some of the messages.
• A can exchange arbitrary messages with the environment.
• The adversary can read the inputs, outputs, incoming messages of a
corrupted party, and instruct the corrupted party for any action.
Output. The environment outputs a ﬁnal result for the whole execution in the
end.
In the execution of protocol pi with security parameter n ∈ N , environment Z,
adversary A and trusted party G, we deﬁne execGpi,A,Z(n) to be the random variable
describing the output of the environment Z, resulting from the execution of the
above procedure.
Let F be an ideal functionality; we denote by piideal the protocol accessing F ,
called as the ideal protocol. In piideal parties simply interacts with F with their
private inputs, and receives their corresponding outputs from the functionality at
the end of the computation. Then the ideal model execution of the functionality F
is just the execution of the ideal protocol piideal with environment Z, adversary A
′
and trusted party F . The output of the execution is thus execFpiideal,A′,Z(n). On the
3The session id in the messages enables the receiver to correctly de-multiplexing a message
to its corresponding session, even though the receiver may involve in multiple sessions simulta-
neously.
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other hand, the real model execution does not require the aid of any trusted party.
Let pi be a multi-party protocol implementing F . Then, the real model execution
of pi is the execution of pi with security parameter n, environment Z and adversary
A, whose output is the random variable execpi,A,Z(n). Additionally, the G-Hybrid
model execution of a protocol pi is the execution of pi with security parameter n,
environment Z and adversary A and ideal functionality G.
Security as emulation of a real model execution in the ideal model.
Loosely speaking, a protocol securely realizes an ideal functionality if it securely
emulates the ideal protocol piideal. This is formulated by saying that for every
adversary A in the real model, there exists an adversary A′ (a.k.a. simulator) in
the ideal model, such that no environment Z can tell apart if it is interacting with
A and parties running the protocol, or A′ and parties running the ideal protocol
piideal.
Deﬁnition 10. (UC security) Let F and piideal be deﬁned as above, pi be a multi-
party protocol in the G-hybrid model. The protocol pi is said to realize F with UC
security in G-hybrid model, if for every uniform PPT adversary A, there exists a
uniform PPT simulator A′, such that, for every non-uniform PPT environment
Z, the following two ensembles are indistinguishable.{
execGpi,A,Z(n)
}
n∈N ≈
{
execFpiideal,A′,Z(n)
}
n∈N
Multi-session extension of ideal functionalities Note that the UC
model only considers a single session of the protocol execution. (The environment
is only allowed to open one session). To consider multiple concurrent executions,
we focus on the multi-session extension of ideal functionalities [12, 19]. More
speciﬁcally, let Fˆ be the multi-session extension of F . Fˆ runs multiple copies of
F , where each copy will be identiﬁed by a special sub-session identiﬁer. Every k
parties, trying access F together, share a sub-session identiﬁer, ssid. To compute,
each party simply sends its private input together with ssid to Fˆ . Fˆ upon receiv-
ing all the inputs, activates the appropriate copy of F identiﬁed by ssid (running
within Fˆ), and forwards the incoming messages to that copy. (If no such copy of
F exists then a new copy is invoked and is given that ssid.) Outputs generated by
the copies of F are returned to corresponding parties by Fˆ .
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3.2 A Generalized Version of UC
In the UC model, the environment is modeled as a non-uniform PPT machine
and the ideal-model adversary (or simulator) as a (uniform) PPT machines. We
consider a generalized version (in analogy with [63, 71]) where we allow them to
be in arbitrary complexity classes. Note, however, that the adversary is still PPT .
Additionally, we strengthen the deﬁnition by allowing the environment to output
a bit string (instead of a single bit) at the end of an execution. In the traditional
UC deﬁnition, it is w.l.o.g. enough for the environment to output a single bit [12];
in our generalized version this no longer holds and we are thus forced to directly
consider the more stringent version.
We represent a generalized UC model by a 2-tuple (Cenv, Csim), where Cenv and
Csim are respectively the classes of machines the environment and the simulator
of the general model belong to. We consider only classes, Cenv and Csim, that are
closed under probabilistic polynomial time computation.
Deﬁnition 11 ((Cenv, Csim)-UC security). Let F and piideal be, as deﬁned above, and
pi be a multi-party protocol. The protocol pi is said to realize F with (Cenv, Csim)-UC
security, if for every PPT machine A, there exists a machine A′ ∈ Csim, such that,
for every Z ∈ Cenv, the following two ensembles are indistinguishable w.r.t Csim.{
execpi,A,Z(n)
}
n∈N ≈
{
execFpiideal,A′,Z(n)
}
n∈N
Using the above notation, traditional UC is equivalent to (n.u.PPT ,PPT )-UC-
security. We let QPS-UC denote (n.u.PPT ,PQT )-UC-security4 (where PQT de-
notes probabilistic quasi-polynomial time algorithms), and Non-uniform UC denote
(PPT ,n.u.PPT )-UC-security.
3.3 Main Result
By relying on previous results [64, 66, 52, 19, 34] the construction of a UC se-
cure protocol for realizing any multi-party functionality reduces to the task of
4We mentioned that this is stronger than the notion of QPS security of [63, 71, 6] which only
consider indistinguishability w.r.t PPT ; we, in analogy with the notion of strong QPS of [63]
require indistinguishability to hold also w.r.t PQT .
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constructing a zero-knowledge protocol that satisﬁes the following two properties:5
UC simulation: For every adversary A receiving honest proofs of statements x
using witness w, where (x,w) are selected by an environment Z, there
exists a simulator S (which only get the statements x) such that no Z can
distinguish if it is talking to A or S.
Concurrent simulation-soundness: Even an adversary that receives an un-
bounded number of concurrently simulated proofs, of statements selected
by the environment Z, still is not able to prove any false statements.
We propose a framework for constructing protocols to securely realize any func-
tionality in a general model (Cenv, Csim). First, we introduce the notion of a UC-
puzzle. Then, we show how to use any UC-puzzle, stand-alone secure SH-OT
and a SNMWI protocol to construct a zero knowledge protocol 〈P, V 〉 that is
UC-simulatable and concurrently simulation-sound. More precisely, assuming the
existence of stand-alone secure SH-OT protocol, a SNMWI protocol and a UC-
puzzle we provide a general procedure that compiles any functionality F into a pro-
tocol pi that securely realizes a multi-session extension of the ideal-functionality F .
Informally, a UC-puzzle is a protocol between two parties, a sender and a receiver
that cannot be solved by an adversary acting as a receiver in the real model,
but can be solved by a machine while simulating the interactions. For a model
(Cenv, Csim), let cl(Cenv, Csim) denote the complexity class that includes all compu-
tations by PPT oracle Turing machines M with oracle access to Cenv and Csim.
Before, providing a formal deﬁnition of a UC-puzzle, we state our main theorem.
Theorem 3 (Main Theorem). Assume the existence of a tP -round (Cenv, Csim)-
secure UC-puzzle in a G-hybrid model, tWI-round SNMWI protocol secure
w.r.t cl(Csim, Cenv) and tOT -round semi-honest oblivious transfer protocol secure
w.r.t cl(Csim, Cenv). Then, for every well-formed functionality F , there exists a
O(tP + tWI + tOT )-round protocol Π in the G-hybrid model that realizes Fˆ with
(Cenv, Csim)-UC-security.
5Formally, this can be modelled as implementing a particular zero-knowledge proof of mem-
bership functionality.
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3.4 UC-puzzles
Roughly speaking, a UC puzzle is a protocol 〈S,R〉 between two playersa sender
and a receiverand a PPT -computable relation R, such that the following two
properties hold:
Soundness: No eﬃcient receiver R∗ can successfully complete an interaction
with S and also obtain a trapdoor y, such that R(TRANS, y) = 1, where
TRANS is the transcript of the interaction.
Statistical UC-simulation: For every eﬃcient adversary A, participating in
a polynomial number of concurrent executions with receivers R (i.e., A is
acting as a puzzle sender in all these executions) and at the same time com-
municating with an environment Z, there exists a simulator S that is able to
statistically simulate the view of A for Z, while at the same time outputting
trapdoors to all successfully completed puzzles.
Formally, let n ∈ N be a security parameter and 〈S,R〉 be a protocol between
two parties, the sender S and the receiver R. We consider a concurrent puzzle exe-
cution for an adversary A. In a concurrent puzzle execution, A exchanges messages
with a puzzle-environment Z ∈ Cenv and participates as a sender concurrently in
m = poly(n) puzzles with honest receivers R1, . . . , Rm. At the onset of a concur-
rent execution, Z outputs a session-identiﬁer sid that all receivers in the concurrent
puzzle execution receive as input. Thereafter, the puzzle-environment is allowed
to exchange messages only with the adversary A. We compare a real and an ideal
execution.
Real execution. In the real execution, the adversary A on input 1n, interacts
with a puzzle-environment Z ∈ Cenv and participates as a sender in m interactions
using 〈S,R〉 with honest receivers that receive input sid (decided by Z). The
adversary A is allowed to exchange arbitrary messages with environment Z when
participating in puzzle interactions with the receivers as a sender. We assume
without loss of generality that, after every puzzle-interaction, A honestly sends
TRANS to Z, where TRANS is the puzzle-transcript. Finally, Z outputs a string in
{0, 1}∗. We denote this by realA,Z(n).
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Ideal execution. Consider A′ ∈ Csim in the ideal-model that has a special
output-tape (not accessible by Z). In the ideal execution, A′ on input 1n interacts
with puzzle-environment Z. We denote the output of Z at the end of the execution
by idealA′,Z(n).
Deﬁnition 12 (UC-Puzzle). A pair (〈S,R〉,R) is a (Cenv, Csim)-secure UC-puzzle
for a polynomial time computable relation R and model (Cenv, Csim), if the following
conditions hold.
• Soundness: For every malicious PPT receiver A, there exists a negligible
function ν(·) such that the probability that A, after an execution with R on
common input 1n, outputs y such that y ∈ R(TRANS) where TRANS is the
transcript of the messages exchanged in the interaction, is at most ν(n).
• Statistical Simulatability: For every adversary A ∈ Cadv participating
in a concurrent puzzle execution, there is a simulator A′ ∈ Csim such that
for all puzzle-environments Z ∈ Cenv, the ensembles {realA,Z(n)}n∈N and
{idealA′,Z(n)}n∈N are statistically close over n ∈ N and whenever A′ sends
a message of the form TRANS to Z, it outputs y in its special output tape
such that y ∈ R(TRANS).
In other words, we require that no adversarial receiver can complete a puzzle
with a trapdoor, but there exists a simulator (which does not rewind the environ-
ment it runs in) that can generate statistically indistinguishable puzzle transcripts
joint with trapdoors. We highlight that the puzzle protocol 〈S,R〉 may make use
of trusted set-up.
As we show, UC-puzzles in a trusted set-up model T are suﬃcient for achiev-
ing UC secure computation with set-up T . This result also holds in generalized
versions of the UC framework (which allow us to consider QPS and non-uniform
UC security).
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CHAPTER 4
STRONG NON-MALLEABLE WITNESS INDISTINGUISHABLE
PROOFS
4.1 Deﬁnition
We start by deﬁning the notion of strong non-malleable witness-indistinguishability
(SNMWI) only for languages with unique witnesses; we next extend it to general
NP-languages. Let RL be the canonical witness relation for some language L with
unique witnesses. Consider a, so-called, tag-based argument system for Li.e., the
prover and the veriﬁer receive a tag as an additional common input, besides the
statement x. SNMWI considers a man-in-the-middle execution of the protocol
〈Ps, Vs〉, in which the adversary A simultaneously participates in two interactions of
〈Ps, Vs〉, one left and one right interaction. In the left interaction, the adversary A,
on auxiliary input z, receives a proof of statement x from Ps on private input y such
that y ∈ RL(x), using a ﬁxed tag id. In the right interaction, A adaptively chooses
a statement x˜ and tag i˜d and attempts to provide a proof to Vs. Let y˜ denote the
witness associated with x˜, unless either of the following happens (a) A fails in the
right interaction or (b) id = i˜d; in this case y˜ is set to ⊥. Let mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, id)
denote the random variable that describes the witness y˜ combined with the view
of A in the above man-in-the-middle experiment.
Deﬁnition 13 (Strongly Non-Malleable WI). We say that 〈Ps, Vs〉 is strongly
non-malleable witness-indistinguishable for RL if for every non-uniform PPT
man-in-the-middle adversary A, every id ∈ {0, 1}∗ and every two se-
quences of input distributions {D1n}n∈N and {D2n}n∈N , the following holds: if
{(x, y, z)← D1n : (x, z)}n∈N and
{(x, y, z)← D2n : (x, z)}n∈N are computationally indistinguishable, so are the fol-
lowing ensembles:{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, id)
}
n∈N,id∈{0,1}∗{
(x, y, z)← D2n : mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, id)
}
n∈N,id∈{0,1}∗
When considering a general language, mim is not well deﬁned, as y˜ is not
uniquely determined. In this case, whenever A chooses a statement x˜ that does
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not have a unique witness, simply let y˜ output ⊥. Furthermore, we only require
that the above condition holds for well-behaved adversaries A, where A is said to
be well-behaved, if, except with negligible probability A only chooses statements
x˜ with unique witnesses.
We remark that our notion of SNMWI is similar in spirit to the notion of non-
malleable witness indistinguishability (NMWI) recently introduced by Ostrovsky,
Persiano, and Visconti [61]. Both notions consider a ﬂavor of non-malleability for
WI argument systems and (informally) require that the witness in the right inter-
action is independent of that of the left interaction. The main diﬀerence between
the notions is that whereas the notion ofNMWI only requires this to holds when
varying the witness used in the left interaction, but keeping the statement ﬁxed,
we also require indistinguishability whenever the statements in the left interac-
tions are indistinguishable (just as the notion of strong witness indistinguishability
[31]). As such, our notion is interestingin fact, the most interestingalso when
considering statements with unique witnesses, whereas NMWI vacuously holds.
In essence, the notion of NMWI extends the notion of plain WI to the man-in-
the-middle setting, whereas SNMWI extends strong WI.
Constructing SNMWI Argument of Knowledge. We provide two con-
structions of SNMWI protocols.
• For the ﬁrst construction, we show that SNMWI is a relaxation of
the notion of simulation-extractability [25, 67]. The notion of simulation-
extractability, roughly speaking, requires the existence of an eﬃcient machine
SIMEXT , called a simulator extractor, that can statistically simulate the
view of a man-in-the-middle adversary A (that participates in two interac-
tions, a left one as a veriﬁer and a right one as a prover) while at the same
time extracting all the witnesses used by A.
It can be seen that this notion directly implies SNMWI. In fact, in the case
of languages with unique witnesses, a simulator-extractor can, given only the
statement on the left, reconstruct both the view and the witness used by the
adversary on the right (note that we here rely on the fact that simulation
is statistically secure, or argue that the witness is correctly distributed). As
such, we directly get that the O(1)-round construction of [67] is a SNMWI
argument of knowledge; this construction relies on collision-resistant hash-
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functions.
Then, relying on a constant-round construction of a simulation-extractable
protocol based on collision-resistant hash function in [66] we obtain a O(1)-
round SNMWI protocol. We provide this construction merely to show
the relationship of SNMWI to simulation-extractability. In our actual
construction, we will rely on the SNMWI argument constructed from a
non-malleable commitment.
• To minimize assumptions, we provide a new construction of SNMWI
arguments of knowledge based on O(1)-robust non-malleable commitment
schemes. Then by relying on the construction of such non-malleable com-
mitment scheme from [50, 40], we get the existence O(1)-round SNMWI
argument of knowledge from any one-way function.
4.2 SNMWI from Simulation-Extractability
The notion of simulation extractability was introduced in the work of Dolev, Dwork
and Naor [25]; we here rely on a formalization due to Pass and Rosen [66]: Intu-
itively, a protocol is said to be simulation extractable if for any man-in-the-middle
adversary A, there exists a simulator-extractor that can statistically simulate the
views of both the left and the right interactions for A, while outputting a witness for
the statement proved by A in the right interaction. We denote by viewA(x, y, z, id)
the view of A in a real man-in-the-middle execution with inputs x, y, z and iden-
tity id in the left interaction. Let S(x, z, id) be the output of the simulator, which
consists of the simulated view of A and the witness it uses; we denote the former
by S1(x, z, id) and the latter by S2(x, z, id).
As shown in [67], Simulation-extractability is suﬃcient for an interactive-proof
to be non-malleable ZK. Below, we show that any protocol that it is also suﬃcient
for SNMWI.
First, we recall the deﬁnition of simulation-extractability from [66]. Given
a function t = t(n) we use the notation {·}n,x,y,z,id as shorthand for
{·}n∈N,x∈L,y∈RL∩{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗,id∈{0,1}t(n) .
Deﬁnition 14 (Simulation-extractable protocol). A family {〈Pid, Vid〉}n∈N,id∈{0,1}∗
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of interactive proofs is said to be simulation extractable with tags of length t= t(n)
if for any man-in-the-middle adversary A, there exists a probabilistic expected poly-
time machine S such that:
1. The probability ensembles {S1(x, z, id)}n,x,y,z,id and {viewA(x, y, z, id)}n,x,y,z,id
are statistically close.
2. Let n ∈ N , x ∈ L∩{0, 1}n, z ∈ {0, 1}∗, id ∈ {0, 1}t(n) and let (view, w) denote
the output of S(x, z, id) (on input some random tape). Let x˜ be the right-
execution statement appearing in view and let i˜d denote the right-execution
identity. Then, if the right-execution in view is accepting AND id 6= i˜d, then
RL(x˜, w) = 1.
We now proceed to show that all simulation-extractable protocols satisfy
SNMWI.
Lemma 1. Let {〈Pid, Vid〉}n∈N,id∈{0,1}t(n) be a simulation-extractable protocol. Then,
{〈Pid, Vid〉}n∈N,id∈{0,1}t(n) is SNMWI.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that {〈Pid, Vid〉}n∈N,id∈{0,1}t(n) is not SNMWI.
Then, there exists a well-behaved adversary A, a distinguisher D, two sequences
of identiﬁes {idn}n∈N and {id′}n∈N , two sequences of distributions D1n and
D2n such that {(x, y, z)← D1n : (x, z)}n∈N and {(x, y, z)← D2n : (x, z)}n∈N are
computationally-indistinguishable and a polynomial p(·) such that for inﬁnitely
many n,∣∣∣Pr [{(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1}]−
Pr
[{
(x, y, z)← D2n : D
(
mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, id
′
n)
)
= 1
}] ∣∣∣ ≥ 1
p(n)
Using the adversary A and the distinguisherD, we construct a distinguisherD′ that
distinguishes {(x, y, z)← D1n : (x, z)} from {(x, y, z)← D2n : (x, z)} and thus ar-
rive at a contradiction.
Since {〈Pid, Vid〉}n∈N,id∈{0,1}t(n) is simulation-extractable, there exists a simulator
S such that the view in mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, id) and S1(x, z, id) are statistically close.
Further, the witness output by the simulator, i.e. S2(x, z, id) is identical to the
witness in mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, id) since the adversary is well-behaved and hence, the
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statement has an unique witness. Thus mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, id) and S(x, z, id) are
statistically-close. This means that there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that∣∣∣Pr [{(view, w)← mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn) : D(view, w) = 1}]
− Pr [{(view, w)← S(x, z, id′n) : D(view, w) = 1}]
∣∣∣ ≤ ν(n)
The distinguisher D′ proceeds as follows. On input (x, z) internally incorpo-
rates S with inputs (x, z, idn). Upon receiving the output (view, w) from S, D′
internally incorporates D with input (view, w) and outputs what D outputs. It fol-
lows from construction that the experiments {(view, w)← S(x, z, id) : D(view, w)}
and {D′(x, z)} are identical. Therefore, for i ∈ {1, 2} we have that∣∣∣Pr [{(x, y, z)← Din : (view, w)← mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn) : D(view, w) = 1}]
− Pr [{(x, y, z)← Din : D′(x, z) = 1}] ∣∣∣ ≤ ν(n)
Thus, ∣∣∣Pr [{(x, y, z)← D1n : D′(x, z) = 1}]
− Pr [{(x, y, z)← D2n : D′(x, z) = 1}] ∣∣∣ ≥ 1p(n) − 2ν(n)
and we arrive at a contradiction since by hypothesis {(x, y, z)← D1n : x, z}n∈N
and {(x, y, z)← D2n : x, z}n∈N are computationally-indistinguishable.
As the protocol of [67] is both simulation-extractable and an argument of knowl-
edge, we conclude that the existence of collision-resistant hash functions implies
O(1)-round SNMWI argument of knowledge.
4.3 SNMWI from any Non-Malleable Commitment
In this section we provide a construction of SNMWI argument of knowledge
systems based on any O(1)-robust non-malleable commitment scheme (See the
deﬁnition below). Then by relying on the construction of non-malleable commit-
ments from [50, 40], we get the existence O(1)-round SNMWI from any one-way
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function. (If we had relied on the original construction of [25] (see also [51]) we
would instead have obtained a log n-round construction.) Below we ﬁrst provide
the formal deﬁnition of non-malleable commitments and then proceed to the con-
struction of SNMWI arguments of knowledge.
4.3.1 Non-malleable commitment schemes
Let 〈C,R〉 be a tag-based commitment scheme, and let n ∈ N be a security
parameter. Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in one
left and one right interaction simultaneously. In the left interaction the man-in-
the-middle adversary A interacts with C receiving a commitment to values v, using
identity id of its choice. In the right interaction A interacts with R attempting
to commit to a related value v˜, again using identities of its choice i˜d. If the
right commitment is invalid, or undeﬁned, its value v˜ is set to ⊥; so is it, when
the adversary picks the same identity left and right, that is i˜d = id  i.e., a
commitment where the adversary uses the same identity as the honest committer
is considered invalid. Let mimA〈C,R〉(v, z) denote a random variable that describes
the values v˜ and the view of A, in the above experiment.
Deﬁnition 15 ([25, 67, 51]). A commitment scheme 〈C,R〉 is said to be non-
malleable (with respect to itself) if for every probabilistic polynomial-time man-in-
the-middle adversary A, the following ensembles are computationally indistinguish-
able:
{
mimA〈C,R〉(v1, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗{
mimA〈C,R〉(v2, z)
}
n∈N,v1,v2∈{0,1}n,z∈{0,1}∗
Non-Malleability w.r.t. Arbitrary k-round Protocols. Consider a
man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in one left interaction, communi-
cating with a machine B, and one right interaction, acting as a committer using
the commitment scheme 〈C,R〉. As in the standard deﬁnition of non-malleability,
A can adaptively choose the identity in the right interaction. We denote by
mimB,A〈C,R〉(y, z) the random variable consisting of the view of A(z) and the value
it commits on the right in a man-in-the-middle execution when communicating
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with B(y) on the left and honest receivers on the right. Intuitively, we say that
〈C,R〉 is non-malleable w.r.t B if mimB,A〈C,R〉(y1, z) and mimB,A〈C,R〉(y2, z) are indistin-
guishable whenever interactions with B(y1) and B(y2) cannot be distinguished.
More formally, let viewA[〈B(y), A(z)〉] denote the view of A(z) in an interaction
with B(y).
Deﬁnition 16. Let 〈C,R〉 be a commitment scheme, and B an interactive Turing
machine. We say the commitment scheme 〈C,R〉 is non-malleable w.r.t. B, if for
every probabilistic polynomial-time man-in-the-middle adversary A, and every two
sequences {y1n}n∈N and {y2n}n∈N , such that{
viewA[〈B(y1n), A(z)〉]
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈
{
viewA[〈B(y2n), A(z)〉]
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
it holds that:{
mimB,A〈D,E〉,〈C,R〉(y
1
n, z)
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
mimB,A〈D,E〉,〈C,R〉(y
2
n, z)
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
We say that 〈C,R〉 is non-malleable w.r.t arbitrary k-round protocols if 〈C,R〉
is non-malleable w.r.t any machine B that interacts with the man-in-the-middle
adversary in k rounds, also called as a k-robust commitment scheme. Such commit-
ment schemes are easy to construct: any commitment scheme that is extractable
and has more than k rewinding slots is directly non-malleable w.r.t. arbitrary
k-round protocols.
We focus on non-malleability w.r.t 5-round protocols. As all known non-
malleable commitment scheme either directly satisfy this property (for instance,
the non-malleable commitment schemes of [25, 51] have many rewinding slots) or
can be easily modiﬁed to do so1, we call such protocols robust.
4.3.2 SNMWI Argument of Knowledge Protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉
Let 〈C,R〉 be a 4-robust non-malleable commitment, and 〈Pˆ , Vˆ 〉 be a 4-round
zero-knowledge argument of knowledge system [30, 9]. The SNMWI argument
of knowledge 〈Ps, Vs〉 for NP language L, proceeds in the following two phases, on
1All non-malleable commitment scheme contain a proof of knowledge protocol as a sub proto-
col; non-malleability w.r.t k-round protocols is easily achieved by repeating this proof of knowl-
edge protocol for k times. See [49] for more details.
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common inputs the security parameter n, statement x, and identity id, and private
input w, (x,w) ∈ RL, to the prover.
1. In the Committing Phase, the prover provides (sequentially) two commit-
ments to the witness w using 〈C,R〉.
2. In the Proving Phase, the prover proves to the veriﬁer that it has committed
to the valid witness w in the committing phase, using 〈Pˆ , Vˆ 〉.
A formal description of the protocol appears in ﬁgure 4.1.
Protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉
Common Input: Statement x ∈ L, security parameter n and identity id.
Private Input for Prover: The witness w of statement x, (w, x) ∈ RL.
Committing Phase:
Ps uniformly chooses σ1 and σ2 from {0, 1}poly(n).
Ps → Vs: 〈C,R〉 commitment to w using randomness σ1. Let T1 be
the transcript of messages generated.
Ps → Vs: 〈C,R〉 commitment to w using randomness σ2. Let T2 be
the transcript of messages generated.
Proving Phase:
Ps ↔ Vs: a 〈Pˆ , Vˆ 〉 proof of the statement:
there exist values w, σ1 and σ2 s.t w ∈ RL(x), and T1 and T2
are two valid commitments to w using randomness σ1 and
σ2 respectively.
Figure 4.1: Strongly Non-Malleable WI Argument of Knowledge for NP
It follows directly from the argument-of-knowledge property of 〈Pˆ , Vˆ 〉 that
〈Ps, Vs〉 is an argument of knowledge. We therefore focus on the SNMWI prop-
erty of 〈Ps, Vs〉.
Lemma 2. For every uniform PPT man-in-the-middle adversary A, and ev-
ery two sequences of input distributions {D1n}n∈N and {D2n}n∈N , it holds that if
{(x, y, z)← D1n : (x, z)}n∈N and {(x, y, z)← D2n : (x, z)}n∈N are computation-
ally indistinguishable, so are the following ensembles:{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N{
(x, y, z)← D2n : mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N
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Proof. Below ﬁx an arbitrary adversary A and two sequences of input dis-
tributions {D1n}n∈N and {D2n}n∈N , such that {(x, y, z)← D1n : (x, z)}n∈N and
{(x, y, z)← D2n : (x, z)}n∈N are indistinguishable. The goal is to show that in
a man-in-the-middle execution of 〈Ps, Vs〉, the view of A combined with the unique
witness of the right interaction are indistinguishable, when the input distribution
changes from D1n to D
2
n. Notice that when the right interaction succeeds, it follows
from the soundness of the ZK proof that, except from negligible probability, A
commits to the same value in the two commitments (of the Committing Phase)
and the value is the valid witness of the right interaction. (In the negligible proba-
bility event that the right interaction succeeds but A commits to diﬀerent values in
the two commitments, the committed value is set to ⊥. Moreover, if the right in-
teraction fails or has the same identity as the left interaction, the committed value
is set to ⊥ as well). Therefore, the combined view and value committed to by A in
the two commitments are statistically close to the combined view and the valid wit-
ness on the right; we denote the former random variable by mim〈Ps, Vs〉A(x, y, z).
It thus suﬃces to show the indistinguishability of the following ensembles:{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N{
(x, y, z)← D2n : mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N
Towards this, consider the following two scenarios:
NMCom
NMCom
NMCom
NMCom
ZK
ZK
Ps A Vs
NMCom
NMCom
NMCom
NMCom
ZK
ZK
Ps A Vs
(i) Case 1 (ii) Case 2
Figure 4.2: The two cases in a man-in-the-middle execution of 〈Ps, Vs〉 with adver-
sary A.
Case 1: Consider the case that A completes the ﬁrst commitment before the ZK
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proof on the left starts, as shown in ﬁgure 4.2 (i). In this case, the value com-
mitted to by A in the ﬁrst commitment is independent of the ZK proof in the
left interaction. It essentially follows from the non-malleability of 〈C,R〉 and
the (standard stand-alone) simulatability of the ZK proof that, the combined
view V and value v˜ A commits to in the ﬁrst commitment would remain es-
sentially the same, even if A had received two commitments to an arbitrary
value, say 0n, in the left interaction, instead of commitments to the true
witness y. Suppose that this is the case (that A does receive commitments
to 0n in the left interaction). Then the only diﬀerence between the execu-
tions with input distributions D1n and D
2
n lies in the common input x and
the auxiliary input z of the left interaction. It now follows from the robust-
ness of 〈C,R〉 and the indistinguishability of {(x, y, z)← D1n : (x, z)}n∈N
and {(x, y, z)← D2n : (x, z)}n∈N that, the view and the committed value,
V and v˜, are indistinguishable when the input distribution changes from D1n
to D2n. Therefore, conditioned on Case 1 occurring in the execution, the
view and value A commits to in the ﬁrst commitment are indistinguishable,
when changing from using distribution D1n to D
2
n. Formally, in a man-in-the-
middle execution, we denote by mim1A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z), the view and the value
A(z) commits to in the ﬁrst commitment if Case 1 occurs in the execution,
and ⊥, otherwise. Below, we show the following claim:
Claim 1. The following ensembles are indistinguishable:{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mim1A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N{
(x, y, z)← D2n : mim1A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N
Case 2: Consider the case that the ﬁrst commitment on the right coincides with
the ZK proof on the left, as shown in ﬁgure 4.2 (ii). In this case, the second
commitment on the right comes after both commitments on the left, which
means that there are at most 4 rounds remaining in the left interaction (since
by deﬁnition the ZK proof has 4 rounds). By relying on the non-malleability
with respect to 5-round protocols of 〈C,R〉, it follows that the view and
the value committed to by A in the second commitment, conditioned on
Case 2 occurring, are indistinguishable, when the input distribution changes
from D1n or D
2
n. Similar to the previous case, we deﬁne the random variable
mim2A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z) to describe the view and the value committed to by A in
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the second commitment, if Case 2 occurs, and ⊥ otherwise. Below, we show
the following claim:
Claim 2. The following ensembles are indistinguishable:{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mim2A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N{
(x, y, z)← D2n : mim2A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N
Before we proceed to provide the formal proofs of Claim 1 and 2. We ﬁrst show
that the lemma follows from the two claims. More precisely, for an arbitrary distin-
guisher D, there exists a negligible function ε, such that, for all n, the probability
P(n) that D distinguishes the view and the value A commits to in an execution
with distribution D1n or D
2
n is smaller than ε(n), i.e.
P(n) =
∣∣∣Pr [(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)) = 1]
− Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D2n : D(mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)) = 1
] ∣∣∣ < ε(n)
Let αb(n) (and βb(n) resp.) denote the probability that Case 1 (and Case 2 resp.)
occurs in a man-in-the-middle execution with input distribution Dbn. Since in any
execution, either Case 1 or Case 2 occurs, it holds that
Pr
[
(x, y, z)← Dbn : D(mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)) = 1
]
=
αb(n) Pr
[
(x, y, z)← Dbn : D(mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)) = 1 | Case 1
]
+ βb(n) Pr
[
(x, y, z)← Dbn : D(mimA〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z) = 1) | Case 2
]
For convenience, use Abn and B
b
n as the shorthands for the two terms on the right
hand side above. Then,
P(n) = ∣∣(A1n +B1n)− (A2n +B2n)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣A1n − A2n∣∣+ ∣∣B1n −B2n∣∣
We show below that Claim 1 implies that there exists a negligible function ε1, such
that A1n and A
2
n diﬀer by at most ε
1(n). Similarly, by Claim 2 there is another
negligible function ε2, such that, |B1n −B2n| < ε2(n). Thus P(n) is bounded by
(ε1(n) + ε2(n)), a negligible amount, as desired.
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Assume for contradiction that there exists a polynomial p, such that |A1n − A2n|
is at least 1
p(n)
. Then using D we can construct another distinguisher D′ such that∣∣∣Pr [(x, y, z)← D1n : D′(mim1A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)) = 1]
− Pr [(x, y, z)← D2n : D′(mim1A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)) = 1] ∣∣∣ ≥ 1p(n)
More precisely, D′, on receiving a view V and the value v committed to by A
in the ﬁrst commitment, simply outputs 0, if both of them are ⊥ (which means
Case 1 does not occur); otherwise, it feeds V and v to D, and outputs whatever
D outputs. In other words, D′ outputs 1 if and only if Case 1 occurs in the
execution and D outputs 1 on V and v; this happens with probability almost Abn
(since when the right interaction succeeds in V , except from negligible probability,
the committed value v in the ﬁrst commitment is just the value A commits to in
both commitments). Then by our hypothesis, D′ violates Claim 1. Using exactly
the same argument, we can show that the diﬀerence between B1n and B
2
n is also
negligible. This completes the proof.
Next we turn to prove Claim 1 and 2 formally.
Proof of Claim 1. Towards this, we consider a sequence of hybrid experiments H0,
H1, H2 and H3, each of which is a (simulated) man-in-the-middle execution of
〈Ps, Vs〉 with the adversary A. We denote by hybin(A) the random variable describ-
ing the (simulated) view of A and the value that A commits in the ﬁrst commitment
in Hi. (The committed value is set to ⊥ if A fails to complete the right interaction
in Hi or it uses the same identity in the left and right interactions.) Since we only
focus on Case 1 in this proof, if in a hybrid experiment, Case 1 does not occur, the
execution is cut oﬀ and the correspondingly hybin(A) is set to ⊥. Below, we describe
how each hybrid experiment proceeds when Case 1 does occur, and we show that,
in successive hybrids,
{
hybin(A)
}
n∈N and
{
hybi+1n (A)
}
n∈N are indistinguishable.
Hybrid H0 is simply an honest man-in-the-middle execution of 〈Ps, Vs〉 with A,
using inputs (x, y, z) sampled randomly from D1n. Since the execution is cut
oﬀ and hyb0n set to ⊥, if Case 1 does not occur, it holds that:{
hyb0n(A)
}
n∈N =
{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mim1A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
n∈N
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Hybrid H1 proceeds identically as H0 until the ZK proof on the left is about to
start; let T be the transcript of the two commitments on the left, and ρ
the partial joint view of A and the right receiver generated so far. If Case
1 occurs in ρ, instead of completing the rest of the execution honestly as in
H0, H1 simulates the execution by simulating the ZK proof on the left. More
precisely, consider a veriﬁer V ∗ for the ZK proof, which, on auxiliary input ρ,
internally emulates the right interaction with A and Vs, by feeding them with
their partial views from ρ, and forwarding messages in the external proof to
A. By the ZK property, there exists a simulator S such that, S on inputs
(x′, z′) outputs a view indistinguishable to the view of V ∗(z′) participating in
a ZK proof of the statement x′. By the construction of V ∗, the view output
by S contains the view VA of A and the view VVs of Vs. Hence H1 simply
invokes S on inputs ((x, T ), ρ), and sets hyb1n(A) to VA (outputted by S) and
the value A commits to in the ﬁrst commitment in ρ. We claim that the
following holds for H0 and H1.{
hyb0n(A)
}
n∈N ≈
{
hyb1n(A)
}
n∈N
Observe that H0 and H1 proceed identically before the ZK proof on the left
starts; let ρ be any arbitrary partial joint view of A and the right veriﬁer (in
H0 and H1) before the left ZK proof starts. Conditioned on ρ occuring, if
it is a Case 2 scenario, hyb0n(A) = hyb
1
n(A) = ⊥; otherwise, it follows from
the simulatability of the ZK proof that the simulated view VA in hyb1n(A)
is indistinguishable from the perfect view in hyb0n(A). Furthermore, in Case
1, the actual value v committed to in the ﬁrst commitment is decided in ρ
(since the ﬁrst commitment completes in ρ); but it may be replaced with ⊥ if
the right intection fails after ρ. However, by the indistinguishability between
the views in hyb0n(A) and hyb
1
n(A), the probabilities that v is replaced with ⊥
in H0 and H1 diﬀer by at most a negligible amount. Therefore we conclude
the claim.
Hybrid H2 proceeds identically to H1, with the exception that in the left inter-
action, the value committed to in the ﬁrst commitment is 0n instead of the
valid witness y. We deﬁne hyb2n similar to hyb
1
n. When Case 1 occurs, hyb
2
n
is set to the simulated view of A and the value committed to in the ﬁrst
commitment on the right. It then follows from the non-malleability of 〈C,R〉
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that {
hyb1n(A)
}
n∈N ≈
{
hyb2n(A)
}
n∈N
Hybrid H3 This experiment proceeds identically to H2, except that in the left
interaction, the second commitment is also set to 0n. (hyb3n is deﬁned similar
to hyb2n.) Using exactly the same argument as for hybrids H1 and H2, it
follows that {
hyb2n(A)
}
n∈N ≈
{
hyb3n(A)
}
n∈N
The above hybrid experiments were considered for the case when the input
distribution for the left interaction was D1n. We can deﬁne similarly, hybrid exper-
iments H0 to H3 for input distribution D
2
n and denote hyb
i
n(A) the corresponding
random variables. Observe that, the only diﬀerence between hybrid H3 and H3 is
that the common input x and auxiliary input z are sampled from D2n and D
1
n re-
spectively. (Note that we ignore the private input y to the left prover as in both the
experiments H3 and H3, the left interaction is simulated without using y.) It then
follows from the the indistinguishability between {(x, y, z)← D1n : (x, z)}n∈N and
{(x, y, z)← D2n : (x, z)}n∈N , and the non-malleability w.r.t. arbitrary 5-round
protocols of 〈C,R〉 (note that here we consider a non-interactive protocol that
simply samples from the two distributions mentioned above), that{
hyb3n(A)
}
n∈N ≈
{
hyb
3
n(A)
}
n∈N
This completes the proof of the claim.
Proof of Claim 2. Assume for contradiction that there exists a distinguisherD and
a polynomial p, such that for inﬁnitely many n, it holds that∣∣∣Pr [(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mim2A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)) = 1]
− Pr [(x, y, z)← D2n : D(mim2A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)) = 1] ∣∣∣ ≥ 1p(n)
Fix one such n. Given A, we construct an adversary A˜, a machine B, and a
distinguisher D˜, such that, B, on input 1n or 2n, interacts with A˜ in 5 rounds, and
D˜ distinguishes the view and committed value (using 〈C,R〉) by A˜ in interaction
with B on diﬀerent inputs, with probability 1
p(n)
.
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The machine B(bn), in essence, simply interacts as the prover of the ZK proof
of the protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉. More precisely, B(bn), ﬁrst prepares a random statement s
for the ZK proof, i.e. it honestly emulates a man-in-the-middle execution of 〈Ps, Vs〉
with A using inputs (x, y, z)← Dbn, until the ZK proof on the left starts. Let T be
the transcript of the two commitments in the left interaction, and ρ the partial joint
view of A(z) and the right veriﬁer generated so far. B(bn), then sets the statement
s to (x, T ) and sends the statement s together with z and ρ to A˜, followed by
a ZK proof of the statement that T is a transcript of two commitments to the
valid witness of x using 〈C,R〉. The adversary A˜, on the other hand, externally
interacts with B(bn), and, on receiving s, z and ρ from B(bn) in the ﬁrst round,
starts emulating honestly a man-in-the-middle execution of 〈Ps, Vs〉 from ρ. More
speciﬁcally, it ﬁrst feeds A(z) and the right veriﬁer their partial views from ρ.
To emulate the left interaction, it externally forwards messages in the ZK proof
to B(bn). For the right interaction, it emulates the right receiver honestly for A,
except that, if the second commitment starts outside ρ (i.e. Case 2 occurs), it
forwards the commitment externally.
The distinguisher D˜, on input the view V and the values v˜ committed to by A˜,
ﬁrst reconstructs the view VA and the value v˜′ committed to in the second commit-
ment by A(z) in emulation by A˜, i.e. D˜ extracts VA from V ; if Case 2 occurs in VA,
it sets v˜′ to v˜ if the right interaction succeeds in VA and ⊥ otherwise; if Case 2 does
not occur, it sets both VA and v˜′ to ⊥. D˜ then executes the distinguisher D on the
reconstructed view and committed value, VA and v˜′, and outputs what D outputs.
From the construction of A˜ it follows that the emulation of the man-in-the-middle
execution with A is identical to an actual execution with A. Therefore, VA and v˜′
are identically distributed to
{
(x, y, z)← Dbn : mim2A〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z)
}
when A˜ in-
teracts externally with B(bn). Hence, D˜ distinguishes the view and the values
committed to by A˜ with probability 1
p(n)
, when interacting with B(1n) or B(2n).
Given that the view and the value committed to by A˜ after the interactions
with B on input 1n or 2n are distinguishable (by D), by the non-malleability w.r.t.
arbitrary 5-round protocols of 〈C,R〉, it follows that even only the views of A˜ in
interactions with B on input 1n or 2n are distinguishable. (Here we rely on the fact
that the ZK proof in the protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉 has only 4 rounds, and thus B interacts
with A˜ in 5 rounds. Note that the choice of statement by B only adds one round.)
However, we show in the subclaim below that the view of A˜ in interaction with
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B(1n) or B(2n) are indistinguishable, which gives a contradiction, and concludes
the claim.
Subclaim 1. {
viewA˜[〈B(1n), A˜〉]
}
n∈N
≈
{
viewA˜[〈B(2n), A˜〉]
}
n∈N
This subclaim follows from the fact that the whole protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉 is zero-
knowledge (this follows using standard techniques), and hence strongly WI (see
[31]).
4.4 Robust SNMWI Arguments
In our actual constructions, we require a slightly stronger non-malleability re-
quirement from the SNMWI proofs. We here consider the notion of robust
non-malleability analogous to [49] with respect to arbitrary k-round protocols.
SNMWI considers a man-in-the-middle execution of the protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉, in
which the adversary A simultaneously participates in two interactions of 〈Ps, Vs〉,
one left and one right interaction. A k-robust SNMWI proof additionally con-
siders man-in-the-middle adversaries that interacts with a machine B on the left
in k-rounds and one interaction of 〈Ps, Vs〉 on the right. More precisely, in the
left interaction, the adversary A, on auxiliary input z, interacts with machine B
on input v in at most k-rounds. In the right interaction, A adaptively chooses a
statement x˜ and tag i˜d and attempts to provide a proof to Vs. Let y˜ denote the
witness associated with x˜, unless A fails in the right interaction ; in this case y˜ is
set to ⊥. Let mimA,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v) denote the random variable that describes the witness
y˜ combined with the view of A in the above man-in-the-middle experiment.
Deﬁnition 17 (Strongly Non-Malleable WI w.r.t. B). Let 〈Ps, Vs〉 be a tag-based
argument system for RL and B a PPT ITM. We say that 〈Ps, Vs〉 is strongly non-
malleable witness-indistinguishable w.r.t. B, If for every two sequences of inputs
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{v1n}n∈N and {v2n}n∈N , such that, for all PPT machines A˜, it holds that{
viewA˜[〈B(v1n), A˜(z)〉]
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
viewA˜[〈B(v2n), A˜(z)〉]
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
then it also holds that, for every non-uniform PPT man-in-the-middle adversary
A, {
mimA,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v
1
n, z)
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
mimA,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v
2
n, z)
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
We say that 〈Ps, Vs〉 is k-robust strongly non-malleable witness-indistinguishable
if 〈Ps, Vs〉 is strongly non-malleable witness indistinguishable w.r.t. every PPT
machine B that sends at most k messages in its interaction with the adversary.
Now, we proceed to show how to construct a k-robust SNMWI argument.
In fact, we will show that the protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉 constructed in the previous section
from non-malleable commitments is k-robust if the non-malleable commitment
scheme used in the protocol is k-robust.
Lemma 3. Let k > 4 and 〈C,R〉 be a k-robust non-malleable commitment scheme.
Then the protocol 〈Ps, Vs〉 described in Figure 4.1 is a k-robust SNMWI argument
of knowledge for RL.
Proof: Assume for contradiction, there exists an adversary A˜, machine B, input
sequences {v1n}n∈N and {v2n}n∈N, auxiliary input sequence {zn}n∈N, distinguisher
D, polynomial p(·) such that{
viewA˜[〈B(v1n), A˜(zn)〉]
}
n∈N
≈
{
viewA˜[〈B(v2n), A˜(zn)〉]
}
n∈N
(4.1)
and for inﬁnitely many n, it holds that
Pr
[
D(mimA˜,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v
1
n, zn)) = 1
]
− Pr
[
D(mimA˜,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v
2
n, zn)) = 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)
(4.2)
Fix an n for which Equation 4.2 holds. Then consider the following man-in-the-
middle adversary A˜∗ for 〈C,R〉. Adversary A˜∗ interacts with machine B on the left
and with an honest receiver on the right using 〈C,R〉. On input zn, A˜∗ incorporates
A˜ and proceeds as follows:
• For the messages exchanged by A˜ on the left with B, A˜∗ simply forwards the
message with the external machine B on the left.
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• For the right interaction, A˜∗ chooses the ﬁrst commitment proved using
〈C,R〉 and forward the messages to the external receiver on the right.
• All other interactions are emulated internally. On completion, A˜∗ outputs
what A˜ outputs.
First, we note that the value committed to in the ﬁrst (or second) commitment
using 〈Ps, Vs〉 is equal to the witness used by the adversary in the right interac-
tion, except with negligible probability. This follows from the statistical-binding
property of the commitment and the soundness of the ZK protocol. Therefore, we
have that the following pairs of ensembles are statistically-close.
•
{
mimA˜
∗,B
〈Ps,Vs〉(v
1
n, zn)
}
n∈N
and
{
mimA˜,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v
1
n, zn)
}
•
{
mimA˜
∗,B
〈Ps,Vs〉(v
2
n, zn)
}
n∈N
and
{
mimA˜,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v
2
n, zn)
}
Now, using Equation 4.2, it follows that
Pr
[
D(mimA˜
∗,B
〈Ps,Vs〉(v
1
n, zn)) = 1
]
− Pr
[
D(mimA˜
∗,B
〈Ps,Vs〉(v
2
n, zn)) = 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)
− ν(n)
for some negligible function ν(·). Therefore, A˜∗ violates k-robustness of 〈C,R〉 and
we arrive at a contradiction.
4.5 Sequential composition of SNMWI Arguments
In this section, we prove that SNMWI arguments are closed under 2-sequential
repetitions. The proof extends for constant repetitions, however, for the purposes
of this thesis, we only require SNMWI arguments secure under two sequential
repetitions. Given a protocol 〈P, V 〉, let 〈P 2, V 2〉 denote the protocol obtained by
repeating the interaction 〈P, V 〉 sequentially twice.
Proposition 1. Let 〈Ps, Vs〉 be a SNMWI argument for language for RL that is
zero-knowledge. Then 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 is a SNMWI argument for RL.
Proof: Assume for contradiction, there exists a man-in-the-middle adversary A,
ensembles {D1n}n and {D2n}n, sequences {idn}n polynomial p(n), such that the
following ensembles are indistinguishable for n ∈ N
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• {(x, y, z)← D1n : (x, z)}n∈N
• {(x, y, z)← D2n : (x, z)}n∈N
and for inﬁnitely many n, the following holds:
Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1
]
−Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)
(4.3)
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SNMWI
SNMWI
SNMWI
P 2s A V
2
s
SNMWI
SNMWI
SNMWI
SNMWI
P 2s A V
2
s
(i) Case E1 (ii) Case E2
Figure 4.3: The two cases E1 and E2 in a man-in-the-middle execution of 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉
with adversary A
In a man-in-the middle execution with A, two scenarios arise depending on
how the adversary schedules the messages. The ﬁrst scenario, that we represent
by the event E1 occurs when A completes the ﬁrst 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof as the prover on
the right in 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 before the ﬁrst 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof is received by A on the left.
The second scenario or event E2 occurs when A completes the ﬁrst 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof
on the right after the ﬁrst 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof on the left is received. See Figure 4.3 for
a pictorial representation of the two scenarios. It follows that, if A successfully
completes without aborting, exactly one of E1 or E2 deﬁnitely occurs.
Therefore it holds that one of the two equations below holds for inﬁnitely many
n.
Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1 ∧ E1
]
−Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1 ∧ E1
]
≥ 1
2p(n)
(4.4)
Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1 ∧ E2
]
−Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D1n : D(mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1 ∧ E2
]
≥ 1
2p(n)
(4.5)
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In either case, we show how to construct an adversary that violates the
SNMWI property of 〈Ps, Vs〉 and arrive at a contradiction.
Resolving Case 1: Assume for contradiction that Equation 4.4 holds for in-
ﬁnitely many n.
Consider an adversary A1 that on input (x, z) proceeds as follows. It incorpo-
rates A in the following manner:
• For the 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof on the left, A1 forwards messages in the ﬁrst 〈Ps, Vs〉
proof received by A to the external prover (on the left).
• For the 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof on the right, A1 forwards messages in the ﬁrst 〈Ps, Vs〉
proof given by A to the external veriﬁer (on the right).
• All other messages are simulated internally. On completion of the left proof,
A1 cuts oﬀ A and outputs the partial view of A at that instant. If E1 does
not occur, A1 simply outputs ⊥.
Using the SNMWI property of 〈Ps, Vs〉 we obtain the following claim.
Claim 3. The following distributions are indistinguishable over n ∈ N:
•
{
(x, y, z)← D1n; (view, w)← mimA1〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn) : ((x,view), w))
}
n∈N
•
{
(x, y, z)← D2n; (view, w)← mimA1〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn) : ((x,view), w)
}
n∈N
Next, consider a second adversary A2 that on input (x, (view, w)) proceeds as
follows. It incorporates A in the following manner:
• If view = ⊥, A2 halts outputting ⊥. Otherwise, it feeds A with the messages
in view.
• For the 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof on the left, A2 forwards messages in the second 〈Ps, Vs〉
proof received by A to the external prover (on the left).
• All other messages are simulated internally. On completion, A2 outputs what
A outputs concatenated with w.
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Deﬁne distributions D˜1n and D˜
2
n as follows:
D˜1n =
{
(x, y, z)← D1n; (view, w)← mimA1〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn) : (x, y, (view, w))
}
D˜2n =
{
(x, y, z)← D2n; (view, w)← mimA1〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn) : (x, y, (view, w))
}
It follows from construction that view emulated by A2 in the man-in-the-middle
experiment when the inputs are chosen by ﬁrst sampling (x, y, z)← D˜1n (similarly
D˜2n) and using (x, z) as input is identical to the view of A in the man-in-the-middle
experiment using 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 when inputs come from D1n (resp., D2n). Furthermore, as
we consider only well-behaved adversaries (i.e. adversaries that prove statements
with unique witnesses), it follows that the witness w output by A2 satisﬁes the
property that is the witness of the statement A is proving on the right using
〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 in the internal emulation. Therefore, it holds that.{
(x, y, z)← D˜1n : viewA2 [〈P (y), A2(z)〉(x)]
}
=
{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)
}
, and{
(x, y, z)← D˜2n : viewA2 [〈P (y), A2(z)〉(x)]
}
=
{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)
}
Therefore, using Equation 4.4, we have that
Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D˜1n : D
(
viewA2 [〈P (y), A2(z)〉(x)]
)
= 1
]
−Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D˜1n : D
(
viewA2 [〈P (y), A2(z)〉(x)]
)
= 1
]
≥ 1
2p(n)
From Claim 3, it follows that the following ensembles are indistinguishable over
n ∈ N
•
{
(x, y, z)← D˜1n : (x, z)
}
n∈N
•
{
(x, y, z)← D˜2n : (x, z)
}
n∈N
Since, D distinguishes the output of the man-in-the middle experiment with A2
for inﬁnitely many n, A2 violates the Strong WI property of 〈Ps, Vs〉. Thus, we
arrive at a contradiction.
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Resolving Case 2: Assume for contradiction that Equation 4.5 holds for in-
ﬁnitely many n.
Along the lines of Case 1, we again consider an adversary A1 that on input
(x, z) proceeds as follows. It incorporates A in the following manner:
• For the 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof on the left, A1 forwards messages in the ﬁrst 〈Ps, Vs〉
proof received by A to the external prover (on the left).
• All other messages are simulated internally. On completion of the left proof,
A1 cuts oﬀ A and outputs the partial view of A at that instant. If E2 does
not occur, A1 simply outputs ⊥.
Using the Strong WI property of 〈Ps, Vs〉 we obtain the following claim.
Claim 4. The following distributions are indistinguishable over n ∈ N:
• {(x, y, z)← D1n : viewA1 [〈Ps(y), A1(z)〉(x)]}n∈N
• {(x, y, z)← D2n : viewA1 [〈Ps(y), A1(z)〉(x)]}n∈N
Next, consider a second adversary A2 that on input (x,view) proceeds as
follows. It incorporates A in the following manner:
• If view = ⊥, A2 halts outputting ⊥. Otherwise, it feeds A with the messages
in view.
• For the 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof on the left, A2 forwards messages in the second 〈Ps, Vs〉
proof received by A to the external prover (on the left).
• For the 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof on the right, A2 forwards messages in the second
〈Ps, Vs〉 proof given by A to the external veriﬁer (on the right).
• All other messages are simulated internally. On completion, A2 outputs what
A outputs.
Deﬁne distributions D˜1n and D˜
2
n as follows:
D˜1n =
{
(x, y, z)← D1n;view← viewA1 [〈Ps(y), A1(z)〉(x)] : (x, y,view)
}
D˜2n =
{
(x, y, z)← D2n;view← viewA1 [〈Ps(y), A1(z)〉(x)] : (x, y,view)
}
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As in Case 1, it follows from construction that view emulated by A2 in the
man-in-the-middle experiment when the inputs are according to D˜1n (similarly D˜
2
n)
is identical to the view of A in the man-in-the-middle experiment using 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉
when inputs come from D1n (resp., D
2
n). Furthermore, as we consider only well-
behaved adversaries (i.e. adversaries that prove statements with unique witnesses),
it follows that the witness w used by the adversary in the second 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof is
identical to the witness of the statement A is proving on the right using 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉
in the internal emulation. Therefore, it holds that.{
(x, y, z)← D˜1n : mimA2〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn)
}
=
{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)
}
, and{
(x, y, z)← D˜2n : mimA2〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn)
}
=
{
(x, y, z)← D2n : mimA〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, y, z, idn)
}
Therefore, using Equation 4.5, we have that
Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D˜1n : D(mimA2〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1
]
−Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D˜2n : D(mimA2〈Ps,Vs〉(x, y, z, idn)) = 1
]
≥ 1
2p(n)
From Claim 4, it follows that the following ensembles are indistinguishable for
n ∈ N
•
{
(x, y, z)← D˜1n : (x, z)
}
n∈N
•
{
(x, y, z)← D˜2n : (x, z)
}
n∈N
Since, D distinguishes the output of the man-in-the middle experiment with A2
for inﬁnitely many n, A2 violates the SNMWI property of 〈Ps, Vs〉. Thus, we
arrive at a contradiction. This completes the proof of Proposition 1
Remark 1. Following a similar proof strategy, it is possible to show that Strong
WI is also closed under constant sequential repetition.
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Remark 2. The above proof can be extended to any constant number of sequential
repetitions by establishing that the view of the adversary after receiving each proof
on the left remains indistinguishable. However, it remains an open question as
to whether SNMWI or even the weaker property of Strong WI is closed under
non-constant sequential repetitions.
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CHAPTER 5
PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
In this chapter, we state and prove the main theorem.
Theorem 4 (Main Theorem (restatement)). Assume the existence of a tP -round
(Cenv, Csim)-secure UC-puzzle in a G-hybrid model, tWI-round SNMWI protocol
secure w.r.t cl(Csim, Cenv) and tOT -round semi-honest oblivious transfer protocol se-
cure w.r.t cl(Csim, Cenv). Then, for every well-formed functionality F , there exists
a O(tP + tWI + tOT )-round protocol Π in the G-hybrid model that realizes Fˆ with
(Cenv, Csim)-UC-security.
On a high-level, the compilation proceeds in two steps:
• First, every functionality is compiled into a protocol in the ZK-Hybrid model.
In the ZK-Hybrid, all parties have access to the ideal zero-knowledge func-
tionality called IdealZK functionality. This step is formalized in the IdealZK-
lemma (Lemma 4).
• In the second step, assuming the existence of a UC-puzzle, a semi-honest
oblivious transfer protocol and a SNMWI protocol, we show that the
IdealZK functionality can be securely realized in the real-model. This step is
formalized in the Puzzle-lemma (Lemma 5).
Lemma 4 (IdealZK-Lemma). Assume the existence of t-round stand-alone secure
semi-honest oblivious transfer secure w.r.t cl(Cenv, Csim). For every well-formed
functionality F , there exists a O(t)-round protocol Π in the ZK-Hybrid model, such
that, for every adversary A ∈ Csim in the FˆIdealZK−Hybrid model, there exists an
adversary simulator A′ ∈ Csim, such that for every environment Z ∈ Cenv, the
following two ensembles are indistinguishable w.r.t cl(Cenv, Csim).
•
{
execFˆIdealZKΠ,A,Z (n)
}
n∈N
•
{
execFˆpiideal,A′,Z(n)
}
n∈N
where Fˆ is the ideal-functionality implementing the multi-session extension of f .
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This lemma is implicit for the original UC model in the previous works
[64, 8, 34, 19, 66]. The series of works shows that in the standard model (i.e.
(n.u.PPT ,PPT )-UC), assuming the existence of stand-alone secure semi-honest
oblivious transfer, any well-formed functionality can be securely realized in the
FˆIdealZK-Hybrid model. On a high-level, given a well-formed functionality F , the
compilation proceeds in three steps:
1. Construct a protocol Π1F that UC realizes F in the FOT -hybrid model in the
presence of semi-honest, static adversaries.
2. Assuming the existence of stand-alone secure semi-honest oblivious-transfer,
construct a protocol ΠOT that UC-realizes FOT in the presence of semi-
honest, static adversaries. Then using the protocol obtained from Step 1,
obtain a protocol Π2F that UC-realizes F in the presence of semi-honest,
static adversaries.
3. Compile any protocol Π to Π′ in the ZK-Hybrid, so that, for any malicious
adversary A interacting with Π in ZK-Hybrid, there exists a semi-honest static
adversary S that interacts with Π′, such that no environment can distinguish
if it we interacting with A in ZK-Hybrid running Π′ or S in the plain-life model
running Π. Then using the protocol obtained from Step 2, obtain a protocol
Π3F that is UC-secure in ZK-Hybrid.
We remark that we require the protocol obtained from Step 3 to be secure for
Cenv-adversaries. This can be obtained by following the same steps as above, with
the exception that the semi-honest oblivious transfer protocol must be secure w.r.t
cl(Csim, Cenv).
The main technical contribution of our work is the following lemma:
Lemma 5 (Puzzle-Lemma). Let Π′ be a protocol in the FˆIdealZK−Hybrid model.
Assume the existence of a (Cenv, Csim)-secure tP -round puzzle 〈S,R〉 in a G-
hybrid model and a tOT -round stand-alone malicious oblivious-transfer protocol
〈SOT , ROT 〉 secure w.r.t cl(Csim, Cenv) and a tWI-round tOT -robust SNMWI proto-
col 〈Ps, Vs〉 secure w.r.t cl(Csim, Cenv) . Then, there exists a O(tP +tWI +tOT )-round
protocol Π in the G-hybrid such that, for every uniform PPT adversary A, there
exists a simulator A′ ∈ Csim, such that, for every environment Z ∈ Cenv, the follow-
ing two ensembles are indistinguishable over N w.r.t Csim.
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•
{
execGΠ,A,Z(n)
}
n∈N
•
{
execFˆIdealZKΠ′,A′,Z (n)
}
n∈N
Before we proceed to proving the Puzzle Lemma we formally deﬁne the IdealZK-
functionality and oblivious-transfer.
5.1 IdealZK Functionality
The notion of ideal functionalities is a central tool in the framework of universal
composability [12], and can be thought of as the introduction of a trusted third
party that is designed to perform a speciﬁc task. The communication with the
trusted third party is speciﬁed as follows. All parties have a secret, authenticated
and unblockable channel to the trusted third party through which they send their
input. The trusted party computes the output, hands the output of the corrupted
parties to the adversary, and asks the adversary to deliver the output to the honest
parties. The adversary does not see the output destined to the honest party but
may deliver it (or not), at will. One of the most basic and useful ideal functional-
ities in the design of cryptographic protocols is the ideal zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge functionality.
The IdealZK functionality: The ideal zero-knowledge functionality is pa-
rameterized by an NP-relation RL and deﬁned as follows:
• Upon receiving a message (ZK-Prover, j, x, w) from a party Pi (called the
prover), the functionality sends (ZK-Proof, i, x, RL(x,w)) to party Pj (called
the veriﬁer). Unless the party Pj is corrupted, the functionality also sends the
message (ZK-Proof, i, x, RL(x,w)) to the adversary (controlling the network).
Remark 3. Since we consider an asynchronous execution of protocols, formally,
both the input and the output of the functionality should also contain a session
identiﬁer (as was done in [12]) not to mix up messages from diﬀerent sessions.
In order to simplify the notation (for this and other ideal functionalities that we
use), we leave out the session identiﬁer and instead assume that this information
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is added to all messages (sent to and from ideal functionalities) in some canonical
way.
Thus, slightly over-simpliﬁed, the prover sends an instance-witness pair (x,w)
and an index j to the ideal functionality, which in turn, sends (x, 1) to the veriﬁer
(party Pj) if w is a valid witness for x ∈ L and (x, 0) otherwise. In order to model
provers that fail in proving true instance (clearly, one can not force a prover to
prove something that is does not want to), we deﬁne a special symbol ⊥ such
that for every RL and every x, it holds that (x,⊥) 6∈ RL. The setting in which
the parties have access to (multiple) ideal zero-knowledge functionalities is called
the ZK-Hybrid model. The power of this model has been demonstrated in for
example [19] where a universally composable two-party computation protocol was
constructed.
5.2 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer is generally modeled as a secure two-party computation task
following the real-world/ideal-world paradigm. However, we do not require a pro-
tocol implementing oblivious transfer in the strongest setting and therefore present
a deﬁnition that is suﬃcient for the protocols presented in this work. First, we
deﬁne the oblivious transfer functionality.
Let s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {1, 2}. Then the 1-out-of-2 string OT functionality
OTn(·) is deﬁned as
OTn ((s1, s2), b) = (⊥, sb)
.
Real World. In the real world, the Sender S and Receiver R execute the given
protocol Π on common security parameter n and respective private inputs (s1, s2)
and b, where s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ {1, 2}. A probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary, who may corrupt one of the parties and observe all of its internal data.
In the malicious case, the adversary has full control over the messages sent by
the corrupted party while in the semi-honest or passive case, the adversary may
only try to deduce information by performing computations on observed data, but
otherwise follows the protocol's instructions. At the end of the interaction, the
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adversary may output an arbitrary function of its view. The output of the real
world (on the the given pair of initial inputs) is deﬁned as the random variable
realS,R(n, s1, s2, b) the adversary's output.
Ideal World. In the ideal world, an incorruptible trusted party implement-
ing the OT functionality is employed. That is, the protocol in the ideal world
instructs each party to send its input to the trusted party, who computes the func-
tionality and sends to each party its output. The interaction of the adversary with
the ideal process and the output of the ideal process represented by the random
variable idealOTS,R(n, s1, s2, b) and deﬁned analogously to the above deﬁnitions for
the real process. The adversary attacking the ideal process is referred to as a
simulator.
Deﬁnition 18. We say that a protocol 〈S,R〉 is a stand-alone secure semi-honest
oblivious-transfer (SH-OT) protocol if the following conditions hold:
1. For every semi-honest PPT receiver R∗, there exists a PPT simulator R′
such that the following distributions are indistinguishable over n ∈ N:
• {realS,R∗(n, s1, s2, b)}n∈N,s1,s2∈{0,1}n,b∈{1,2}
• {idealOTS,R′(n, s1, s2, b)}n∈N,s1,s2∈{0,1}n,b∈{1,2}.
2. For every semi-honest PPT sender S∗, there exists a PPT simulator S ′
such that the following distributions are indistinguishable over n ∈ N:
• {realS∗,R(n, s1, s2, b)}n∈N,s1,s2∈{0,1}n,b∈{1,2}
• {idealOTS′,R(n, s1, s2, b)}n∈N,s1,s2∈{0,1}n,b∈{1,2}.
We further say that 〈S,R〉 stand-alone secure malicious oblivious-transfer (m-OT) if
both the conditions hold for all malicious adversaries.
Deﬁnition 19. A stand-alone secure m-OT protocol 〈S,R〉 is said to be input-
binding w.r.t the Sender if for every malicious Sender S∗ and auxiliary input z
and every view of the honest Receiver on any input b, i.e. viewR[〈S∗(z), R(b)〉] is
consistent with at most one input (s1, s2) for an honest Sender. Similarly, 〈S,R〉
is said to be input-binding w.r.t the Receiver if for every malicious Receiver R∗
and auxiliary input z and every view of the honest Sender on any input (s1, s2),
i.e. viewS[〈S(s1, s2), R∗(z)〉] is consistent with at most one input b for an honest
58
Receiver. Finally, we say that 〈S,R〉 is input-binding if it is input-binding w.r.t the
Sender and Receiver.
In our construction, we will require an input-binding stand-alone secure m-
OT. However, due to the following result it suﬃces to assume the existence of
stand-alone secure SH-OT.
Proposition 2 ([34, 31]). Assume the existence of a t-round stand-alone secure
SH-OT. Then, there exists an O(t)-round input-binding stand-alone secure m-OT.
The proof of the proposition is implicit in [31, 34], where they show how to
transform any semi-honest secure computation protocol to one that is secure w.r.t
malicious adversaries. The high-level idea is that in the transformed protocol,
ﬁrst, every party Pi commit to their inputs and randomness at the beginning of
the protocol execution. Then using a fair coin-tossing protocol the parties obtain
uniformly generated random tapes. Thereafter, all parties execute the semi-honest
protocol with the exception that, after each step, every party Pi proves to every
other party in zero-knowledge that the message generated is consistent with the
value committed to at the beginning. Since the parties commit to their inputs and
randomness, it will follow that the protocol is also input-binding.
Existence of Oblivious Transfer Protocols. We know how to construct
O(1)-round stand-alone secure semi-honest oblivious transfer protocols based on
enhanced trapdoor permutations, homomorphic encryption.
5.3 The Puzzle Lemma
In this section, we prove the puzzle lemma. More precisely, we provide a general
transformation that transforms any protocol Π in the ZK-Hybrid model into a
protocol Π′ in the real model. First, we describe a special-purpose zero-knowledge
protocol that enables this transformation.
Special-purpose ZK Protocol 〈P, V 〉. Let (〈S,R〉,R) be a (Cenv, Csim)-secure
puzzle in the G-hybrid, 〈Ps, Vs〉 be a SNMWI protocol secure w.r.t cl(Cenv, Csim)
and 〈SOT , ROT 〉 be 1-out-of-2 malicious string oblivious-transfer protocol secure
w.r.t cl(Cenv, Csim). Let L be a language in NP with witness relation RL.
59
On common input instance x, witness relation RL, prover and veriﬁer identities
idP and idV , and additional auxiliary input w = RL(x) for the prover, the protocol
〈P, V 〉 proceeds in 5-stages as follows:
Stage 1: The Prover and Veriﬁer participate in a puzzle-interaction where the
Veriﬁer assumes the role of the sender and the Prover as the receiver. Let
transV→P be the transcript of the messages exchanged in this Stage.
Stage 2: The Prover and Veriﬁer participate in a second puzzle-interaction with
the roles reversed, i.e. the Prover is the sender and the Veriﬁer is the receiver.
Let transP→V be the transcript of the messages exchanged in this Stage.
Stage 3: The Prover ﬁrst selects a random string r ∈ {0, 1}n. Then the Prover
and Veriﬁer interact using 〈SOT , ROT 〉, where the Prover is the sender with
inputs (r, r ⊕ w) and the Veriﬁer is the receiver with input 1. Let transOT
be the transcript of the messages exchanged in this stage.
Stage 4: The Veriﬁer commits to s using a perfectly binding commitment scheme
com1. Then it proves using two 〈Ps, Vs〉 proofs in succession with identity
idV , the statement that it either committed to a string s that contains a valid
witness establishing the veriﬁers input as index 1 in transOT and the string
output by the receiver at the end of the Stage 3 protocol or a string s such
that (s,transV→P ) ∈ R.
Stage 5: The Prover sends the string r in the clear and commits to s using com.
Then the prover proves using two 〈Ps, Vs〉 proofs in succession with idP , the
statement that it either committed to a string s that establishes that the
inputs used by the prover in transOT is (r, r
′) such that r ⊕ r′ ∈ RL(x) or
a string s such that (s,transP→V ) ∈ R.
Realizing the IdealZK-functionality: Given any protocol Π′ in
FˆIdealZK−Hybrid model and the special-purpose zero-knowledge protocol 〈P, V 〉, the
protocol Π in the real model is constructed from Π′ by instantiating the FˆIdealZK
functionality using 〈P, V 〉. All invocations of the FˆIdealZK functionality with input
(ZK-prover,sid, ssid, Pj, x, w) from an honest party Pi is replaced with an instance
of 〈P, V 〉 between Pi and Pj on common inputs x,w, identities idP = (Pi, sid, ssid)
1For simplicity of exposition, we construct the protocol 〈P, V 〉 using a perfectly binding com-
mitment scheme, it is actually suﬃcient to use a statistically binding commitments.
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and idV = (Pj, sid, ssid). To prove correctness, we need to show that for every ad-
versary A ∈ PPT in the real-model, there exists a simulator S ∈ Csim such that no
environment Z ∈ Cenv can distinguish if it is interacting with A in the real-model
or S in the FˆIdealZK−Hybrid.
Recall that in any 〈Ps, Vs〉 interaction (Stage 4 or Stage 5), a prover can al-
ternatively use a fake witness which is a witness to the puzzle to convince the
veriﬁer. However, to prove correctness of our simulator, we require that no adver-
sary controlling the prover be able to commit to the fake witness in any instance
of 〈Ps, Vs〉-subprotocol. For the reminder of the proof, still informally, we say that
an adversary is non-abusing in an execution, if except with negligible probability,
it never commits to a fake witness.
We construct the simulator in two steps.
Step 1: First, we consider a hybrid experiment H0n where all the puzzle-
interactions part of 〈P, V 〉 are simulated. For this hybrid, we show that for
every adversary A ∈ Cadv in the real-model, there exists a machine A∗ ∈ Csim
such that no environment Z ∈ Cenv can distinguish A in the real-model and A∗
in H0n. This machine A
∗ additionally outputs a valid witness for every puzzle
interaction where the adversary controls the sender on a special-output tape.
This step essentially follows from the deﬁnition of the puzzle by constructing
an adversary using A that participates in a concurrent puzzle execution. Let
hybrid0A∗,Z(n) denote the output of Z in experiment H
0
n. More precisely, we
establish the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For every adversary A ∈ PPT , there exists an adversary A∗ ∈
Csim such that for every environment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds that{
execGΠ,A,Z(n)
}
n∈N
≈
{
hyb0A∗,Z(n)(Z)
}
n∈N
Furthermore, A∗ is non-abusing in H0n.
Step 2: Using A∗ we construct S and prove that no environment Z can distinguish
between A∗ in the H0n and S in FˆIdealZK−Hybrid. This step relies on the
straight-line extractability of the special-purpose ZK protocol 〈P, V 〉 and
the robustness SNMWI property of the 〈Ps, Vs〉.
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On a high-level, S internally incorporates A∗ and emulates an execution
with A∗. All messages from A∗ are forwarded externally (to the respective
entities) except messages that are part of any execution using 〈P, V 〉, which
are instead dealt with internally.
• In 〈P, V 〉-interactions where A∗ controls the veriﬁer, S simulates the
prover messages internally for A∗. Recall that the honest prover uses
the witness of the statement to generate inputs to the Stage 3 OT
protocol and the Stage 5 SNMWI-proof. As S does not possess a
witness, it instead uses two random strings as input for the Stage 3 OT
protocol and uses the fake witness in the Stage 5 SNMWI-proof (the
witness to the puzzle). We remark that the simulation is correct only
if the veriﬁer does not cheat in choosing the inputs for the Stage 3 OT
protocol. This can be ensured if the string s committed to by A∗ in the
Stage 4 is not the fake witness.
• In executions where A∗ controls the prover, S emulates the code of the
honest veriﬁer with the exception that A′ runs the Stage 3 OT protocol
with input index 2 instead of 1 and again uses a fake witness in the
Stage 4 SNMWI-proof. Finally, using the string s received from the
prover in the Stage 3 OT protocol and string s′ that it received in
Stage 5 from the prover, A′ computes w = s⊕ s′ as the witness for the
statement and forwards it externally to the FˆIdealZK-functionality. Note
that the witness extracted by S is valid witness to the statement only
if A∗ does not cheat in choosing the inputs for the OT protocol. This
can be ensured if the string s committed to by A∗ in the Stage 5 is not
the fake witness.
More precisely, in this step, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7. For every adversary A∗ ∈ Csim that is non-abusing in H0n, there
exists a simulator S ∈ Csim such that for every environment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds
that {
hybrid0A∗,Z(n)(Z)
}
n∈N
≈
{
execFˆIdealZKΠ′,S,Z (n)
}
n∈N
Furthermore, S is non-abusing in FˆIdealZK−Hybrid.
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The puzzle lemma follows from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 using a standard hybrid
argument. Before we proceed to the actual proofs, we formalize the non-abusing
property.
In an execution of 〈P, V 〉, where an adversary controls either the prover or the
veriﬁer, we say that the event cheat occurs if:
• The adversary commits to w such that w ∈ RtransV→P in Stage 5 when
controlling the prover, or,
• The adversary commits to w such that w ∈ RtransP→V in Stage 4 when
controlling the veriﬁer.
We say that an adversary is non-abusing if the probability that cheat oc-
curs for any 〈P, V 〉 interaction where the adversary controls one of the parties is
negligible.
5.3.1 Step 1: Simulating puzzle interactions
In the ﬁrst hybrid experiment H0n the execution proceeds identically to the real-
execution, with the exception that, in Stage 1 and Stage 2 of all 〈P, V 〉-interactions,
the parties instead of participating in the protocol to generate a puzzle, receive a
complete (simulated) puzzle-transcript for each Stage from the adversary A∗. We
show that for every adversary A in the real-model there exists an adversary A∗
such that no environment can distinguish if it is interacting with A in the real-
model or A∗ in H0n. Furthermore, for every puzzle interaction where the sender is
controlled by the adversary,2 A∗ outputs a valid witness w corresponding to the
puzzle-transcript in a special-output tape. The existence of A∗ and the correctness
of the simulation essentially follows from the concurrent simulatability of the puzzle
〈S,R〉.
Lemma 8 (Lemma 6 (restated)). For every adversary A ∈ PPT , there exists an
adversary A∗ ∈ Csim such that for every environment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds that{
execGΠ,A,Z(n)
}
n∈N
≈
{
hybrid0A∗,Z(n)(Z)
}
n∈N
2These are Stage 1 puzzles for 〈P, V 〉-interactions where the adversary controls the veriﬁer
and Stage 2 puzzles for interactions where the adversary controls the prover
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Furthermore, A∗ is non-abusing in H0n.
Proof: We begin by describing an adversary Apuz ∈ PPT constructed from A
that participates in a concurrent puzzle execution. Then using the simulator A′puz
corresponding to Apuz that exists from the deﬁnition of the puzzle, we construct
A∗.
The adversary Apuz internally incorporates A and begins an emulation of an
execution with A. All messages that are not part of puzzle interactions from A
are forwarded to the external puzzle environment Zpuz. Every puzzle interaction
where A assumes the role of the sender in the internal emulation, Apuz forwards the
messages to and from an external receiver. For puzzle interactions with A as the
receiver, Apuz emulates the interaction with A internally by running the code of
an honest sender with A. For all puzzle interactions between honest parties, Apuz
internally emulates a puzzle interaction by running the code of the receiver and
sender. At the end of every puzzle interaction, Apuz forwards the puzzle-transcript
to Zpuz. As this deﬁnes an adversary participating in a concurrent puzzle execution,
there exists a simulator A′puz that simulates all puzzle interactions and outputs
witnesses for all puzzles where the adversary controls the sender. More precisely,
A′puz is such that, for every environment Zpuz ∈ Cenv, it holds that
{realApuz,Zpuz(n)}n∈N ≈ {idealA′puz,Zpuz(n)}n∈N
Given A′puz, we describe the construction of A
∗. A∗ internally incorporates A′puz
and emulates the ideal experiment of a concurrent puzzle execution. Externally, A∗
interacts with the honest parties and Z in the hybrid experiment H0n. All messages
received from external parties are fed internally to A′puz and interpreted as coming
from an internal emulation of Zpuz. Messages received from A
′
puz in the internal
emulation, on the other hand, are forwarded externally to the party as intended
by A in the original execution with Z (we assume without loss of generality that
the identity of the recipient is encoded in every message). All messages from A′puz
that contain puzzle-transcripts are forwarded to the corresponding honest parties.
Finally, A∗ outputs on its special output tape whatever A′puz outputs on its special
output tape.
Proving indistinguishability: Assume for contradiction, there exists an en-
vironment Z that violates the indistinguishability, i.e. there exists a distinguisher
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D and polynomial p(·) such that for inﬁnitely many n,
Pr
[
D(execGΠ,A,Z(n)) = 1
]− Pr [D(hybrid0A∗,Z(n)) = 1] ≥ 1p(n)
Using Z we construct an environment Zpuz that violates the security of the puzzle
in a concurrent puzzle execution with Apuz and thus arrive at a contradiction.
More precisely, consider an environment Zpuz that internally incorporates all the
honest parties and Z in a real-world execution with adversary A. Zpuz internally
begins an emulation with the parties and proceeds as follows: It forwards the
messages it receives from Apuz internally to the corresponding honest party or
Z (as encoded in the message). Finally, Zpuz outputs what Z outputs. Recall
that, the puzzle-environment is allowed to interact only with the adversary and in
particular cannot access G. This is ensured in our construction of Zpuz, since only
the puzzle interactions access G and all those are emulated internally by Apuz.
Claim 5.
Pr
[
D(realApuz,Zpuz(n)) = 1
]− Pr [D(idealA′puz,Zpuz(n)) = 1] ≥ 1p(n)
Proof: By construction of Zpuz and Apuz, it directly follows that:
1. The output of Z in the internal emulation by Zpuz when interacting with Apuz
is identically distributed to execGΠ,A,Z(n).
2. The output of Z in the internal emulation by Zpuz when interacting with A
′
puz
is identically distributed to hybrid0A∗,Z(n).
The claim now follows from the fact that D distinguishes execGΠ,A,Z(n) and
hyb0A∗,Z(n) with probability at least
1
p(n)
.
We conclude the proof of indistinguishability by observing that Claim 5 violates
the (statistical-)simulatability of the puzzle protocol 〈S,R〉 and thus arrive at a
contradiction.
Proving A∗ is non-abusing in H0n: First, we establish that A is non-abusing
in the real-world experiment. We then reduce the non-abusing property of A∗
in H0n to the statistical-simulatability of the 〈S,R〉 protocol.
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Claim 6. A is non-abusing in the real-world experiment.
Proof: Assume for contradiction there exists an adversary A ∈ PPT and poly-
nomial p(·) such that, for inﬁnitely many n, in the execGΠ,A,Z(n), A commits to
the fake witness corresponding to some instance of the 〈Ps, Vs〉-protocol (i.e. com
message in Stage 4 or 5 of a 〈P, V 〉-interaction) with probability at least 1
p(n)
.
We construct a cheating receiver R˜ ∈ Cadv using A that violates the soundness
condition of the puzzle and arrive at a contradiction.
More formally, R˜ on input n proceeds as follows: It incorporates A, Z and
all the honest parties and emulates the experiment execGΠ,A,Z(n) in the following
manner:
• For a randomly chosen puzzle interaction where the adversary A controlling
the receiver interacts with a sender controlled by an honest party, R˜ forwards
messages in the 〈S,R〉-interaction to the external sender S.
• Once the execution has concluded, R˜ applies the (stand-alone) extractor
guaranteed by the proof-of-knowledge property of 〈Ps, Vs〉 on the Stage 4 or
5 proofs (as the case may be) to extract a witness w. If w ∈ R(TRANS),
where TRANS is the transcript of the 〈S,R〉-interaction with the external
sender, then R˜ outputs w and halts. Otherwise, R˜ outputs ⊥.
Since there are only polynomially many puzzles and 〈Ps, Vs〉 interactions, R˜
chooses the 〈Ps, Vs〉 interaction corresponding to which A commits to the fake
witness with non-negligible probability. By the proof of knowledge property of the
〈Ps, Vs〉 proof and the statistical-binding property of the com scheme, it follows
that, if the string committed to by A in the proof is a witness to the puzzle,
then except with negligible probability, R˜ extracts w such that such that w ∈
R(TRANS). Therefore R˜ outputs a valid witness to the puzzle with non-negligible
probability and this violates the soundness condition of the 〈S,R〉 protocol against
PPT adversaries and we arrive at a contradiction. This concludes the proof of the
claim.
As in the proof of indistinguishability, we reduce the proof of the claim to the
statistical-simulatability of the 〈S,R〉 protocol. Assume for contradiction, for some
A and A∗ described above, there exists a polynomial p(·) such that, for inﬁnitely
many n, A∗ commits to a fake witness with probability 1
p(n)
in H0n.
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Fix an n for which this happens. Consider Zpuz that proceeds identically to Zpuz
(described above), with the exception that it outputs a randomly chosen puzzle-
transcript and the corresponding commitment following the puzzle interaction.
Let q(n) be a bound on the total number of 〈Ps, Vs〉-interactions. Consider a
distinguisher D that on input (TRANS, com(w)), computes w using exhaustive
search and outputs 1 if w ∈ R(TRANS) and 0 otherwise. Note that we allow
D to run unbounded time, since we are interested only in violating statistical
simulatability.
Claim 7.
Pr
[
D(realApuz,Zpuz(n)) = 1
]− Pr [D(idealA′puz,Zpuz(n)) = 1] ≥ 1p(n)q(n) − ν(n)
for some negligible function ν(·).
Proof: By construction of Zpuz and Apuz, it directly follows that: the internal
emulation by Zpuz when interacting with Apuz proceeds identically to the real-
world experiment. Similarly, the internal emulation by Zpuz when interacting with
A′puz proceeds identically to the experiment H
0
n. It now follows that D on input
idealA′puz,Zpuz(n) outputs 1 if
1. A∗ commits to the fake witness corresponding to some 〈Ps, Vs〉 instance. This
happens with probability 1
p(n)
.
2. Zpuz picks the instance on which A
∗ commits to fake witness. This occurs
with probability at least 1
q(n)
.
3. Given the output (TRANS, com(σ)) of Zpuz, D computes σ correctly. Since
com is a statistically-binding commitment, it holds that, except with prob-
ability ν1(n) for some negligible function ν1(·), D computes an unique w
corresponding to com(w).
Therefore,
Pr
[
D(idealA′puz,Zpuz(n)) = 1
] ≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
− ν1(n)
It follows from Claim 6 that
Pr
[
D(realApuz,Zpuz(n)) = 1
] ≤ ν2(n)
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for some negligible function ν2(·).
The proof of the claim now follows from the preceding two equations.
Claim 7 now implies that D and Zpuz violate the statistical-simulatability of
the puzzle protocol 〈S,R〉 and thus we arrive at a contradiction. This concludes
the proof that A∗ is non-abusing in H0n. We remark that this is the only place
where we require that the puzzle is statistically simulatable.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 6 and Step 1 of the proof.
5.3.2 Step 2: Simulating Zero-Knowledge
Description of the simulator S: S incorporates A∗, and internally emulates
an execution withA∗ in the following manner: All messages exchanged withA∗ that
are not part of the protocol 〈P, V 〉 are forwarded outside to respective parties. Only
messages exchanged as part of interactions using 〈P, V 〉 are dealt with internally.
More precisely, when party Pi wishes to prove a statement x to Pj, S proceeds as
follows:
Case: Prover (Pi) is honest and Veriﬁer (Pj) is controlled by S. S (con-
trolling party Pj) receives a message of the type (ZK-Proof, i, x, 1) from
FˆIdealZK and starts simulating messages for Pi internally. Initially, A∗ sends
a puzzle-transcript transV→P for Stage 1 and transP→V for Stage 2 to Pi
and outputs a witness w′ (corresponding to the Stage 1 transcript) in the
special output tape, which is stored by S internally. In Stage 3, S runs the
code of an honest sender for the OT protocol with two randomly chosen
strings s0, s1 as input. In Stage 4, S runs the code of the honest veriﬁer for
the 〈S,R〉 protocol. In Stage 5, S sends s0 and then convinces A∗ (acting
as Pj) using the fake witness w
′ that it received from A∗. More precisely, it
commits to w′ and then proves using 〈S,R〉 that w′ ∈ R(transV→P ).
Case: Prover (Pi) is controlled by A and Veriﬁer (Pj) is honest. S (con-
trolling party Pi) starts simulating the veriﬁer messages for Pj internally. As
before, A∗ sends a puzzle-transcript transV→P for Stage 1 and transP→V
for Stage 2 to Pi and outputs a witness w
′ (corresponding to the Stage 2
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transcript) in the special output tape. In Stage 3, S (acting as Pj) runs the
code of an honest receiver for the OT protocol with input 2 (instead of 1)
and receives a string r′. In Stage 4, S convinces A∗ (acting as Pi) using the
fake witness w′ that it received from A∗. In Stage 5, after receiving the string
r, S runs to code of the honest veriﬁer of the 〈S,R〉 protocol. On successful
completion, S computes w = r⊕r′ and checks if w is a valid witness for x. If
it is valid S sends (ZK-Prover, j, x, w) to the FˆIdealZK functionality. Otherwise
S outputs ⊥ and halts.
Case: Prover (Pi) is honest and Veriﬁer (Pj) is honest. S (controlling the
network) receives the message (ZK-Prover, Pi, Pj, sid, ssid, x, 1) from the
IdealZK functionality. Internally S, again receives a puzzle-transcript TRANS
from A∗. Since, we are in the secure channels model, to simulate the in-
teraction between honest parties to A∗, S merely sends null messages of
appropriate length for each message passed in 〈P, V 〉.
We now proceed to prove correctness of simulation. This is formalized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 9 (Lemma 7 (restated)). For every adversary A∗ ∈ Csim that in
non-abusing in H0n, there exists a simulator S ∈ Csim such that for every en-
vironment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds that{
hybrid0A∗,Z(n)(Z)
}
n∈N
≈
{
execFˆIdealZKΠ′,S,Z (n)
}
n∈N
Towards proving the lemma we consider the following intermediate hybrid ex-
periments:
Experiment H1n: This experiment proceeds identically to H
0
n with the exception
that in all 〈Ps, Vs〉 interactions in which the prover is honest, the fake witness
(i.e. witness to the puzzle) is used to convince the veriﬁer instead of the real
witness. For this experiment, we prove the following claim.
Claim 8. For every adversary A∗ ∈ Csim that is non-abusing in H0n, and
environment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds that{
hybrid0A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
≈
{
hybrid1A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
Furthermore, A∗ is non-abusing in H1n.
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Experiment H2n: H
2
n proceeds identically to H
1
n with the exception that in all
〈SOT , ROT 〉 interactions where the veriﬁer is honest, the receivers inputs to
the Stage 3 OT protocol is replaced from index 1 to index 2. For this exper-
iment, we prove the following claim.
Claim 9. For every adversary A∗ ∈ Csim that is non-abusing in H1n and
environment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds that{
hybrid1A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
≈
{
hybrid2A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
Furthermore, A∗ is non-abusing in H2n.
Experiment H3n: H
3
n proceeds identically to H
2
n with the exception that, in all
〈SOT , ROT 〉 interactions where the prover is honest, the senders inputs in
the Stage 3 OT protocol is replaced by randomly strings r1, r2. For this
experiment, we prove the following claim.
Claim 10. For every adversary A∗ ∈ Csim that is non-abusing in H2n and
environment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds that{
hybrid2A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
≈
{
hybrid3A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
Furthermore, A∗ is non-abusing in H3n.
Recall that the simulator S in the FˆIdealZK−Hybrid incorporates A∗ and all the
honest parties and emulates the experiment H3n. It follows from the description
that conditioned on A∗ not proving a false statement, the view of A∗ internally
emulated is identical to the view of A∗ in H3n. Hence, if A
∗ is non-abusing in
H3n, we have that {
hybrid3A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
≈
{
execFˆIdealZKΠ′,S,Z (n)
}
n∈N
The proof of Lemma 7 follows combining the above equation with Claims 8-10
using a standard hybrid argument.
Comparing H0n and H
1
n. Consider a sequence of intermediate experiments
E1n, . . . , E
q(n)
n where q(·) is a polynomial bounding the maximum number of proofs
by the adversary A∗. Ein is the experiment with A
∗ that proceeds identically to H0n,
with the exception that in the ﬁrst i proofs using 〈P, V 〉, where an honest party
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interacts with the adversary A∗, the honest party uses the fake witness of the real
witness in the 〈Ps, Vs〉 sub-protocols. Recall that the fake witness is a witness to
the puzzle transcript and is output by A∗ in a special output tape. More precisely,
in experiment Ein, the ﬁrst i proofs using 〈P, V 〉, the honest party is simulated
identical to the experiment H0n with the following exceptions:
• If the prover in the 〈P, V 〉-interaction is honest, the prover commits to fake
witness (i.e. the witness of the puzzle-transcript transV→P ) in Stage 5 and
convinces A∗ in the 〈Ps, Vs〉 using the fake witness.
• If the veriﬁer is honest, then the veriﬁer commits to fake witness (i.e. the
witness of the puzzle-transcript transP→V ) in Stage 4 and convinces A∗ in
the 〈Ps, Vs〉 using the fake witness.
We restate Claim 8 followed by the proof.
Claim 11 (Claim 8 restated). For every adversary A∗ ∈ Csim that is non-abusing
in H0n, and environment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds that{
hybrid0A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
≈
{
hybrid1A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
Furthermore, A∗ is non-abusing in H1n.
Proof: From the description it follows that the experiment E
q(n)
n is identical to
H1n. Let E
0
n denote the experiment H
0
n. For hybrid experiment E
i
n, deﬁne random
variables hybiA∗,Z(n) and wit
i
A∗,Z(n) to be respectively the output of Z and the
value committed to by A∗ corresponding to a randomly chosen 〈Ps, Vs〉 interaction
where A∗ controls the prover (the value is well-deﬁned since the non-interactive
commitment scheme com is perfectly-binding).
Assume for contradiction that there exists an adversary A∗ that is
non-abusing in F 0n , distinguisher D and polynomial p(·) such that for inﬁnitely
many n, either of the following holds:
Pr
[
D
(
hyb0A∗,Z(n)
)
= 1
]− Pr [D(hybq(n)A∗,Z(n)) = 1] ≥ 1p(n) , or
Pr
[
wit
q(n)
A∗,Z(n) is a fake witness
]
≥ 1
p(n)
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Then there exists a function i(·) such that i(n) ∈ [q(n)] for all n, such that for
inﬁnitely many n, either of the following holds:
Pr
[
D
(
hyb
i(n)
A∗,Z(n)
)
= 1
]
− Pr
[
D
(
hyb
i(n)−1
A∗,Z (n)
)
= 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
(5.1)
Pr
[
wit
i(n)
A∗,Z(n) is a fake witness
]
− Pr
[
wit
i(n)−1
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
(5.2)
Fix a particular n for which that happens and let i = i(n). Using A∗, we
construct a man-in-the-middle adversary A˜∗ and distributions D1n and D
2
n that
violate the SNMWI property of the 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 protocol. Recall that in Stage
4 and 5, 〈Ps, Vs〉 protocol is repeated sequentially twice. For the proof of this
claim, we consider the execution in Stage 4 and 5 after the commitment message
as an interaction using 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉. Furthermore, since 〈Ps, Vs〉 is SNMWI, using
Proposition 1 it follows that 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 is also SNMWI.
First, note that experiments Ei−1n and E
i
n proceed identically up until the end
of Stage 4 of the ith proof if the prover is honest in the ith proof and until the end
of Stage 3 if the veriﬁer is honest in the ith proof. Let Γ(A∗, Z, n) denote the set
of all possible joint views τ of A∗ and all the parties such that the next message
is the beginning of either a Stage 4 or Stage 5 message depending on which party
is honest in the ith proof using 〈P, V 〉. Let wit1A∗,Z(n) and wit2A∗,Z(n) denote
random variables that represent the value committed to by value committed to
by A∗ in a randomly chosen 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 interaction that begins after the messages
in τ are exchanged in experiments Ei−1n and E
i
n respectively. It now follows that
Equation 5.2 continues to hold, even if we replace witi−1A∗,Z(n) and wit
i
A∗,Z(n) to
wit1A∗,Z(n) and wit
2
A∗,Z(n) respectively. This is because, if the com message corre-
sponding to a 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 proof occurs in the messages in τ , then the probability that
the value in the commitment is fake is identical in experiments Ei−1n and E
i
n and
thus can be safely ignored. Furthermore, we combine the case when Equation 5.1
or Equation 5.2 holds by constructing a distinguisher D˜ that achieves the following
in either of the two cases.
Pr
[
D˜
(
hybiA∗,Z(n),wit
1
A∗,Z(n)
)
= 1
]
−Pr
[
D˜
(
hybi−1A∗,Z(n),wit
2
A∗,Z(n)
)
= 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
(5.3)
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Such a distinguisher exists when Equation 5.1 holds; consider D˜ that ignores the
second input and runs D on the ﬁrst input. When Equation 5.2 holds, consider a
distinguisher D˜ that merely checks and outputs 1 if and only if the second input
is a witness to a puzzle interaction (i.e. fake witness).
Deﬁne distributions D1n and D
2
n as follows: Sample τ according to Γ(A
∗, Z, n)
and,
• If in τ , A∗ is controlling the prover in the ith proof, then D1n outputs
((x :: transV→P :: transOT :: r, com(w, s)), (w, s), τ, )
and D2n outputs
((x :: transV→P :: transOT :: r, com(w′, s)), (w′, s), τ)
where corresponding to the ith proof, x is the statement that the honest
prover is proving in the 〈P, V 〉 interaction, w ∈ RL(x), transV→P and
transOT are transcripts of Stages 1 and 3, r is the input revealed by the
honest prover in Stage 5 and w′ ∈ R(transV→P ).
• If in τ , A∗ is controlling the veriﬁer in the ith proof, then D1n outputs
((transP→V :: transOT , com(w, r)), (w, r), τ)
and D2n(τ) outputs
((transP→V :: transOT , com(w′, r)), (w′, r), τ)
where corresponding to the i
th
proof, transOT and transP→V are the tran-
scripts of Stage 2 and 3 and w is the witness used by the honest veriﬁer in
Stage 4, w′ ∈ R(transP→V ).
For a partial transcript τ sampled from Γ(A∗, Z, n), deﬁne id(τ) to be the identiﬁer
of the honest party participating in the ith proof.
The adversary A˜∗ proceeds as follows on input ((TRANS, com(σ)), τ). It incor-
porates A∗, Z and all the parties and internally emulates the experiment Ei−1n in
the following manner.
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• It starts by feeding the parties all messages in τ .
• For the ith proof, if the prover is honest, A˜∗ feeds com(σ) as the commitment
in Stage 5 to A∗ and forwards messages in the 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉-interaction to the
external prover (on the left).
• For a randomly chosen 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉-interaction that begins after the messages
in τ and A∗ controls the prover, A˜∗ forwards the messages to the external
veriﬁer (on the right).
• On completion of the internal emulation , A˜∗ outputs what Z outputs in the
internal emulation.
It follows from the description that the interaction emulated internally by A˜∗
is identical to Ei−1n when the inputs are chosen from D
1
n and identical to E
i
n when
the inputs are chosen from D2n. Since A˜
∗ outputs what Z outputs, it follows that
(hybi−1A∗,Z(n),wit
1
A∗,Z(n)) =
{
(x, y, z)← D1n : mimA˜
∗
〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, z, id(z))
}
(hybiA∗,Z(n),wit
2
A∗,Z(n)) =
{
(x, y, z)← D2n : mimA˜
∗
〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, z, id(z))
}
Using Equation 5.3, it follows that:
Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D1n : D˜(mimA˜
∗
〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, z, id(z))) = 1
]
−Pr
[
(x, y, z)← D1n : D˜(mimA˜
∗
〈P 2s ,V 2s 〉(x, z, id(z))) = 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
Therefore, D˜ distinguishes the man-in-the-middle experiments with A˜∗ when
the inputs are chosen according to D1n and D
2
n. Furthermore, since the com scheme
is computationally-hiding , we have that the following distributions are indistin-
guishable over n ∈ N:
• {((TRANS, com(σ)), y, z)← D1n : ((TRANS, com(σ)), z)}n∈N
• {((TRANS, com(σ′)), y, z)← D2n : ((TRANS, com(σ′)), z)}n∈N
Therefore, A˜∗ with D1n and D
2
n violates the SNMWI property of 〈P 2s , V 2s 〉 and
we arrive at a contradiction. This concludes the proof of the claim.
Comparing H1n and H
2
n. Again, we consider a sequence of intermediate experi-
ments F 0n = H
1
n, F
1
n , . . . , F
q(n)
n where F in is the experiment that proceeds identical
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to H1n, with the exception that in the ﬁrst i proofs using 〈P, V 〉 where honest par-
ties receive a proof from A∗, the honest veriﬁer is simulated so as to use index 2
instead of index 1 as input to the Stage 3 OT protocol. We restate Claim 9 and
then provide the proof.
Claim 12 (Claim 9 restated). For every adversary A∗ ∈ Csim that is non-abusing
in H1n and environment Z ∈ Cenv, it holds that{
hybrid1A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
≈
{
hybrid2A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
Furthermore, A∗ is non-abusing in H2n.
Proof: By construction, the experiment F
q(n)
n is identical to H2n. We also have
that the experiments F in and F
i−1
n proceed identically up until the end of Stage 2 in
the ith proof using 〈P, V 〉. Let Γ(A∗, z, n) denote the set of all possible joint views
τ of A∗ and all the parties such that the next message is the beginning of Stage 3 in
the ith proof using 〈P, V 〉 where the prover is honest. Deﬁne random variables for
F in, hyb
i
A∗,Z(n) and wit
i
A∗,Z(n) to be respectively the output of Z and the value
committed to by A∗ corresponding to a randomly chosen 〈Ps, Vs〉 interaction where
A∗ controls the prover. Assume for contradiction that there exists an adversary
A∗ that is non-abusing in experiment F 0n , distinguisher D and polynomial p(·)
such that for inﬁnitely many n, either of the following holds:
Pr
[
D
(
hyb0A∗,Z(n)
)
= 1
]− Pr [D(hybq(n)A∗,Z(n)) = 1] ≥ 1p(n)
Pr
[
wit
q(n)
A∗,Z(n) is a fake witness
]
≥ 1
p(n)
Then, there exists a function i(·) such that i(n) ∈ [q(n)] for all n.
Pr
[
D
(
hyb
i(n)
A∗,Z(n)
)
= 1
]
− Pr
[
D
(
hyb
i(n)−1
A∗,Z (n)
)
= 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
Pr
[
wit
i(n)
A∗,Z(n) is a fake witness
]
− Pr
[
wit
i(n)−1
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
Just as in hybrids H0n and H
1
n, we can construct distinguisher D˜ such that for
inﬁnitely many n, it holds that:
Pr
[
D˜
(
hyb
i(n)
A∗,Z(n),wit
1
A∗,Z(n)
)
= 1
]
−Pr
[
D˜
(
hyb
i(n)−1
A∗,Z (n),wit
2
A∗,Z(n)
)
= 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
(5.4)
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wherewit1A∗,Z(n) andwit
2
A∗,Z(n) denote random variables that represent the value
committed to by value committed to by A∗ in a randomly chosen 〈Ps, Vs〉 interac-
tion that begins after the messages in τ are exchanged in experiments F i−1n and
F in respectively.
Fix a particular n for which that happens and let i = i(n). Using A∗, we
construct a man-in-the-middle adversary A˜∗ and machineB that violate the robust-
SNMWI property of the 〈Ps, Vs〉 protocol.
The machine B on input vbn = (b, n), proceeds as follows: it runs the code of an
honest receiver for the 〈SOT , ROT 〉 protocol and interacts with external adversary
A˜∗ with input index b.
The adversary A˜∗ on auxiliary input τ , proceeds as follows: It incorporates A∗,
Z and all the parties and internally emulates the experiment F i−1n in the following
manner.
• It starts by feeding the parties all messages in τ .
• For the ith proof, A˜∗ forwards messages in the Stage 3 OT protocol to the
external machine B (on the left).
• For a randomly chosen 〈Ps, Vs〉-interaction that begins after the messages
in τ and A∗ controls the prover, A˜∗ forwards the messages to the external
veriﬁer (on the right).
• On completion of the internal emulation , A˜∗ outputs what Z outputs in the
internal emulation.
It follows from the description that the interaction emulated internally by A˜∗
when the auxiliary input z is chosen according to the distribution Γ(A∗, Z, n) is
identical to F i−1n when B's input is v
1
n and F
i
n when B's input is v
2
n. Therefore, it
follows that (
hybi−1A∗,Z(n),wit
1
A∗,Z(n)
)
= mimA˜
∗,B
〈Ps,Vs〉(v
1
n)(
hybiA∗,Z(n),wit
2
A∗,Z(n)
)
= mimA˜
∗,B
〈Ps,Vs〉(v
2
n)
Now it follows from Equation 5.4 that:
Pr
[
D˜(mimA˜
∗,B
〈Ps,Vs〉(v
1
n)) = 1
]
− Pr
[
D˜(mimA˜
∗,B
〈Ps,Vs〉(v
2
n)) = 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
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Since the OT protocol is receiver private, we additionally have that:{
viewA˜[〈B(v1n), A˜(z)〉]
}
n∈N
≈
{
viewA˜[〈B(v2n), A˜(z)〉]
}
n∈N
Since 〈Ps, Vs〉 is tOT -robust and B interacts in at most tOT rounds, we have that A˜∗,
B and D˜ violates the tOT -robustness of the 〈Ps, Vs〉 and arrive at a contradiction.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Comparing H2n and H
3
n. Again, we consider a sequence of hybrid experiments
H2n = G
0
n, G
1
n, . . . , G
q(n)
n where Gin is a hybrid experiment with A
∗ that is identical
to H2n, with the exception that last i proofs given by honest provers using 〈P, V 〉
ordered by completion of Stage 4, the honest prover is simulated so as to use two
random strings r1, r2 as input to the OT protocol instead of inputs that add up to
the witness w.
As in the previous hybrids, we construct an adversary that violates the robust-
ness of the SNMWI protocol. Towards achieving this, we prove in a preliminary
step that in experiments G
i(n)
n for every function i, the adversary does not commit
to the fake witness (i.e. is non-abusing) in any 〈Ps, Vs〉 proofs that complete
before the end of Stage 4 of the ith interaction. More precisely, consider the trun-
cated experiments G˜in which proceeds identically to G
i
n, with the exception that
the adversary A∗ halts after completing the Stage 4 proof in the ith interaction
and outputs its view (this can be achieved by constructing a wrapper that inter-
nally emulates the code of A∗ and cuts it oﬀ when required). Deﬁne h˜yb
i
A∗,Z(n)
to be the random variable that represents the partial view of A∗ at the end of the
experiment G˜in. Also, w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n) represent the value committed to by A
∗ in the
jth 〈Ps, Vs〉 interaction where A∗ controls the prover in G˜in. If the jth proof starts
before the beginning of Stage 4 or after the end of Stage 4 in the ith proof then let
w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n) = ⊥. We now have the following claim.
Subclaim 2. For any function i : N → N and j : N → N, the following distribu-
tions are indistinguishable over n ∈ N:
•
{
(h˜yb
i
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n))
}
n∈N
•
{
(h˜yb
i−1
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n))
}
n∈N
Consequently, for every adversary A∗ that is non-abusing in G˜0n, there exists a
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negligible function ν(·) such that
Pr
{
witi,jA∗,Z(n) is a fake witness ∧
jth 〈Ps, Vs〉-proof completes before Stage 4 of ith 〈P, V 〉 interaction
}
≤ ν(n)
We turn towards comparing hybrids H2n and H
3
n and defer the proof of the claim
to the end. As before, we have that the experiment G
q(n)
n is identical to H3n. We
also have that the experiments Gin and G
i−1
n proceed identically up until the end of
Stage 2 in the ith proof using 〈P, V 〉 (reverse ordered from the end). Let Γ(A∗, z, n)
denote the set of all possible joint views τ of A∗ and all the parties such that the
next message is the beginning of Stage 3 in the ith proof using 〈P, V 〉 where the
prover is honest. Deﬁne random variables for Gin, hyb
i
A∗,Z(n) and wit
i
A∗,Z(n) to
be respectively the output of Z and the value committed to by A∗ corresponding
to a randomly chosen 〈Ps, Vs〉 interaction where A∗ controls the prover.
Claim 13 (Claim 10 restated). The following ensembles are indistinguishable over
n ∈ N:
•
{
hybrid2A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
(
=
{
hyb0A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
)
•
{
hybrid3A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
(
=
{
hyb
q(n)
A∗,Z(n)
}
n∈N
)
Furthermore, if A∗ is non-abusing in G0n, then it is non-abusing in G
q(n)
n .
Proof: Assume for contradiction, either one of the following occurs,
Case 1: There exists a function j : N → N and polynomial p(·) such that for
inﬁnitely many n,
Pr
[
wit
q(n),j(n)
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
≥ 1
p(n)
Case 2: There exists a distinguisher D and polynomial p(·) such that for inﬁnitely
many n,
Pr
[
D(hyb0A∗,Z(n)) = 1
]− Pr [D(hybq(n)A∗,Z(n)) = 1] ≥ 1p(n)
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Resolving Case 1: If Case 1 occurs for inﬁnitely many n, then there exists a
function i : N→ N such that
Pr
[
D(hyb
i(n)
A∗,Z(n)) = 1
]
− Pr
[
D(hyb
i(n)−1
A∗,Z (n)) = 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
(5.5)
Let the second 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof in Stage 4 of the ith interaction be the jth 〈Ps, Vs〉
proof in which the adversary controls the prover. We assume further that
Pr
[
wit
i(n),j
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
≤ 1
4p(n)q(n)
(5.6)
Pr
[
wit
i(n)−1,j
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
≤ 1
4p(n)q(n)
(5.7)
This follows without loss of generality for suﬃciently large n from Sub-Claim 2.
Fix an n for which Equations 5.5-5.7 hold and let i = i(n), j = j(n). Using
A∗, we construct a distinguisher that distinguishes (h˜yb
i
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n)) and
(h˜yb
i−1
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n)) with non-negligible probability and arrive at contradic-
tion to Sub-Claim 2.
The distinguisher D∗ on input (τ, w) proceeds as follows:
• If w is a witness to a puzzle interaction, then D halts outputting 0.
• Otherwise, D∗ interprets w as a witness for the Stage 4 proof in ith 〈P, V 〉-
interaction. If w is not a fake witness, then let r be the value part of the
witness w, that represents the receivers output in the Stage 3 OT protocol.
For the ith proof, in Stage 5, D∗ feeds r and continues emulation.
• On completion, D∗ feeds the output of Z to D and outputs what D outputs.
It follows from the description that the internal emulation byD∗ when the input
is sampled from (h˜yb
i
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n)) proceeds identically to G
i
n if w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n)
is not the fake witness. Similarly, the internal emulation proceeds identically to
Gi−1n when th input is sampled from (h˜yb
i−1
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n)) if w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n) is not
the fake witness. Since w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n) and w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n) are each not fake except with
79
probability 1
4p(n)q(n)
, it follows that
Pr
[
D∗(h˜yb
i
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n)) = 1
]
− Pr
[
D∗(h˜yb
i−1
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n)) = 1
]
≥ Pr [D(hybiA∗,Z(n)) = 1]
− Pr [D(hybi−1A∗,Z(n)) = 1]− 24p(n)q(n)
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
− 2
4p(n)q(n)
=
1
2p(n)q(n)
Therefore, D∗ with the functions i and j as deﬁned above, contradicts Sub-
Claim 2 and this concludes the proof of Case 1.
Resolving Case 2: If Case 2 occurs for inﬁnitely many n, then there exists a
function i : N→ N such that either of the following case occurs:
Case 2a: There exists a function i : N→ N such that for inﬁnitely many n,
Pr
[
wit
i(n),j(n)
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
−Pr
[
wit
i(n)−1,j(n)
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
and a 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof corresponding to the j(n)th commitment completes be-
fore Stage 4 of the ith 〈P, V 〉 interaction completes. This case directly con-
tradicts Sub-Claim 2 and hence can be ruled out.
Case 2b: There exists a function i : N→ N such that for inﬁnitely many n,
Pr
[
wit
i(n),j(n)
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
−Pr
[
wit
i(n)−1,j(n)
A∗,Z (n) is a fake witness
]
≥ 1
p(n)q(n)
and a 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof corresponding to the j(n)th commitment begins after
Stage 4 of the ith 〈P, V 〉 interaction completes.
In this case, we follow the same approach as Case 1. Assume further Equa-
tions 5.6 and 5.7 hold. Then consider a distinguisher D∗ that proceeds iden-
tically as in Case 1, with the exception that on completion, for a randomly
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chosen 〈Ps, Vs〉-interaction that begins after Stage 4 of the ith interaction
where A∗ controls the prover, D∗ applies the (stand-alone) extractor guaran-
teed by the proof-of-knowledge property of 〈Ps, Vs〉 and extracts a witness w.
D∗ then outputs 1 if witness w is fake and 0 otherwise. As before, we have
that the internal emulation carried out by D∗ when inputs are sampled from
(h˜yb
i
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n)) and (h˜yb
i−1
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n)) proceed identically
to Gin and G
i−1
n respectively if w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n) and w˜it
i,j−1
A∗,Z (n) are not fake. Fur-
thermore, whenever the execution completes, except with probability ν(n)
for some negligible function ν(·), the extraction succeeds. Therefore,
Pr
[
D∗(h˜yb
i
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n)) = 1
]
− Pr
[
D∗(h˜yb
i−1
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n)) = 1
]
≥ Pr [witi,jA∗,Z(n) is a fake witness]
− Pr [witi−1,jA∗,Z (n) is a fake witness]− 24p(n)q(n) − 2ν(n)
≥ 1
2p(n)q(n)
− 2ν(n)
and again we obtain a contradiction to Sub-Claim 2.
Remark 4. Note that Cases 2a and 2b do not necessarily include all the 〈Ps, Vs〉
proofs given by the adversary. Consider a 〈Ps, Vs〉-proof that begins before Stage 4
of the ith begins and completes after Stage 4 ﬁnishes. This proof is not considered
in either of the cases. However, it suﬃces to ensure that some 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof is
considered for the commitment message in Stage 4 or Stage 5 (as the case may be)
in every 〈P, V 〉 interaction. This holds because in each of Stage 4 and Stage 5, two
〈Ps, Vs〉 proofs are provided and at least one of the two proofs fall in either Case
2a or Case 2b.
This concludes the proof of Claim 10. It only remains to prove Sub-Claim 2.
Proof of Sub-Claim 2: Assume for contradiction, there exists distinguisher D,
functions i, j : N→ N and polynomial p(·) such that for inﬁnitely many n,
Pr
[
D
(
h˜yb
i(n)
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i(n),j(n)
A∗,Z (n)
)
= 1
]
−Pr
[
D
(
h˜yb
i(n)−1
A∗,Z (n), w˜it
i(n)−1,j(n)
A∗,Z (n)
)
= 1
]
≥ 1
p(n)
(5.8)
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Fix a particular n for which this happens and let i = i(n), j = j(n). Using A∗,
we construct an adversary A˜ and machine B such that A˜ violates the k-robustness
of the 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof and arrive at a contradiction. Observe that the only diﬀerence
in experiments G˜i−1n and G˜
i
n is in the inputs used by the honest prover in the Stage
3 OT protocol of ith interaction. Now, using the idea from the previous step,
we consider a machine B plays that participates as the sender in the 〈SOT , ROT 〉
protocol and on inputs 1 and 2 it changes from real to fake inputs. The adversary
A˜∗ internally incorporates A∗ and forwards the Stage 3 of ith instance to B and
the jth 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof on the right. We arrive at a contradiction to the robustness
of the 〈Ps, Vs〉 proof by showing that interaction with B on real and fake inputs
are indistinguishable.
More formally, let Γ(A∗, z, n) denote the set of all possible joint views τ of A∗
and all the parties in G˜in such that the next message is the beginning of Stage 3
in the ith proof. Given τ , deﬁne vb(τ) = (b, w) where w is the real witness used by
the honest prover in the ith proof.
The machine B on input vbn = (b, w), proceeds as follows:
• If b = 1, it chooses a random string r and runs the code of an honest sender
for the 〈SOT , ROT 〉 protocol with inputs r, r ⊕ w.
• If b = 2, it choose two random strings r1, r2 and runs the code of an honest
sender for the 〈SOT , ROT 〉 protocol with inputs r1, r2.
The adversary A˜∗ on auxiliary input τ , proceeds as follows: It incorporates A∗,
Z and all the parties and internally emulates the experiment G0n in the following
manner.
• It starts by feeding the parties all messages in τ .
• For the ith proof, A˜∗ forwards messages in the Stage 3 OT protocol to the
external machine B (on the left).
• For the jth 〈Ps, Vs〉-interaction where A∗ controls the prover, A˜∗ forwards the
messages to the external veriﬁer (on the right). We remark that by deﬁnition,
the jth proof begins after the Stage 3 of the ith proof begins.
82
• On completion of Stage 4 in the ith proof, A˜∗ cuts oﬀ the experiment and
outputs the joint partial view of Z, A∗ and all honest parties in the internal
emulation.
Note that A˜ will not be able to carry out the internal emulation beyond Stage 4
in the ith proof without knowing the ﬁrst input used by B in the OT protocol.
However, this will not be a problem since we consider only the truncated experi-
ment G˜in. It therefore follows from the description that the interaction emulated
internally by A˜∗ when the auxiliary input z is chosen according to the distribution
Γ(A∗, Z, n) is identical to G˜i−1n when B's input is v
1
n and G˜
i
n when B's input is v
2
n.
Therefore, it follows that(
h˜yb
i−1
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i−1,j
A∗,Z (n)
)
=
{
τ ← Γ(A∗, Z, n) : mimA˜∗,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v1n(τ))
}
(
h˜yb
i
A∗,Z(n), w˜it
i,j
A∗,Z(n)
)
=
{
τ ← Γ(A∗, Z, n) : mimA˜∗,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v2n(τ))
}
Using Equation 5.8, it follows that
Pr
[
τ ← Γ(A∗, Z, n) : D(mimA˜∗,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v1n(τ)))]
−Pr
[
τ ← Γ(A∗, Z, n) : D(mimA˜∗,B〈Ps,Vs〉(v1n(τ)))] ≥ 1p(n)
Using sender privacy of the OT protocol in Stage 3, we have the following sub-
claim:
Subclaim 3.{
viewA˜[〈B(v1(z)), A˜(z)〉]
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
≈
{
viewA˜[〈B(v2(z)), A˜(z)〉]
}
n∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
Since 〈Ps, Vs〉 is tOT -robust and B interacts in at most tOT rounds, it follows
from the above claim that A˜∗, B and D violates the tOT -robustness of the 〈Ps, Vs〉
and thus we arrive at a contradiction. This concludes the proof of the Sub-Claim 2.
It only remains to prove the sub-claim.
Proof of Sub-Claim 3: Since the OT protocol is sender-private, it follows that
there exists a cheating receiver that can distinguish the inputs in the ideal world
where the parties have access to a ideal OT-functionality. However, the inputs
used in the OT protocol when τ is sampled through Γ satisfy the property that
the string obtained by the receiver from the ideal OT-functionality in the ideal-
world is uniformly random. Thus, the view of the receiver in the ideal-world when
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the senders inputs are chosen according to v1(τ) and v2(τ) are identical when
τ is sampled from Γ. Therefore, the views in the real-world must at least be
computationally indistinguishable.
This concludes the proof of the Lemma 7.
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CHAPTER 6
APPLICATIONS OF THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we provide protocols to realize any functionality securely in
diﬀerent UC models. On a high-level, we construct a UC-puzzle in the diﬀerent
UC-models and obtain feasibility as a corollary to our main theorem.
More precisely, for secure computation to be feasible in a general model
(Cenv, Csim), we require:
• A (Cenv, Csim)-secure UC-puzzle.
• Existence of stand-alone SH-OT protocol that is secure w.r.t cl(Cenv, Csim).
These in turn can be constructed by relying on the existence of enhanced
trapdoor permutation or homomorphic encryption secure w.r.t cl(Cenv, Csim).
• A SNMWI argument of knowledge protocol that is secure w.r.t
cl(Cenv, Csim); by this we mean an interactive argument system where both
the argument of knowledge and SNMWI property holds w.r.t adversaries
in cl(Cenv, Csim). These in turn can be constructed in O(1)-rounds by re-
lying on one-way functions secure w.r.t cl(Cenv, Csim) using the construction
provided in Chapter 4.
Since stand-alone SH-OT protocol secure w.r.t cl(Cenv, Csim) is necessary for UC-
security and its existence implies the existence of one-way functions secure w.r.t
cl(Cenv, Csim), it suﬃces to construct a UC-puzzle to demonstrate feasibility in a
general model. Below, we provide UC-puzzles for various UC models.
6.1 Non-Uniform UC
In this model, we consider a uniform PPT adversary and non-uniform PPT sim-
ulator. We prove the following feasibility result for this model.
Theorem 5. Assume the existence of t-round stand-alone secure SH-OT protocol,
and an evasive promise problem in BPP. Then, for every well-formed ideal func-
tionality F , there exists a O(t)-round protocol pi that realizes Fˆ with Non-Uniform
UC-security.
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As mentioned before, we construct a UC-puzzle in this model and obtain the
theorem as corollary of Theorem 3. First, we introduce some new complexity
theoretic assumptions that we use in the construction. Recall the notion of an
evasive sets [33] and promise problems.
Deﬁnition 20. A set S is said to be evasive, if for all n, S ∩ {0, 1}n 6= ∅
and for any PPT machine M , there is a negligible function ν(·), such that,
Pr [M(1n) ∈ S ∩ {0, 1}n] ≤ ν(n)
Deﬁnition 21. A promise-problem ∆ is a pair of disjoint sets ∆Y ,∆N ⊆ {0, 1}∗
and ∆Y ∪∆N is called the promise.
Deﬁnition 22. A promise problem ∆ = (∆Y ,∆N) is evasive, if for all n, ∆Y ∩
{0, 1}n 6= ∅ and for PPT machine M , there is a negligible function ν(·), such that,
Pr [M(1n) ∈ {0, 1}n\∆N ] ≤ ν(n)
We now turn towards constructing a UC-puzzle in this model. For simplicity, we
begin by constructing a puzzle relying on a slightly stronger assumption, namely,
the existence of an evasive set ∆ in P . Then, we give the actual construction
assuming the existence of an evasive promise-problem in BPP.
Lemma 10. Assume the existence of an evasive set L in P. Then, there exists a
puzzle in (PPT ,n.u.PPT ) with an empty protocol.
Proof: Let λ denote the empty string. Deﬁne the puzzle Pnu = (〈S,R〉,R) as
follows:
Protocol 〈S,R〉: S and R on input 1n run the empty protocol.
Relation: R = {(x, λ)|x ∈ L}
We prove soundness and statistical simulatability of the puzzle.
Soundness: Since, L is evasive, no cheating PPT receiver can output x such
that (x, λ) ∈ R, i.e. x ∈ L with more than negligible probability.
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Statistical-simulatability: Consider an adversary A that participates in a
concurrent puzzle execution with environment Z. We construct a nuPPT adver-
sary A′ that receives δ ∈ L as non-uniform advice and proceeds as follows. It
incorporates A internally and emulates an execution with A. It forwards all mes-
sages from A to Z, except the messages involved in the puzzle interactions with
A. However, since the protocol is empty, there are no messages exchanged in the
puzzle interaction. To output a witness, A′ simply outputs δ on its special output
tape whenever A sends (TRANS = λ,C) to Z for a puzzle interaction. Finally,
since the interaction between A′ with Z is identical to the interaction between A
with Z, the real and ideal executions are perfectly indistinguishable to Z.
We show at the end of this section that the stronger assumption is implied by
a number of more standard assumptions, such as,
• the existence of a uniform collision-resistant hash-function.
• the existence of a language L ∈ NE (where NE = Ntime(2O(n)))
that is hard-on-the-average for probabilistic exponential time machines, i.e.
BPtime(2O(n)); in other words, a scaled-up version of the assumption that
there exists a language inNP that is hard on the average for PPT machines.
• the existence of a language L ∈ NE ∩ coNE that is worst-case hard for
probabilistic exponential time machines; in other words, a scaled up version
of the assumption that there exists a language in NP∩ coNP that is worst-
case hard for PPT machines.
We turn towards constructing a puzzle based on the weaker assumption.
Lemma 11. Assume the existence of an evasive promise-problem ∆ in BPP.
Then, there exists a puzzle in (PPT ,n.u.PPT ).
Proof: Let ∆ = (∆Y ,∆N) and M be the PPT machine that decides ∆. To
construct a puzzle, we modify the protocol from the previous lemma as follows:
The sender samples r1, . . . , rn uniformly at random from {0, 1}r(n), where r(·) is the
polynomial that bounds the number of random bits used byM for inputs of length
n. The relation R is deﬁned as {(w, (r1, . . . , rn))|# {i|Mri(w) = 1} > n3}, where
Mr stands for the machine M with the random tape ﬁxed to r. The soundness
follows from the evasiveness of ∆. For simulatability, consider A′ that receives an
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element δ from ∆Y as non- uniform advice and outputs δ as witness for a puzzle-
transcripts TRANS = (r1, . . . , rn), if # {i|Mri(w) = 1} > n3 . If for some puzzle-
transcript TRANS, the condition is not true, A′ aborts outputting ⊥. Conditioned
on A′ not aborting, it follows that the simulation is perfectly indistinguishable
to Z. For every w ∈ ∆Y , using Chernoﬀ-bound we have that the probability A′
aborts is poly(n)2−O(n
2) which is exponentially small. Thus, {realA,Z(n)}n∈N and
{idealA′,Z(n)}n∈N are statistically close.
Quite surprisingly, we show in Section 7, that the weaker assumption is in fact
necessary to achieve secure computation with Non-Uniform UC-security. Since
stand-alone secure SH-OT is also necessary, we obtain necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for Non-Uniform UC-security to be feasible.
6.2 Quasi-Polynomial UC
In this model, we consider a PPT adversary and a PQT simulator. Assuming the
existence of one-way functions that are invertable by PQT machines, we show
in Lemma 12 and obtain the following feasibility result.
Theorem 6. Assume the existence of stand-alone secure SH-OT secure w.r.t PQT
and one-way functions that can inverted w.p. 1 in PQT . Then, for every well-
formed ideal functionality F , there exists a O(t)-round protocol pi that realizes Fˆ
with QPS UC-security.
We remark that one-way functions that are invertable by PQT machines can be
constructed based on one-way functions with sub-exponential hardness. Therefore,
assuming sub-exponential hardness, we obtain as corollary an O(t)-round protocol
that securely realizes any functionality with QPS-UC-security. In comparison with
previous works, we obtain the following improvements.
Complexity Assumptions: We require stand-alone secure SH-OT w.r.t PQT
and one-way functions with sub-exponential hardness (or one-way functions
invertable by PQT ). The protocol in [6] apart from relying on the particular
assumption of the existence of enhanced-trapdoor permutation secure w.r.t
PQT , also requires collision-resistant hash functions that are secure w.r.t
sub-exponential circuits.
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Security: We achieve a stronger notion of security, which (in analogy with [63])
requires that the output of the simulator is indistinguishable also for PQT ;
in contrast, [6] only achieves polynomial-time indistinguishability. In essence,
this means that anything an attacker can learn on-line (in poly-time) can
be simulated oﬀ-line (in qpoly-time) in a way that is indistinguishable also
oﬀ-line. In this language, [6] only achieves on-line indistinguishability.
Lemma 12. Assume the existence of a one-way function f , such that there
exists a PQT machine that inverts f w.p. 1. Then, there exists a 1-round
(n.u.PPT ,PQT )-secure UC-puzzle.
Proof: Let f be the one-way function. Deﬁne Ppqt = (〈S,R〉,R) as follows
Protocol 〈S,R〉: S → R: S picks x← {0, 1}n and sends y = f(x) to
R
S ↔ R: a witness-hiding argument of knowledge of the state-
ment that there exists x′ such that y = f(x′)
Relation: R = {(x, y)|y = f(x)}
Soundness: This follows directly from the one-wayness of f and the witness-
hiding property of the proof given by the sender.
Statistical Simulatability: Simulation follows identically as in the case for
Non-Uniform UC model. To output a witness, we require A′ to compute the
inverse of y = f(x) for a random x. While emulating A, if A completes a puzzle-
interaction, then A′ tries to invert x to obtain a witness y such that y = f(x) if
one exists and halts outputting fail. Since f is invertable in PQT , we have that
A′ succeeds whenever y is in the range of f and the simulation is identical to the
real execution. It suﬃces to bound the failure probability of A′. Since A uses a
proof-of-knowledge in the puzzle to prove that y is in the range of f , except with
negligible probability, for every puzzle, it holds that y is in the range of f .
Remark 5. If we further assume the existence of collision-resistant hash functions
that are secure w.r.t PQT , we can construct a UC-puzzle relying on the weaker
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assumption of the existence of a PPT interactive Turing Machine M such that
for every PPT machine P , Pr [outputM(〈P,M〉(1n)) = 1] is negligible and there
exists a PQT machine P˜ such that Pr [outputM(〈P,M〉(1n)) = 1] is negligibly
close to 1. In fact, this weaker assumption can be shown to be necessary for realizing
QPS-UC-security. However, both the construction and the lower-bound is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
6.3 UC in the Common Reference String model
In the traditional Common Reference String (CRS) model, all parties have access
to a common reference string that is chosen from a speciﬁed trusted distribution D.
In the UC framework, this is captured via an ideal functionality FDCRS that samples
a string τ from a pre-determined ﬁxed distribution D and sets τ as the reference
string. Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky and Sahai in [19] show that any functionality
can be realized in the FCRS-hybrid assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor
permutations.
We show how to construct a puzzle relying on one-way functions. Since one-way
functions can be based on stand-alone SH-OT, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Assume the existence of a O(t)-round stand-alone secure SH-OT. Let
G be a pseudo-random generator. Then, for every well-formed ideal functionality
F , there exists a O(t)-round protocol pi that realizes Fˆ with UC-security in FGCRS-
hybrid.
In comparison with previous works, our construction for the CRS-model is
optimal w.r.t complexity assumptions since stand-alone SH-OT is necessary. Since
we construct a O(t)-round protocol, our construction is also round-optimal.
We show how to construct a puzzle in the FGCRS-hybrid, where G is a pseudo-
random generator. The puzzle for this model, PCRS = (〈S,R〉,R) is deﬁned as
follows. The protocol 〈S,R〉 in this model, simply requires S and R on input sid to
request the reference string by sending sid to the ideal functionality FGCRS. As in
the quasi-polynomial model, we deﬁne the relation R to include the set of tuples
(x,G(x)). Soundness of the puzzle, follows from the pseudo-randomness (and
thus, one-wayness) of G. In a concurrent puzzle execution the puzzle environment
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Functionality FDCRS
1. Upon activation with session id sid proceed as follows. Run the sam-
pling algorithm D on a uniformly distributed random input ρ from
{0, 1}n to obtain a reference string r = D(ρ). Store D, ρ, r and send
(URS, sid, ρ) to the adversary.
2. When receiving input (CRS,sid) from some party P with session id
sid′, send (CRS,sid, ρ) to that party if sid = sid′; otherwise ignore the
message.
Figure 6.1: Uniform Reference String functionality
Z decides the sid that the receivers receive as input. Furthermore, since Z is
allowed to interact only with the adversary, it can never obtain the reference string
directly from FGCRS. We obtain simulatability, by allowing the simulator A′ to set
the reference string as G(x) for its choice of x, and thus enable A′ to obtain the
witness x (to all puzzles) directly.
We remark that pseudo-random generator can be constructed relying on one-
way functions[43] which in turn exist if SH-OT exists. Therefore, existence of
SH-OT is necessary and suﬃcient for UC-security to be feasible in the CRS model.
6.4 UC in the Uniform Reference String model
When the distribution D in the CRS-functionality is ﬁxed as the uniform distribu-
tion, we obtain the uniform reference string (URS) model. In [19], assuming further
the existence of dense crypto-systems, they show how to realize any functionality
in the URS-model. They require this additional assumption to embed the key of
a public-key crypto-system in the reference string for ensuring non-malleability.
We show that how to improve their construction by achieving the same without
assuming the existence of dense-crypto systems and using only stand-alone SH-OT.
Let the URS-functionality be FURS = F ICRS, where I is the identity func-
tion. Since, the FGCRS-functionality implements the FURS-functionality when G is
a pseudo-random generator, any protocol that realizes f in the FGCRS also realizes
the same functionality in the FURS-hybrid. This follows from the UC-composition
Theorem [12]. Thus, without any additional assumptions, we obtain a protocol in
the URS-model.
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Theorem 8. Assume the existence of a t-round stand-alone secure SH-OT. Then,
for every well-formed ideal functionality F , there exists a O(t)-round protocol pi
that realizes Fˆ with UC-security in FURS-hybrid.
As in the CRS-model, our construction is optimal both in complexity-
assumptions and round-complexity.
6.5 UC in the Key Registration model
The Key-Registration (KR) service introduced in [2], represents a method for all
parties to obtain a public-key from a seed (representing the secret-key) which
is kept private by the service. The service is modeled as an ideal functionality
parameterized by a function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. Any party can register with
the KR service and obtain a public key in return. In a registration process, the
party obtains a public key v = f(R) for some uniformly chosen r aha its known
only to the service. In addition, a corrupted party may provide the service with
any arbitrary r and have its public-key set to r. In an execution, whenever a party
asks the service for the public key of another party, the service returns one of the
keys registered for that party. We provide the description of the KR-functionality
from [2] in Figure 6.2.
In [2], they show feasibility of UC-security in the KR-hybrid assuming enhanced
trapdoor permutation for speciﬁc one-way functions f .1 We dispense the latter
assumption and show how to achieve the same assuming only stand-alone secure
SH-OT. We prove the following feasibility theorem for this model.
Theorem 9. Assume the existence of a t-round SH-OT. Let f be a one-way
function. Then, for every well-formed ideal functionality F , there exists a O(t)-
round protocol pi that realizes Fˆ with UC-security in FfKR-hybrid.
Again, our construction is optimal both in complexity-assumptions and round-
complexity.
1They required one-way functions that mapped secret keys to corresponding public keys of a
crypto-system
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Functionality FfKR
Upon activation with input sid and security parameter n, proceed as follows.
Initialize a set of R of strings empty.
Registration: When receiving a message (register, sid) from a party Pi
(which is either corrupted or uncorrupted), send (register, sid, Pi) to
the adversary A and receive a value p′. Then, if p′ ∈ R then let
p ← p′. Else, choose r ← {0, 1}n, let p ← f(r), and add p to R.
Finally, record (Pi, p) and return (sid, p) to Pi and to A.
Registration by a corrupted party: When receiving a message
(register, sid, r) from a corrupted party Pi, record (Pi, f(r)). In
this case, f(r) is not added to R.
Retrieval: When receiving a message (retrieve, sid, Pi, Pj) from Pj , send
(retrieve, sid, Pi, Pj) to A, and obtain a value p from A. If (Pi, p) is
recorded then return (sid, Pi, p) to Pj . Else, return (sid, Pi,⊥) to Pj .
Figure 6.2: Key Registration functionality
We prove the theorem by constructing a puzzle. Deﬁne the puzzle Pkr =
(〈S,R〉,R) in FfKR as follows. The protocol 〈S,R〉 requires the receiver R to
obtain the public-key of the sender by sending the message (retrieve, sid, S,R) to
FfKR. The relation R is deﬁned as in the CRS model with function f . Soundness of
the puzzle follows from the one-wayness of f . To obtain simulation, the simulator
of the puzzle A′, internally emulates the adversary A and emulates an interaction,
by forwarding all messages sent by A to its puzzle-environment externally to A′'s
environment. All messages sent to FfKR are however treated diﬀerently so that A′
obtains the secret-key corresponding to the public-keys of all senders controlled by
the adversary A in a concurrent puzzle execution. More precisely, the adversary
A sends two kinds of messages to FfKR.
• A, controlling party Pi can register with FfKR honestly. In this case, A′ does
not let FfKR chose the public-key, but instead, chooses the public-key r and
registers r with FfKR. Internally, A′ feeds the message (Pi, f(r)) to A.
• A, controlling party Pi chooses the public-key r and registers by sending r
to FfKR. In this case, A′ stores r and forwards it to FfKR.
Finally, A′ is required to output a witness corresponding to every puzzle-
interaction s. Recall that, s is the public-key of some sender controlled by A,
and therefore, the witness is the secret-key corresponding to s. Since, A′ knows all
the secret-keys of senders controlled by A, it can output the witness accordingly.
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6.6 UC in the Sunspots model
The sunspots model introduced by Canetti, Pass and Shelat [20], considers a vari-
ant of the CRS model. In contrast to the traditional CRS-model, here the ideal-
functionality, that we call the Fsun, sets the reference string by sampling uniformly
from an eﬃcient distribution D (that has suﬃcient min-entropy) which is initially
set by the environment Z. In [20], they show how to securely realize any func-
tionality in the Fsun-hybrid. Their construction, however, requires every pair of
parties to share two separate reference string in order to achieve non-malleability.
We show how to remove this assumption, by constructing a protocol that is secure,
when parties have access to only a single reference string with minimal min-entropy
guarantees.
In [20], the sunspots model allows the environments to decide the distribution
D for the Fsun-functionality. This is done, in order to consider random sources
computable in exponential time and derive (black-box) lower bounds. Since, we
focus only on feasibility, we slightly simplify the model (as suggested in [20]) and
instead directly let the adversary select the distribution D.
As in [20], we consider (µ, d, t)-conforming adversaries:
Deﬁnition. An adversary A is called (µ, d, t)-conforming if the following conditions
hold:
1. Given security parameter 1n, and upon receiving a message (Activated-
CRS, sid) from Fsun, A directly replies by sending back a message
(Distribution, sid,D), where the sampling algorithm D outputs reference
strings of length n, has description size at most d(n), and generates an out-
put within t(n) steps.
2. The distribution induced by the output of Fsun in the execution by A (on input
1n) has min-entropy at least µ(n) (over the random choices of both A and
Fsun).
First, we state our feasibility theorem for the Sunspots model.
Theorem 10. Assume the existence of t-round stand-alone secure SH-OT and
collision-resistant hash-functions. Then, for every well-formed ideal functionality
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Functionality Fsun
1. Upon activation with session id sid proceed as follows. Send the mes-
sage (Activated, sid) to the adversary, and wait to receive back a
message (n, sid,D). Run the sampling algorithm D on a uniformly
distributed random input ρ from {0, 1}n to obtain a reference string
r = D(ρ). Store D, ρ, r and send (CRS, sid, r, ρ) to the adversary.
2. When receiving input (CRS,sid) from some party P with session id
sid′, send (CRS,sid, r) to that party if sid = sid′; otherwise ignore the
message.
Figure 6.3: The Sunspots functionality
F , there exists a O(t)-round protocol pi in the Fsun-hybrid that realizes Fˆ with UC-
security w.r.t (µ, d, t)-conforming adversaries where µ(n) − d(n) > nε for some
ε > 0.
We remark that as in [20], we can achieve the same result for smaller min-
entropies (i.e. µ(n)− d(n) > poly(log n)) by additionally assuming one-way func-
tions with sub-exponential hardness. To prove the above theorem, it suﬃces to
construct a O(1)-round UC-puzzle in the Fsun-hybrid model. To show feasibility
with UC-security in the Fsun-hybrid, we use a similar approach to the FURS-hybrid,
by ﬁrst considering a FGsun-hybrid model, where Fsun,G is the ideal-functionality
identical to Fsun, with the exception that, instead of running the sampling algo-
rithm D on a uniformly distributed ρ, it runs D on input G(x) for a uniformly
random x, where G is a pseudo-random generator. Then similar to the URS-model,
we conclude that the protocol constructed in the FGsun-hybrid also securely realizes
the functionality in the Fsun-hybrid.
We proceed towards constructing a puzzle in the FGsun-hybrid. Let G :
{0, 1}nδ → {0, 1}∗ be a pseudo-random generator that expands a seed of length
nδ (for δ > 0) to a stream of bits such that d(n) + nδ + |G| < µ(n). Such a δ(n)
is guaranteed to exist since µ(n) − d(n) > nε. Such a generator can in turn be
constructed relying on any one-way function[43].
Our construction of the puzzle is essentially identical to the construction used
in [20], the only diﬀerence is we rely on the use of statistically-hiding commitments
in the construction. We mention that although we rely on a similar protocol, we
show that a single reference string is enough, while [20] requires many strings. As in
[20], we rely on universal arguments to construct the puzzle. Universal Arguments
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(UARGs) [3], are a variant of CS-proofs introduced by Micali [55]. Informally,
such proofs systems are used in order to provide eﬃcient proofs to statements
of the form y = (M,x, t), where y is considered to be a true statement if M is a
non-deterministic machine that accepts x within t steps. Such a system can be
constructed based on collision-resistant hash functions. See [3] for more details.
Let (V1, P1, V2, P2, V3) be the respective veriﬁer and prover algorithms for a
public-coin UARG for the language {r|r ∈ {0, 1}n and KOL(r) < n ε+δ2 }, where
KOL(x) is the Kolmogorov complexity of a string x.2 We describe a language of
transcripts of universal arguments in which the prover's messages are committed
instead of sent to the veriﬁer. (In the protocol, we make use of the fact that
the universal argument we use is a public-coin system, so the Veriﬁer can always
choose a next message without seeing the Prover's prior messages.). Let com be a
statistically-hiding commitment scheme (which exists based on collision-resistant
hash functions)
Protocol 〈S,R〉: S and R obtain the reference string r from the FGsun-
functionality.
S → R : Pick m1 ← V1(r, n) and send to R.
R→ S : Pick c1 ← {0, 1}l and send to S.
S → R : Pick m2 ← V2(r, n) and send to R.
R→ S : Pick c2 ← {0, 1}l and send to S.
Relation: R =
(TRANS, w)
∣∣∣∣∣
TRANS = (r, v1, c1, v2, c2),
w = ((p1, r1), (p2, r2)),
∃r1, r2 c1 ← com(p1, r1), c2 ← com(p2, r2)
and V3(s, v1, p1, v2, p2) = 1

Soundness: Suppose a PPT receiver R∗ is able to break the soundness by out-
putting the witness for a puzzle with probability p. We use R∗ to construct another
2The Kolmogorov complexity of a string x is the size of the smallest Turing machine which
produces x on its output tape, when run on the empty tape.
96
eﬃcient algorithm P which breaks the soundness property of the universal argu-
ment system with probability poly(p). The soundness of the universal argument
system therefore implies that p must be negligible which implies the soundness of
the puzzle. We show that P breaks the soundness of the universal argument w.p.
poly(p) on the statement that the reference string r sampled from FGsun-functionality
has a short description. Since, G is pseudo-random, if p is non-negligible, then
P breaks the soundness with non-negligible probability in the hybrid experiment
when r is sampled from Fsun-functionality. Since, D has min-entropy µ(n), w.p. at
most 2−n
ε−δ
2 = 2−O(n
ε), r has a short description and therefore no computationally
unbounded prover can succeed in the the universal argument with non-negligible
probability. Thus, p is non-negligible.
More precisely, P upon receiving the veriﬁer message v1, feeds v1 to R and
then internally simulates the rest of the puzzle until R outputs the witness. By
hypothesis, this succeeds with probability p. Let p1 be a decommitment to the
ﬁrst message sent by R. P forwards p1 externally to the veriﬁer and receives the
next message v2. At this point, P rewinds R and feeds v2 instead of the second
message (simulated before) from the veriﬁer and continues to simulate the rest of
the puzzle. If R returns a valid decommitment p2 for the second message sent
by R, P forwards p2 to the external veriﬁer. We argue that with probability at
least p2, the transcript (v1, p1, v2, p2) is an accepting transcript for the universal
argument.
Simulatability: We achieve statistical simulation similar to the puzzle in the
URS-model, by allowing the simulator A′ to set the reference string and obtain
the witness, which is the description of D, G and x, whose combined size by
construction is nδ+O(1)+d(n) < n
ε+δ
2 . Furthermore, while emulating a receiver in
a puzzle with adversary A, instead of following the honest receiver's code, runs the
code of an honest prover (P1, P2) in the universal argument with witness (D,G, x)
and sends a commitment to the messages generated by P1 and P2. The witness
output by A′ for the puzzle are decommitments to the messages sent in the puzzle.
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6.7 UC in the Tamper-Proof Hardware Model
In this section, we consider a model that incorporates the physical assumption that
protocols can be run in an isolated environment. In particular, we consider the
existence of tamper-proof hardware, which enables a party Pi to create and give
to another party Pj a hardware token TF implementing any desired functionality
F , and Pj can then access the embedded functionality in a black-box manner.
Here the token is tamper-proof meaning that any adversary having access to the
token can do no more than observing the input/output characteristics of the token.
Such tamper-proof hardware was ﬁrst introduced by Katz [45] in the context of
UC-security, and formalized as the wrap ideal functionality Fwrap, which accepts
two kinds of messages.
• In order for a party Pi to create a token and give it to another party
Pj, it sends the message (create, sid, Pi, Pj, M) to Fwrap, where M is the
interactive Turing machine implementing the functionality Pi wants to embed
in the token. Upon receiving such a message, the ideal functionality stores
internally the initial state (Pi, Pj, M , 0, ∅) for this token, if there has not
been a token from Pi to Pj.
• Once a token is created and given to Pj, it can then access the token (i.e.
interacts with M) via Fwrap. More precisely, Fwrap chooses a fresh random
tape r forM , and internally emulates the execution ofM(r), by forwarding
messages from M(r) externally to Pj. Furthermore, in the emulation, M is
also allowed to receive messages from Pi (forwarded by Fwrap). However, it
can only send messages to Pj; and it cannot communicate with any other
parties except Pi and Pj.
We recall the formal description of Fwrap for a two-round interactive protocol in [45]
in ﬁgure 6.4.
Katz shows that UC secure computation is feasible in the Fwrap-hybrid model
relying on the DDH assumption. Using our generalized framework, we remove
the need for speciﬁc number-theoretic assumption, and show how to construct by
relying only on the existence of SH-OT.
Theorem 11. Assume the existence of a t-round stand-alone secure SH-OT.
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Functionality Fwrap
Fwrap is parameterized by a polynomial p and an implicit security parameter
n.
Creation: Upon receiving (create, sid, Pi, Pj , M) from Pi, where Pj is
another user in the system and M is an interactive Turing machine,
do:
1. Send (create, sid, Pi, Pj) to Pj .
2. If there is no tuple of the form (Pi, Pj , *, *, *) stored, then store
(Pi, Pj , M , 0, ∅).
Execution: Upon receiving (run, sid, Pi, msg) from P
′, ﬁnd the unique
stored tuple (Pi, Pj , M , k, state) (if no such tuple exists, then do
nothing). Then do:
Case 1 (i = 0): Choose random r ← {0, 1}p(n). Run M(msg, r) for
at most p(n) steps, and let out be the response (set out = ⊥ if
M does not respond in the allotted time). Send (sid, Pi, out) to
Pj . Store (Pi, Pj ,M , 1, (msg, r)) and erase (Pi, Pj ,M , i, state).
Case 2 (i = 1): Parse state as (msg1, r). Run M(msg1‖msg, r) for
at most p(n) steps, and let out be the response (set out = ⊥ if
M does not respond in the allotted time). Send (sid, Pi, out) to
Pj . Store (Pi, Pj , M , 0, ∅) and erase (Pi, Pj , M , i, state).
If during the execution, M sends a message msg′ addressed to party
P . (Assume, without loss of generality, that the identity of the receiver
is encoded in the message.) Send (sid, Pi, msg
′) to Pi, if P = Pi, and
ignore otherwise.
Figure 6.4: Wrap functionality
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Then, for every well-formed ideal functionality F , there exists a O(t)-round pro-
tocol pi that realizes Fˆ with UC-security in the Fwrap-hybrid model.
To show the theorem, it suﬃces to construct a puzzle in the Fwrap-hybrid model.
In all the previous models, the puzzle protocols 〈S,R〉 are executed in a stateless
way, that is, whenever a party intends to challenge (acting as the sender of the
puzzle) another, it spawns independently a new subroutine of S to generate the
puzzle. In this model, we, however, consider a stateful puzzle, which requires a
party to spawn a subroutine of S at the beginning of its execution, and use this
subroutine to generate all the puzzles it needs throughout its lifetime. (Note that
the receiver part of the puzzle protocol is still stateless.) It is stateful in the
sense that the subroutine can keep states across multiple invocations, and hence
the puzzle instances generated are not independent to each other, but correlated.
More precisely, We deﬁne the puzzle Pwrap = (〈S,R〉,R) for the Fwrap-hybrid
model as follows. The interactive Turing machine S, proceeds in two phases.
• When it is ﬁrst spawned and invoked on inputs the identity of the sender
Pi and the session id sidcalled the initialization phaseit uniformly picks
a string x ∈ {0, 1}n, computes its image y through the one-way function f ,
and stores (y, Pi, sid) as an internal state.
• Later when S is invoked on inputs the identity of the puzzle receiver Pj to
challenge Pjcalled the challenging phaseS checks whether this is the ﬁrst
time interacting with party Pj, if so, it creates and give Pj a token, which
encapsulates the functionality M that gives a witness-hiding argument-of-
knowledge of the statement that y is in the image set of f , by sending the
message (create, sid, Pi, Pj, M) to Fwrap. To actually challenge Pj, S simply
sends y as the puzzle to the receiver.
On the other hand, the interactive Turing machine R, upon receiving y from the
sender, accesses M via Fwrap. More precisely, it ﬁrst sends the message (run, sid,
S, ε) to Fwrap (where ε is an empty string), and then receives from M a WHAOK
of the statement that y is in the image set of f (forwarded by Fwrap). Finally, the
puzzle relation R is simply {(x, y) | y = f(x)}.
The soundness of the puzzle follows directly from the one-wayness of the func-
tion f and the witness-hiding property of the protocol. Furthermore, to simulate a
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concurrent puzzle execution with A and the environment Z, A′ internally emulates
an execution with A and acts as the Fwrap functionality for A. Whenever A sends
a message (create, sid, Pi, Pj, M
∗) to Fwrap, A′ obtains the message. Later to
extract the witness of a puzzle y challenged by A (controlling Pi) to Pj, A
′ simply
rewinds M∗ in the witness-hiding argument-of-knowledge sub-protocol to extract
the witness. Notice that sinceM∗ is prohibited from receiving messages from other
parties except Pj, it would never expect any new messages from parties other than
Pj during rewindings. Therefore the extraction can be ﬁnished in isolation, with-
out intervening the adversary A and the environment Z. Hence we achieve perfect
simulation.
6.8 Stand-alone Model
The UC-framework enables to guarantee security even when multiple protocol
instances are running concurrently. It might still be useful to capture within the
UC framework also security properties that are not necessarily preserved under
concurrent composition. This section aims at constructing protocols for one such
milder setting that guarantees that during the execution of a protocol instance no
other protocol instances are running concurrently. This model is usually referred
to as the stand-alone or non-concurrent setting.
This model does not directly follow from our general UC-model. However, it is
possible to alter the model following [12] and construct a puzzle to show feasibility.
First we describe the model from [12] in more detail and then prove feasibility.
To model non-concurrent behavior, we ﬁrst require synchronous communication
(as opposed to just authenticated communication). Roughly speaking, in addition
to authenticated delivery, here the computation proceeds in rounds, when in each
round each party receives all the messages that were sent to it in the previous
round, and generates outgoing messages for the next round. This is formally
modeled through the Fsyn ideal-functionality that expects a list of P of parties
among which synchronization is to be provided and then proceeds to guide the
execution in a lock-step manner by providing guaranteed and timely delivery of
messages every round.
For non-concurrent behavior, we additionally require that the environment Z
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Functionality Fsyn
Fsyn expects its SID to be of the form sid = (P¯ , sid′), where P¯ is a list of
party identities among which synchronization is to be provided. It proceeds
as follows.
1. At the ﬁrst activation, initialize a round counter r as 1, and send a
public delayed output (Init, sid) to all parties in P¯ .
2. Upon receiving input (Send, sid,M) from a party P ∈ P¯ , where M =
{(mi, Ri)} is a set of pairs of messages mi and recipient identities
Ri ∈ P¯ , record (P,M, r) and output (sid, P,M, r) to the adversary.
3. Upon receiving message (Advance-Round, sid,N) from the adversary,
do: If there exist uncorrupted parties P ∈ P¯ for which no record
(P,M, r) exists then ignore this message. Else:
(a) Interpret N as list of messages sent by corrupted parties in the
round. That is, N = {(Si, Ri,mi)} where each Si, Ri ∈ P¯ , m
is a message, and Si is corrupted. (Si is taken as the sender of
message mi and Ri is the receiver.)
(b) Prepare for each party P ∈ P¯ the list LrP of messages that were
sent to it in round r.
(c) Increment the round number: r ← r + 1.
4. Upon receiving input (Receive,sid) from some party P ∈ P¯ , output
(Received,sid, r, Lr−1P ) to P . (Let L
0
P = ⊥.)
Figure 6.5: The Synchronous Communication functionality
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and the adversary do not interact from the moment the ﬁrst protocol message
is sent until the moment where the last protocol message is delivered. Thus the
stand-alone model is realized through the Fsyn-hybrid with restricted environments
as described above.
As pointed out in [12], the protocol from [34] can be shown to be secure in this
model. However, the construction in [34] requires O(n)-rounds of communication.
This is because only two parties are allowed to exchange messages according to
a protocol in every round (the others send dummy messages). This is required
to achieve non-malleability. We show how to achieve the same with O(t)-rounds
of communication just assuming existence of a t-round semi-honest SH-OT. Since
oblivious-transfer is necessary for secure-computation, this shows that our con-
struction is round-optimal.
To show feasibility, we construct a puzzle in the Fsyn-hybrid by relying on one-
way functions. We need to alter the deﬁnition of the real-world experiment of the
concurrent puzzle execution slightly to ﬁt the stand-alone UC-model. Recall that
(as in the CRS-model), the puzzle-environment is not allowed to interact with
the Fsyn ideal-functionality. However, here we allow the environment to access
the Fsyn-hybrid. Furthermore, we allow the simulator to rewind the environment
to any previous state. Informally speaking, these changes does not aﬀect secu-
rity. Recall that in the puzzle lemma, to prove correctness, we incorporated the
entire execution in a concurrent puzzle execution, where we considered puzzle-
environments that internally emulated all the honest-parties execution (outside
the puzzle executions) and the environment. However, in this model, since the en-
vironment is denied communication with the adversary during protocol execution,
the puzzle-environment is only require to model honest parties communication.
Since these executions and Fsyn are internally emulated in our ﬁnal simulator and
is allowed to rewind those executions, we can allow simulators for the concurrent
puzzle execution that rewinds environments.
Theorem 12. Assume the existence of t-round stand-alone secure SH-OT proto-
col. Then, for every well-formed ideal functionality F , there exists a O(t)-round
protocol pi that realizes Fˆ with Stand Alone UC-security.
As mentioned before, we construct a UC-puzzle in this model and obtain the
theorem as corollary of Theorem 3. The puzzle we consider is identical to the one
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consider for QPS-UC-Security, with the exception that, we use a standard one-
way function instead of a one-way function that is invertable in PQT . Let f be a
one-way function. Deﬁne P||(〈Ps, Vs〉,R) as follows:
Protocol 〈S,R〉: S → R: S picks x← {0, 1}n and sends y = f(x) to
R
S ↔ R: a witness-hiding argument of knowledge of the state-
ment that there exists x′ such that y = f(x′)
Relation: R = {(x, y)|y = f(x)}
Soundness: This follows directly from the one-wayness of f and the witness-
hiding property of the proof given by the sender.
Statistical Simulatability: To output a witness, we require A′ to compute
the inverse of y = f(x) for a random x. As we are in the Fsyn-hybrid, the execution
proceeds in rounds, where all parties receive and send a message in each round.
After A completes a puzzle execution, A′ temporarily stalls the main execution
and tries to extract a witness for the puzzle.
Towards this, A′ rewinds A to the round where it received the challenge for the
WI protocol in the puzzle, say round r, and feeds a new challenge. For emulating
the environment messages and Fsyn in round r, A′ simply rewinds the respective
parties (as it is allowed to in this model). On receiving a response from A in the rth
round, if A′ obtains a valid challenge-response pair, then using the special-sound
extractor for theWI protocol, A′ extracts a witness. If the extractor fails A′ halts
outputting fail. If A aborts without giving a valid response, A′ rewinds repeatedly
until it obtains a valid challenge-response pair and then continues with the main
execution.
We remark that even if A completes several puzzle interactions concurrently
(or, more accurately, in parallel), A′ can focus on extracting the witnesses one at a
time, since the execution proceeds in rounds and rewinding in one interaction can
not rush A′ into extracting witnesses for other puzzle interactions (as is the case
with concurrent zero-knowledge simulators; see next chapter).
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Since the rewinding does not aﬀect the main execution, unless the special-
soundness extractor fails, the execution proceeds identically to the real-execution.
But this happens only with negligible probability and hence the simulation by A′
is statistically close to the real execution. Finally, to show that the simulator runs
in polynomial time, we rely on the fact that if p is the probability that A completes
the puzzle execution successfully, then A′ needs to rewind it in expectation 1/p
times. Overall, for every puzzle A′ in expectation employs p× 1/p = O(1) rewinds
to extract the witness. Since there are only polynomially many interactions, the
expected running time of A′ is polynomial.
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CHAPTER 7
LOWER BOUNDS FOR NON-UNIFORM UC-SECURITY
In the previous section, we constructed a puzzle in the Non-Uniform UC model
relying on the existence of evasive promise-problem in BPP. In this section, we
show that this assumption is in fact necessary to achieve Non-Uniform UC security.
More precisely, we show that if there exists a protocol Π = (Πcom,Πdecom) that
realizes the bit commitment functionality with Non-Uniform UC security, then
there exists an evasive promise problem ∆ = (∆Y ,∆N) in BPP.
To prove the lower-bound, we consider environments that communicate with
the adversary. However, it should be appreciated that the same lower-bounds hold
even in the case of just self-composition where the environment does not communi-
cate with the adversary. This follows since, as pointed out by Lindell [54], the envi-
ronment can always communicate with the adversary through the functionalityin
our setting, if the environment wishes to send a message to the adversary, it can
ask an honest party to commit and decommit that message to the adversary and
the adversary can commit and decommit the message to an honest party in order
to communicate a message to the environment. The proof idea is similar to [15],
but we exploit the reverse properties.
Functionality Fcom
1. Upon receiving input (Commit, sid, Pj , b) from Pi where b ∈ {0, 1}, in-
ternally record the tuple (Pi, Pj , b) and send the message (sid, Pi, Pj)
to the adversary; When receiving (ok) from the adversary, output
(Receipt, sid, Pi) to Pj . Ignore all subsequent (Commit, ...) inputs.
2. Upon receiving a value (Open, sid) from Pi, where a tuple (Pi, Pj , b)
is recorded, send (b) to the adversary; When receiving (ok) from the
adversary, output (Open, sid, b) to Pj .
Figure 7.1: Ideal Bit Commitment Functionality
Theorem 13. If there exists a protocol Π that with securely realizes Fcom with Non-
Uniform UC security, then there exists an evasive promise problem ∆ = (∆Y ,∆N)
in BPP.
Proof: Let Π = (Πcom,Πdecom) be the protocol that securely realizes the func-
tionality Fcom. Consider the following execution with the environment Z˜. On
activation it activates the adversary and proceeds as follows:
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• First, it activates two parties C and R. It then picks a random bit b and
initiates a session between C and R by selecting a session identiﬁed sid and
sending (Commit, sid, R, b) to C. On completion, it sends (Open, sid, b) to C.
• The Z˜ interacts with the adversary as an honest receiver using Πcom and
then followed by Πdecom
• Finally, Z˜ outputs 1 if the adversary successfully commits and decommits to
b.
Consider an adversary A, which upon activation, corrupts the receiver R and
relays all messages received from C to Z˜. Since Π realizes Fcom with Non-Uniform
UC security, there exists a simulator S∗ such that for all environments Z, the
following distributions are indistinguishable over n ∈ N:
• {execΠ,A,Z(n)}n∈N
• {execFcomΠideal,S∗,Z(n)}n∈N
where Πideal is the protocol, where the parties directly interact with Fcom using
their inputs.
Towards obtaining an evasive promise problem in BPP, we ﬁrst construct an
interactive PPT machine M that is easy to solve for n.u.PPT machines but
hard for PPT machines. Then using M , we show how to construct the required
language. Informally speaking, we say that M is easy to solve for P if after an
execution between P and M , M outputs 1 with high probability and it is hard to
solve if M outputs 1 with small probability.
The machine M on input 1n, proceeds as follows: It incorporates Z˜, Fcom and
the committer C and emulates the ideal-world experiment in the following manner:
• All messages intended for the adversary and receiver R and forwarded outside
with the recipient information encoded appropriately.
• All messages received are fed internally to the respective parties as encoded
in the message.
• Finally, M outputs what Z˜ outputs in the internal emulation.
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Claim 14. There exists a n.u.PPT machine P˜ such that
Pr
[
outputM(〈P˜ ,M〉(1n)) = 1
]
≥ 1− ν(n)
where ν(·) is a negligible function.
Proof: Consider the machine P˜ internally incorporates S∗ and forwards all mes-
sages from S∗ outside with the recipient information encoded appropriately (just
as M does). Since S∗ is a non-uniform PPT machine, so is P˜ . We claim that this
P˜ satisﬁes the conditions of the claim.
Recall that in an execution with Z˜ and A, Z˜ outputs 1 if A commits and
decommits to the bit b that it provided as input to C. Since A controls the receiver
R and relays the messages back-and-forth between C and the environment, and C
commits and decommits to b, it holds that
Pr
[
execΠ,A,Z˜(n) = 1
]
= 1
Since S∗ simulates A, we have that
Pr
[
execFcom
Πideal,S∗,Z˜
(n) = 1
]
≥ 1− ν(n)
for some negligible function ν(·).
We conclude the proof of the claim by observing that the internal emulation
by M when interacting with P˜ , proceeds identically to an execution with Z˜ and
S∗ in the ideal-world. Therefore,
Pr
[
outputM(〈P˜ ,M〉(1n)) = 1
]
= execFcomΠideal,S∗,Z(n) ≥ 1− ν(n)
Claim 15. For every PPT machine P , there exists a negligible function (·) such
that Pr [outputM(〈P,M〉(1n)) = 1] ≤ 12 + (n).
Proof: On a high-level, to prove this claim, we construct for every machine P
interacting with M an adversary A˜ that violates the security of Π realizing Fcom
and thus arrive at a contradiction.
Consider the following execution with the environment Z˜ ′. On activation it
activates the adversary and proceeds as follows:
108
• First, it activates two parties C and R. It then picks a random bit b and
initiates a session between C and R by selecting a session identiﬁed sid and
sending (Commit, sid, R, b) to C.
• On completion, it sends (Open, sid, b) to C and random bit b∗ to the adver-
sary.
• Finally, Z˜ ′ outputs 1 if C successfully commits and decommits the bit b∗ to
R.
Given any machine P that interacts withM , we construct an adversary A. The
adversary A internally incoporates P and proceeds as follows:
• A corrupts the committer C.
• On receiving (Commit, sid, R, b) from Z˜ ′, A ignores the message and feeds the
message (Receipt, sid, C) to P .
• All messages received by A from the external receiver R are fed internally to
P , with the exception that A changes the sender from R to the environment Z˜
(as internally emulated by M). Similarly all messages from P in the internal
emulation with encoded recipient Z˜ is forwarded externally R.
• On receiving b∗ from Z˜ ′, A feeds (Open, sid, b∗) to P .
It follows from construction that
Pr
[
execΠ,A,Z˜′(n) = 1
]
= Pr [outputM(〈P,M〉(1n)) = 1]
Furthermore, there exists S˜ such that∣∣∣Pr [execΠ,A,Z˜′(n) = 1]− Pr [execFcomΠideal,S˜,Z˜′(n) = 1] ∣∣∣ < (n) (7.1)
for some negligible function (·).
However, observe that S˜ controlling C needs to provide Fcom a bit b before Z˜ ′
releases b∗ and hence it can only succeed with probability at most a 1
2
. Therefore,
it follows from Equation 7.1 that
Pr [outputM(〈P,M〉(1n)) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ (n)
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We now turn towards constructing the promise problem.
The promise problem: Let P ∗ be the n.u.PPT machine that solves M . We
denote by P ∗x when the non-uniform advise to P
∗ is ﬁxed to the string x. Deﬁne
the language ∆ as follows:
∆Y =
{
x
∣∣∣Pr [outputM(〈P ∗x ,M〉1n) = 1] ≥ 78
}
∆N =
{
x
∣∣∣Pr [outputM(〈P ∗x ,M〉1n) = 1] ≤ 23
}
Claim 16. ∆ is in BPP.
Proof: To show that ∆ is in BPP, we construct a PPT machine that checks
membership in ∆. The machine A on input x, emulates N = n3 independent
executions of 〈P ∗x ,M〉. Let Xi denote the output of M in the ith iteration. A
accepts x if ∑N
i Xi
N
≥ 7
8
− 1
n
and rejects otherwise. It the follows from deﬁnition of Xi that
E[Xi] = Pr
[
outputP ∗x (〈P ∗x ,M〉(1n)) = 1
]
Hence, if x ∈ ∆Y , using the Chernoﬀ-bound, it follows that:
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣
∑N
i Xi
N
− 7
8
∣∣∣∣∣ > 1n
]
≤ 2−( 1n)
2
N = 2−n
and A accepts x with probability at least 1− 2−n. Similarly, if x ∈ ∆N ,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣
∑N
i Xi
N
− 2
3
∣∣∣∣∣ > 1n
]
≤ 2−( 1n)
2
N = 2−n
and A rejects x with probability at least 1 − 2−n. Therefore, A decides the
promise-problem ∆.
Claim 17. For every PPT machine A, there exists a negligible function ν(·) such
that, the probability that A on input 1n outputs an element in the set {0, 1}n\∆N
is at most ν(n).
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Proof: Assume for contradiction, there exists a PPT machine A and polynomial
p1(·) such that for inﬁnitely many n, it holds that
Pr [x← A(1n) : x 6∈ ∆N ∩ {0, 1}n] ≥ 1
p1(n)
Using A, we construct a PPT machine P ′ such that violates Claim 15
Consider the machine P ′ that on input 1n proceeds as follows:
• In a preprocessing phase, P ′ runs the following sequence of steps np1(n)
times.
1. Run A on input 1n . Let x be A's output.
2. Emulate 〈Px,M〉(1n) n3 times. Compute the fraction of times Px con-
vinces M , let this be p. If p < 2
3
− 1
n
continue with next iteration.
Otherwise, exit loop outputting x.
• Suppose, no x was output by the pre-processing phase, halt outputting ⊥.
Otherwise, run the code of Px to interact with the external machine M .
We claim that P ′ convinces M with probability at least 2
3
− 2
n
and this contra-
dicts Claim 15 since P ′ is a PPT machine.
It follows from description that if the pre-processing phase outputs any x, then
the probability that P ′ convinces M is Pr [outputM(〈Px,M〉(1n)) 6= 1]. Call x
good, if Pr [outputM(〈Px,M〉(1n)) = 1] ≥ 23 , i.e. x ∈ {0, 1}n\∆N . Next, we
bound the probability that the pre-processing phase fails to output a good x. This
happens if:
Event E1: The pre-processing phase outputs an x that is not good. If x is not
good in a trial, then the pre-processing phase outputs x only if the check in
Step 2 succeeds. Using the Chernoﬀ-bound, this is happens with probability
at most 2−n. Using the union bound, we have that the probability that the
pre-processing phase outputs an x that is not good is at most np1(n)2
−n.
Event E2: A fails to output a good x in every iteration. Since every element
outside ∆N is good by deﬁnition, the probability that A does not output
such an element in any of the trials is at most
(
1− 1
p1(n)
)np1(n) ≤ e−n.
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Event E3: A outputs a good x, but the check in Step 2 fails. If x is good, then by
Chernoﬀ-bound we have that except with probability 2−n, the check succeeds.
Observe that if neither of the events E1, E2 or E3 occurs, then the pre-processing
phase outputs a good x. Therefore P ′ interacts with M using Px for a good x and
succeeds with probability at least 2
3
− 1
n
.
Using the union bound we have that the probability that pre-processing phase
fails to output a good x is at most np1(n)2
−n+e−n+2−n < 1
n
(for suﬃciently large
n). Using another union bound, we have that
Pr [outputM(〈P ′,M〉(1n)) 6= 1] > 2
3
− 1
n
− 1
n
=
2
3
− 2
n
This concludes the proof of Theorem 13.
7.1 On Existence of Evasive Sets
We just proved in the previous section that the existence of evasive sets is neces-
sary and suﬃcient for achieving Non-Uniform UC-Security. Here we discuss the
plausibility of this assumption based on concrete constructions.
Evasive sets from Uniform Hash Functions. The ﬁrst construction we
consider will rely on the existence of a uniform hash function that is collision resis-
tant [5, 65]. Recall that hash functions are functions that are length compression.
A uniform hash-function is one that is computable by a deterministic polynomial
time algorithm.
Deﬁnition 23. A uniform hash function H is said to be collision-resistant if for
every uniform PPT algorithm A, there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that,
for all n, the probability that A on input 1n outputs a pair x 6= x′ ∈ {0, 1}n such
that H(x) = H(x′) is at most ν(n).
Theorem 14. Assume the existence of a uniform hash function H that is collision
resistant. Then there exists an evasive set that is decidable in polynomial time.
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Proof: Let H be the collision-resistant hash function. Deﬁne
∆ = {(1n, x, x′)|x 6= x′ ∈ {0, 1}n and H(x) = H(x′)}
Since any member in ∆ yields a valid collision for H, an adversary that outputs
a member of ∆ ∩ {0, 1}n for inﬁnitely many n with non-negligible probability,
also violates the collision-resistant property of H. Therefore, ∆ is an evasive-set.
Furthermore, since H is computable in strict polynomial time, any member of ∆
can also be checked in deterministic polynomial time.
Evasive Sets from Hard-on-the-average Language in NE. We now pro-
vide a construction of complexity ﬂavor. We show how to construct an evasive set
by relying on a language decidable in NE (NE = Ntime(2O(n)) that is hard-on-
the-average for probabilistic exponential time machines (PET ).
Deﬁnition 24. A language L is hard-on-the-average for the class of machines C,
if for any machine M ∈ C, there exists a δ < 1
6
, such that for all suﬃciently large
n,
Pr [x← {0, 1}n : M(x) = L(x)] ≤ 1
2
+ δ
Theorem 15. Assume the existence of hard-on-the-average languages for PET in
NE. Then there exists an evasive-set in BPP.
Proof: Let L ∈ NE be a hard-on-the-average for PET machines. Since L ∈ NE,
we have that every x that is a member of L has a witness of length 2|x|. Set
k(n) = dn
3
+ 1e.
Deﬁne ∆ as follows: the tuple (1n, (x1, w1), (x2, w2), . . . , (xk(n), wk(n))) is in ∆
if all xi's are distinct, for every i ∈ [k(n)], |xi| = blog nc and wi is a witness that
L(xi) = 1.
Membership in ∆ can be checked in polynomial time since the statement and
witness are of length O(log n). To prove that it is evasive, assume for contradiction
that there exists a uniform PPT algorithm A and polynomial p(·) such that for
inﬁnitely many n, the following holds: On input 1n, A outputs a member of ∆ of
the form (1n, · · · ) with probability p(n). Using A, we construct a PET machine
M that decides L on at least 2
3
fraction of strings from {0, 1}n for inﬁnitely many
n.
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Consider M that on input x (|x| = n) proceeds as follows: M runs A n2p(n)
times on input 1n. If it obtains a member in ∆, it outputs 1 if x,w is part of the
output and 0 otherwise. It follows that whenever A outputs a member in ∆, M
answers correctly on at least 2k(2
n)
2n
≥ 2
3
+ 2−n+1 fraction of the strings in {0, 1}2n .
Furthermore, the probability that A fails to output a member of ∆ in all the n2p(n)
tries is at most e−n
2
. Therefore, using the union bound we have that
Pr [x← {0, 1}n : M(x) = L(x)] ≥ 2
3
+ 2−n+1 − e−n2 ≥ 2
3
Thus, L is not hard-on-the-average for PET .
An equivalent formulation is to assume a unary language in NP that is hard-
on-the-average for PPT machines.
Evasive Sets from Worst-cast Hardness of NE ∩ coNE. In this section,
we construct an evasive set from a language in NE∩ coNE that is worst-cast hard
for PET machines. We require worst-case hardness in the following sense.
Deﬁnition 25. A language L is worst-case hard for PET , if for all PPT machines
P , there exists a N > 0, such that for every n > N , there exists xn such that
Pr [P (xn) = L(xn)] <
2
3
]
We remark that this is slightly stronger than the traditional worst-case hardness
deﬁnitions which does not require that there be a hard input for every length n,
but only for inﬁnitely many n. Now, we proceed to construct an evasive set ∆
from a language L that is worst-case hard for PET .
Theorem 16. Assume the existence of language in NE∩ coNE that is worst-case
hard for PET . Then there exists an evasive-set in BPP.
Proof: Let L ∈ NE ∩ coNE that is worst-case hard for PET machines. Since
L ∈ NE ∩ coNE, we have that every x has either a witness of length 2|x| proving
membership in L or a witness of length 2|x| proving membership of {0, 1}∗\L. Let
k(n) = 2blognc.
Deﬁne ∆ as follows: the tuple (1n, (x1, w1), (x2, w2), . . . , (xk(n), wk(n))) is in ∆
if all xi's are distinct, for every i ∈ [n], |xi| = blog nc and wi is either a witness
that L(xi) = 1 or L(xi) = 0.
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Membership in ∆ can be checked in polynomial time since the statement and
witness are of length O(log n). To prove that it is evasive, assume for contradiction
that there exists a uniform PPT algorithm A and polynomial p(·) such that for
inﬁnitely many n, the following holds: On input 1n, A outputs a member of ∆ of
the form (1n, · · · ) with probability p(n). Using A, we construct a PET machine
M that decides L in the worst-case and arrive at a contradiction.
Consider M that on input x (|x| = n) proceeds as follows: M runs A np(n)
times on input 1n. If it obtains a member in ∆, it ﬁnds a witness for x from the
output and checks outputs L(x) using the witness. It follows that whenever A
outputs a member in ∆, M decides L on all inputs from {0, 1}2n . Furthermore,
the probability that A fails to output a member of ∆ in all the n2p(n) tries is at
most e−n. Therefore, using the union bound we have that for inﬁnitely many n it
holds that:
∀ x ∈ {0, 1}n,Pr [M(x) = L(x)] ≥ 1− e−n ≥ 2
3
Thus, L is not worst-case hard for PET .
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CHAPTER 8
EFFICIENT CONCURRENT ZERO-KNOWLEDGE
In the previous chapters, we provided constructions to realize any functionality
that remains secure under arbitrary composition. The focus was to provide a
uniﬁed framework to help construct protocols in the diﬀerent models both with
and without trusted setup. In this chapter, we consider a relatively simpler task
of constructing protocols that are secure under self-composition (i.e. when sev-
eral instances of the same protocol run concurrently) but focusing on obtaining
round-eﬃcient protocols without assuming any trusted set-up, i.e. in the plain
model. In particular, we show how to obtain O(1)-round zero-knowledge proofs
and argument that are secure in this model of concurrent security. First, we begin
with a more detailed discussion on zero-knowledge and concurrent security under
self-composition.
Zero-knowledge interactive proofs [38] are paradoxical constructs that allow
one player (called the Prover) to convince another player (called the Veriﬁer) of
the validity of a mathematical statement x ∈ L, while providing zero additional
knowledge to the Veriﬁer. This is formalized by requiring that the view of every
eﬃcient adversary veriﬁer V ∗ interacting with the honest prover P be simulated
by an eﬃcient machine S (a.k.a. the simulator). The idea behind this deﬁnition
is that whatever V ∗ might have learned from interacting with P , he could have
actually learned by himself (by running the simulator S). As eﬃcient adversaries
normally are modelled as probabilistic polynomial-time machines (PPT ), the tra-
ditional deﬁnition of ZK models both the veriﬁer and the simulator as PPT ma-
chines. In this paper, we investigate alternative models of eﬃcient adversariesin
particular, as in [63], we model adversaries as probabilistic quasi-polynomial time
machines (PQT ).
Concurrency and ZK. The notion of concurrent ZK, ﬁrst introduced and
achieved, by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [27] considers the execution of zero-knowledge
proofs in an asynchronous setting and concurrent setting. More precisely, we con-
sider a single adversary mounting a coordinated attack by acting as a veriﬁer in
many concurrent executions. Concurrent zero-knowledge proofs are signiﬁcantly
harder to construct (and analyze).
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Since the original protocols by Dwork, Naor and Sahai (which relied on so
called timing assumptions), various other protocols have been obtained based
on diﬀerent set-up assumptions (e.g., [29, 22, 16]). On the other hand, in the
plain model without any set-up Canetti, Kilian, Petrank and Rosen [17] (build-
ing on earlier works by [48, 74]) show that concurrent ZK proofs for non-trivial
languages, with so called black-box simulators, require at least Ω( logn
log logn
) number
of communication rounds. Richardson and Kilian [73] constructed the ﬁrst concur-
rent zero-knowledge argument in the standard model. Their protocol which uses
a black-box simulator requires O(n) number of rounds. Kilian and Petrank [47]
later obtained a round complexity of O˜(log2 n), and ﬁnally Prabhakaran, Rosen and
Sahai [70] essentially closed the gap by obtaining a round complexity of O˜(log n).
All of the above results rely on the traditional modeling of adversaries as PPT
machines. Thus, it is feasible that there exists some super-polynomial, but well-
behaved, model of adversaries that admits constant-round concurrent ZK proofs.
Concurrent ZK w.r.t super-polynomial adversaries. The lower bound
of [48] shows that only languages decidable in probabilistic subexponential-time
have 4-round concurrent black-box zero-knowledge arguments w.r.t to probabilistic
subexponential-time adversaries. On the other hand, [63] constructs constant-
round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments w.r.t PQT veriﬁers (and conse-
quently also simulators); however the soundness condition of those argument sys-
tems only holds w.r.t. PPT adversariesin fact, the simulator succeeds in its
simulation by breaking the soundness condition of the argument system. Addi-
tionally, it is noted in [63] that there exist 3-round concurrent ZK proofs w.r.t.
exponential-time adversaries (as any witness indistinguishable proof is also zero-
knowledge with respect to exponential-time veriﬁers). Finally, [73] claimed that
a constant-round version of their protocol remains secure w.r.t PQT adversaries,
when considering a benign type of concurrent adversary (which never sends any
invalid messages and has a ﬁxedi.e., non-adaptively chosenscheduling), but as
far as we know a proof of this has never appeared.
Thus, the above results leave open the question of whether there exist r(n)-
round concurrent black-box zero-knowledge proofs w.r.t super-polynomial, but sub-
exponential, adversaries, as long as 4 < r(n) < log n. In particular,
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Does there exists constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments
w.r.t. PQT (or even sub-exponential time) adversaries?
8.1 Results
Our main result answers the above question in the aﬃrmative. Let PQT denote
the class of probabilistic quasi-polynomial time machines, i.e., randomized ma-
chines that run in time npoly(log(n)). Let ω(PQT ) denote the class of probabilistic
super quasi-polynomial time machines, i.e. randomized machines that run in time
nω(poly(log(n))).
Theorem 17 (Main Theorem). Assume the existence of claw-free permutations
w.r.t PQT . Then, every language in NP has an O(1)-round perfect concurrent
black-box ZK argument w.r.t PQT .
In addition, we show:
Theorem 18. Assume the existence of one-way functions that are secure w.r.t
ω(PQT ) and collision-resistant hash functions that are secure w.r.t ω(PQT ).
Then, every language in NP has an O(1)-round concurrent computational black-
box ZK proof w.r.t PQT .
Theorem 19. Assume the existence of one-way function that are secure w.r.t
ω(PQT ). Then, every language in NP has an O(1)-round concurrent computa-
tional black-box ZK arguments w.r.t PQT .
Theorem 20. There exists an O(1)-round concurrent perfect ZK proof w.r.t PQT
for Graph Non-Isomorphism and Quadratic Non-Residuosity
We emphasize that in the above theorems, ZK proofs and arguments w.r.t PQT 
refer to proofs / arguments where both the soundness condition and the ZK con-
dition holds w.r.t to PQT adversaries; in particular, for the ZK property we also
require that the distinguishability gap is smaller than the inverse of any quasi-
polynomial function.
A note on expected running-time. In contrast to earlier work on concurrent
zero-knowledge (e.g. [73, 47, 70]), our simulators run in expected PQT . This is
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inherent: by the work of Barak-Lindell [4] it follows that only languages decidable
in PQT have constant-round ZK protocols w.r.t PQT if requiring a strict PQT
simulator (let alone the question of concurrency). In particular, this shows that
none of the previous simulation techniques can be extended to get constant-round
protocols w.r.t PQT (at least when requiring that the output of the simulation is
also indistinguishable for PQT ).1
Additional results. Finally, we mention that our techniques apply also to
concurrent ZK proofs w.r.t PPT . As a result we obtain the ﬁrst concurrent
perfect ZK arguments/proofs w.r.t PPT .
Theorem 21. Assume the existence of claw-free permutations (w.r.t PPT ). Then,
every language in NP has an O(n)-round perfect concurrent black-box ZK argu-
ment w.r.t PPT , for every  > 0.
Theorem 22. For every ε > 0, there exists a O(nε)-round concurrent perfect ZK
proof for Graph Non-Isomorphism and Quadratic Non-Residuosity.
As an additional contribution, we believe that both our protocols and their
analysis provides the simplest proof of the existence of concurrent ZK proofs (w.r.t
PPT ).2
PQT v.s. PPT: What is right model for adversarial computation?
Recall that to show that ZK is closed under sequential composition, the original
deﬁnition of ZK was extended to consider non-uniform PPT adversaries [41]in
other words, in the context of ZK the notion of non-uniform PPT (for modeling
adversaries) is more robust than simply PPT . Additionally, security is guaranteed
w.r.t a stronger class of adversaries. Of course, the extra price to pay is that all
hardness assumptions now must hold also with respect to non-uniform PPT .
In this paper we show that by considering an even stronger class of adversaries
namely PQTwe get a notion that is even more robust; in particular, it is now
possible to get constant-round concurrent ZK protocols. Again, this requires us to
1On the other hand, it might still be plausible that the technique of [73] can be extended
to give constant-round protocols w.r.t PQT , when allowing the indistinguishability gap to be a
polynomial (or even some ﬁxed quasi-polynomial) function.
2In a related work [68], joint with Dustin Tseng we provide a simple proof for existence of
concurrent ZK proofs with logarithmic round complexity.
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rely on hardness assumptions against PQT , but this seems like a weak strength-
ening of traditional hardness assumptions (especially since the known attacks on
traditional conjectured hard functions require subexponential time).
A note on plausible deniability. The notion of ZK is traditionally associ-
ated with plausible deniabilityi.e., that the interaction leaves no trace which
the veriﬁer can use later to convince that the interaction took place. Intuitively,
this holds since the veriﬁer could have executed the simulator (on its self) to gen-
erate its view of the interaction. We mention, however, that since the traditional
deﬁnition of ZK allows the simulator to have an arbitrary (polynomial) overhead
with respect to the veriﬁer (who's view it is supposed to simulate), the deniability
guarantee oﬀered by traditional ZK proofs is weak: consider for instance a veriﬁer
with a running-time of t = 240 computational steps, and a simulator with running-
time, say, t3; although 240 is very feasible, 2120 seems like a stretch! The example
is not hypotheticthe tightest concurrent ZK protocols [47, 70] indeed have a
running-time of t2 not counting the time need to emulate the veriﬁer. Additionally,
as demonstrated in [56], the traditional notion of ZK does not guarantee that the
running-time of the simulator is (even polynomially) related to the running-time
of the veriﬁer in the view it is outputting, but rather the worst-case running-time
of the veriﬁer; this makes deniability even harder to argue.3
Nevertheless, in this respect, ZK w.r.t PQT provides even worse guarantees
(as the overhead is now allowed to be quasi-polynomial).
8.2 Techniques
The concurrent ZK protocols of Richardson and Kilian (RK) [73], Kilian and
Petrank (KP) [47] and Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai(PRS) [70] rely on the same
principal idea: provide the simulator with multiple possibilities (called slots) to
rewind the veriﬁer. If a rewinding is successful, the simulator obtains a trapdoor
that allows it to complete the execution that has been rewound. The RK simulator
3In a recent work [62], joint with Pandey, Sahai and Tseng we also show how to obtain precise
concurrent ZK proofs. Precise zero knowledge guarantees that the view of any veriﬁer V can be
simulated in time closely related to the actual (as opposed to the worst-case) time spent by V in
the generated view.
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is adaptive and dynamically decides when and where to rewind, while making sure
there are not too many recursive rewinding (which would result in a large running-
time). On a high-level, this is done by recursively invoking the simulator, but
ensuring that the number of levels of the recursion stays small (in fact, constant).
On the other hand, the KP (and PRS) simulator is oblivious; the simulator has a
ﬁxed rewinding scheduling, thereby ensuring a ﬁxed (and bounded) running-time.
The core of the argument is then to show that every execution has a slot that is
rewound at least once.
Our approach is based on the approach taken by RK. As RK, we consider an
adaptive simulator that makes recursive calls to itself, while ensuring that the depth
of the recursion stays small. Our actual simulation procedure is, however, quite
diﬀerent. On a high-level, our approach will perform a straight-line simulation
until a good slot has been found, and then continue rewinding that slot until
a trapdoor has been found. Thus, in contrast to the previous approach, we can
not bound the worst-case running-time of our simulator, instead we are forced to
bound the expected running-time of the simulator.
The beneﬁt of our approach is that 1) it enables us to achieve perfect simulation,
and 2) our analysis works no matter how many slots we have and what the depth of
recursion is. In fact, we can achieve both of these properties while still guaranteeing
the same expected running-time as RKnamely O(mO(logrm)), where r is the
number of slots. As a consequence, when applied to constant-round protocols
(and considering a logarithmic recursive depth) we get a quasi-polynomial running
time. As already mentioned, for this application, it is inherent to have an expected
quasi-polynomial running-time.
8.3 Open questions
We have demonstrated that constant-round concurrent ZK is possible w.r.t PQT
adversaries. Our protocol currently uses 10 communication rounds4. A natural
open question is to either improve the round-complexity or to strengthen the 4-
round lower bound of [48]. Another question is to investigate the possibility of using
4To obtain a 10 round protocol, we require non-interactive commitment schemes, which can
be constructed from one-way-permutations. If we assume only existence of one-way functions,
we get a 11-round protocol.
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an even weaker (but still super-polynomial) model of computation. Rosen [74]
shows that only languages in probabilistic sub quasi-polynomial time have 7-round
concurrent black-box zero-knowledge arguments when adversaries are modelled
as probabilistic sub quasi-polynomial time machines; thus, such protocols would
require more than 7-rounds.
8.4 Black-Box Concurrent Zero-Knowledge
In this section, we deﬁne black-box concurrent zero-knowledge Concurrent
Zero-Knowledge Let 〈P, V 〉 be an interactive proof for a language L. Con-
sider a concurrent adversary veriﬁer V ∗ that, given an input instance x ∈ L in-
teracts with m independent copies of P concurrently, without any restrictions
over the scheduling of the messages in the diﬀerent interactions with P . Let
output2[〈P, V ∗(z)〉(x)] denote the random variable describing the output of the
adversary V ∗ on common input x and auxiliary input z, in an interaction with P .
Deﬁnition 26 (Black-box concurrent zero-knowledge w.r.t C:). Let 〈P, V 〉 be an
interactive proof system for a language L. We say that 〈P, V 〉 is black-box concur-
rent zero-knowledge w.r.t C if for every functions q,m ∈ C, there exists a prob-
abilistic algorithm Sq,m, such that for every concurrent non-uniform adversary
V ∗ that on common input x and auxiliary input z has a running-time bounded
by q(|x|) and opens up m(|x|) executions, Sq,m(x, z) runs in time polynomial in
(q(|x|),m(|x|), |x|). Furthermore, the ensembles {Sq,m(x, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗ and
{viewV ∗ [〈P (w), V ∗(z)〉(x)]}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗ are computationally indistinguishable
w.r.t C over x ∈ L. We say that 〈P, V 〉 is perfect concurrent zero-knowledge w.r.t
C, if the above ensembles are identical.
8.5 Description of the protocol
Our concurrent ZK protocol (also used in [68]) is a slight variant of the precise ZK
protocol of [65], which in turn is a modiﬁcation of the Feige-Shamir protocol [30].
The protocol proceeds in the following two stages, on a common input statement
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and security parameter n,
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1. In Stage 1, the Veriﬁer picks two random strings s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}n, and sends
their image c1 = f(r1), c2 = f(r2) through a one-way function f to the
Prover. The Veriﬁer sends α1, . . . , αr, the ﬁrst messages of r invocations of
a WI special-sound proof of the fact that c1 and c2 have been constructed
properly (i.e., that they are in the image set of f). This is followed by r
iterations so that in the jth iteration, the Prover sends βj ← {0, 1}n2 , a
random second message for the jth proof and the Veriﬁer sends the third
message γj for the j
th proof.
2. In Stage 2, the Prover provides a WI proof of knowledge of the fact that
either x is in the language, or (at least) one of c1 and c2 are in the image set
of f .
More precisely, let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a one-way function and let the
witness relation RL′ , where ((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) ∈ RL′ if f(x1) = y1 or f(x2) = y2,
characterize the language L′. Let the language L ∈ NP . Protocol ConcZKArg for
proving that x ∈ L is depicted in Figure 8.1.
The soundness and the completeness of the protocol follows directly from the
proof of Feige and Shamir [30]; in fact, the protocol is an instantiation of theirs.
(Intuitively, to cheat in the protocol a prover must know an inverse to either c1
or c2, which requires inverting the one-way function f .).
On a very high-level the simulation follows that of Feige and Shamir [30]: the
simulator will attempt to rewind one of the special-sound proofseach such proof,
i.e. the challenge(β) and the response(γ) is called a slot. If the simulator gets two
accepting proof transcripts, the special-soundness property allows the simulator to
extract a fake witness ri such that ci = f(ri). This witness can later be used in
the second phase of the protocol.
Before we proceed to describing the actual simulator, we describe and analyze
a simple simulator that simulates only a restricted class of adversaries. But ﬁrst,
we ﬁx some notation that will be useful in describing simulation.
We refer to the pair of a prover-challenge, and the veriﬁer answer in Stage 1
as a slot. We say that a slot opens when the veriﬁer receives a prover challenge
and that the same slot slot closes, when the veriﬁer sends the answer to the prover
challenge. Formally, the opening of a slot s is a partial view h of V ∗ immediately
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Protocol ConcZKArg
Common Input: an instance x of a language L with witness relation RL.
Auxiliary Input for Prover: a witness w, such that (x,w) ∈ RL(x).
Stage 1:
V uniformly chooses r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}n.
V → P: c1 = f(r1), c2 = f(r2). r ﬁrst messages α1, . . . , αr for WI
special-sound proof of the statement. (called the start message)
either there exists a value r1 s.t c1 = f(r1)
or there exists a value r2 s.t c2 = f(r2)
The proof of knowledge is with respect to the witness relation R′L
For j = 1 to r do
P→ V: Second message βj ← {0, 1}n2 for jth WI special-sound
proof. (called the opening of slot j)
V → P: Third message γj for jth WI special-sound proof.
(called the closing of slot j)
Stage 2:
P ↔ V: a perfect-WI argument of knowledge of the statement
either there exists values r′1, r′2 s.t either c1 = f(r′1) or c2 =
f(r′2).
or x ∈ L
The argument of knowledge is with respect to the witness relation
RL∨L′(c1, c2, x) = {(r′1, r′2, w)|(r′1, r′2) ∈ RL′(c1, c2)∨w ∈ RL(x)}.
Figure 8.1: Concurrent Perfect ZK Argument for NP
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after which the slot opens; we may now identify a slot s by the view corresponding
to its opening. Analogously, the closing of a slot s is a partial view h immediately
after which s closes.
8.6 Warm-up: Simulating Static Non-Aborting Adversaries
In the context of concurrent zero-knowledge protocols, a benign form of adver-
sary employs an arbitrary but ﬁxed scheduling of messages. Such an adversary is
referred to as a static adversary. A non-aborting adversary is one that never causes
an honest prover to abort in an execution. In this section, we describe a simulator
that simulates only static non-aborting adversaries.
We consider the protocol described in the previous section where r is set to
2, i.e. we have 2 slots for every session. The simulator is deﬁned recursively in
the following manner: On the recursive depth `, from some partially view h of
messages in an execution, the simulator feeds random Stage 1 messages to V ∗.
Whenever the simulator receives the closing of slot s corresponding to a session
for which the simulator has not extracted a fake witness yet, it decides whether or
not to rewind the slot as follows:
• If s is a preﬁx of the partial view h (i.e. it corresponds to a session that
started at a higher recursive call), then the simulator continues simulation
at depth `.
• If the start message corresponding to the session containing s occurs after
the partial view h, then it decides to rewind s depending on the number of
new sessions that started between the challenge message and the response
message of s. If the number of sessions is small (where small is deﬁned
based on the depth `), the simulator begins rewinding the slot.
To rewind a slot s at depth `, S ﬁrst rewinds V ∗ up until the point where V ∗ expects
the opening of s. Then, it sends a new challenge β∗ for slot s and recursively invokes
itself on recursive depth `+1 from partial view s. It continues the simulation until
the slot s closes (i.e. obtains a response for the new challenge β∗). On obtaining
a valid response γ∗, the simulator using the special-soundness extractor, extracts
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a fake witness and continues its simulation (on depth `). To generate Stage 2
messages, S relies on the fake witness extracted in the rewindings. If a fake
witness has not yet been extracted it halts and outputs fail.
The basic idea behind the simulation is similar to [73]: if we deﬁne small
appropriately we can ensure that some slot of every session is rewound and the
running time is bounded. Let small at recursive depth ` be set as m
2`+1
, where m
is the number of sessions. We explain below informally that the simulator always
extracts a witness (i.e. never fails). The proof of indistinguishability follows using
a standard hybrid argument and is presented for the actual simulator in the next
section. For the warm-up simulator, we only analyze running time.
Proof Intuition: From the description, it follows that the simulator fails whenever
the simulator needs to provide a Stage 2 message for a session for which it has not
extracted a witness yet. We argue that this never happens. Suppose the simulation
fails at depth ` starting from partial view h on reaching Stage 2 of session i. There
are two cases depending on where the session started.
• Suppose session i started after partial view h, then it will hold that some slot
of the session is rewound and witness extracted. Recall that the simulator
rewinds every the slot of a session that starts after h, if fewer than m
2`+1
new sessions start within it. Recall that the simulation at level ` > 0 is a
rewinding of a slot at level `−1 and the adversary employs static scheduling;
so, at most m
2`
new sessions start in level `. Since session i starts after h,
both the slots must have completed before the simulation reaches Stage 2
and at least one of them have fewer than m
2`+1
new sessions within it and the
simulator would have chosen this slot to rewind. Finally, since the adversary
is non-aborting, the rewinding of the slot always provides a second challenge-
response for the slot and the simulator would have extracted a witness for
that session. Thus, this case does not occur.
• If the session i started at a higher recursive call, say depth `′ < `, we argue
that the simulator would have failed at depth `′ before it entered depth `.
Recall that the simulation at any depth `∗ > 0 is a rewinding of some slot that
occurred at depth `∗ − 1. Since the adversary employs a static scheduling,
every message that occurs in depth `∗ must have occurred at depth `∗ − 1.
This implies that the simulation should have reached the Stage 2 of session
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i at depth `′. Furthermore, by assumption, it could not have extracted a
witness for session i at depth `. Hence, it could not have had a witness at
depth `′ and failed there before entering depth `.
Running-time analysis: To analyze the running time, we show inductively that,
conditioned on the simulator never failing, the running time of the simulator at
depth ` is bounded by O(m)logm+1−`. Setting, ` = 0, we obtain that the running
time of the simulator is O(m)logm.
• Base case: At depth logm, since there are no more recursive calls and
the simulator does not fail, the total running time of S is bounded by the
maximum number of messages in any session and this is O(m).
• Induction step: Suppose that the statement is true for depth `. At depth
`−1, the running time can be computed by bounding the number of recursive
calls made to depth ` and applying the induction hypothesis. There are at
most m sessions and if the simulator does not fail, at most one recursive call
is made for every session. Therefore, the total number of recursive calls made
to depth ` is bounded by m. As every session has only 2 slots, the time spent
in simulating the messages at depth ` − 1 is bounded by O(m). Therefore,
the time spent at depth `− 1 is bounded by
O(m) +m(Time spent at depth `) = O(m) +m×O(m)logm+1−`
= O(m)logm+1−(`−1)
This concludes the induction step.
Thus, we have shown a protocol with 2 slots where all static non-aborting
adversaries can be simulated.
Simulating general adversaries.
Next, we analyze why the simulator fails on general adversaries. The simulator
fails at depth ` while simulating from some partial view h, if
Simulator fails to extract witness for a session that started after h. For
static adversaries, we argued that some slot of every execution that starts
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after h will be rewound. For this, we relied on the fact that the total num-
ber of new executions that start at depth ` is bounded and the adversary
never aborts. When we consider general adversaries, neither of these proper-
ties hold. To resolve this problem, we can allow the simulator to repeatedly
rewind a slot until it extracts a witness and cutting oﬀ whenever the ad-
versary opens too many new executions or aborts on the slot. This ensures
that every session that begins at a particular depth, some slot is chosen at
the same depth to be recursively rewound and the simulator extracts a wit-
ness if the recursion goes to completion. Furthermore, we show that this
modiﬁcation causes the simulator to run in expected polynomial time rather
than strict polynomial time (which is inevitable if we want to achieve perfect
simulation[4]).
Simulator fails to extract witness for a session that starts in h. For static
non-aborting adversaries, every message that occurs at depth ` occurs at
depth ` − 1 and hence the simulator can fail on an execution only at the
depth it started. For general adversaries this statement no longer holds.
However, it suﬃces to modify the simulator's procedure only in the case
when it reaches the Stage 2 of a session that starts in h, say depth `∗ < `.
There are two cases depending on where the challenge of the last (second)
slot was received and we show how to modify the simulator in each of these
cases.
• If the challenge message of the last slot did not start at the depth where
the execution started, i.e. at a depth `′ > `∗, then we store the challenge-
response pair obtained from the last slot and restart simulation at depth
`∗ + 1. This modiﬁcation allows the simulator to make progress w.r.t
session i at depth `∗ since the next time it reaches Stage 2 of session
i, a second challenge-response pair for the last slot must occur and the
simulator can extract a witness with this and the one stored (as they
share the same start message from depth `∗).
• If the challenge-message of the last slot occurred at the depth where the
execution started, i.e. depth `∗, then the previous modiﬁcation does not
help as the challenge-message remains the same for every simulation at
depth `∗+1. To avoid this case, we take a diﬀerent approach. We add a
third slot and still require that the simulator rewinds some slot among
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the ﬁrst 2 slots. This modiﬁcation ensures that this case does not occur
as the simulator is guaranteed to extract a witness for session i before
it reaches the last (or 3rd) slot.
We show in the next section that essentially by incorporating these modiﬁ-
cations, we can construct a simulator that works for all adversaries.
We now proceed to formally describe our simulator and prove its correctness.
8.7 The Simulator
Our simulator is deﬁned recursively in the following manner. Given the view h′
of V ∗, we call a preﬁx h of h′ `-good if the number of new executions that open
in h′ after h is at most m
(r−1)` (recall that m is an upper bound on the number of
executions started by V ∗). Given a partial view h′ after which we have the closing
of a slot s, we say that the slot is `-good in h if s is a d-good preﬁx of h′ (Recall
that s stands for the preﬁx after which slot s opens). Our simulator maintains a
collection of partial views in H so that if two challenge-response pair occurs for
any slot, it can use the special-soundness extractor to extract a witness.
Now, on recursive level ` > 0, starting from a view h, SV
∗
feeds messages to V ∗
until a slot s of an execution that started after h closes and the slot is `+ 1-good
for the current view h′; whenever this happens, it rewinds V ∗ back to the point
when s opened, and invokes itself recursively at level `+ 1. It continues rewinding
until it gets m partial transcripts, each time appending the partial transcript to H.
If at any instant, the current view h′ and any view h∗ in H contain two challenge-
response pairs for the same slot (with same start message for which a witness has
not been extracted yet), then the simulator applies the special soundness extractor
on the two transcripts; if the extractor outputs a valid witness corresponding to
the jth proof proved using 〈P, V 〉, the witness is stored. Furthermore, at each
recursive level ` ≥ 1 (i.e., on all recursive levels except the ﬁrst one), if h is not a
`-good preﬁx of the current view h′ (i.e., if the number of new executions that start
exceeds m
(r−1)` or V
∗ aborts on the slot s that opened at h, the recursive procedure
aborts). Finally, whenever V ∗ is expecting a Stage 2 message , SV
∗
checks 1) if a
witness has been extracted; then, it simply uses the witness to generate the Stage
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2 message, or 2) if a witness has not been extracted and the execution began at
a preﬁx of h, then it returns the view to the level where the execution began.
Otherwise SV
∗
halts outputting fail.
A formal description of our simulator can be found in Figure 8.2. Let d =
dlogr−1me, the maximum depth of recursion. By construction we have that the
simulation does not go beyond d recursive levels.
Procedure SV
∗
(1n, `, h,H) :
On input the recursive level ` and the partial view h of V ∗, and collection of
partial views H proceeds as follows. Let h′ = h.
Repeat the following:
• If ` > 0 and h′ is the closing of the slot opened at h, return h.
• If ` > 0 and the partial view h is not d-good, restart simulation at current
depth from h.
• If h′ is the closing of a slot s corresponding to a session that started after
h and s is `+ 1-good for h′: let i = 0; repeat the following until i = m:
 Let h∗ = SV
∗
(1n, ` + 1, s,H). If h∗ is the closing of the last slot of a
session that opened at a preﬁx of h, return h∗.
 Otherwise, if h∗ 6= ⊥, let i = i+ 1, append h∗ to H.
• If V ∗ is expecting to hear a Stage 1 message, S˜V ∗ samples a random message
of length l(n), and updates h′ accordingly.
• If V ∗ is expecting to hear a Stage 2 message in the jth proof, S˜V ∗ checks
if there exists a view h∗ in H such that the special soundness extractor on
the pair of transcripts h′ and h∗ outputs a witness r for the jth session. If
so, it uses r to generate the Stage 2 message, updates h′ accordingly and
continues. If not, it returns h′ if session j started before h and otherwise
halts outputting fail.
If in the simulation, S queries V ∗ more that 2n times, it proceed as follows: Let
h denote the view reached in the main-line simulation (i.e., at depth 0 of the
recursion). Continue the simulation in a straight-line fashion from h by using
a brute-force search to ﬁnd a fake witness each time Stage 2 of a session i is
reached.
Figure 8.2: Simulator for Perfect Concurrent Zero-Knowledge Argument 〈P, V 〉
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8.8 Analysis of the Simulator
To prove correctness of the simulator, we show that the output of the simulator is
correctly distributed and its expected running-time is bounded. We ﬁrst prove in
Claim 18 that the simulator never aborts. Using Claim 18, we show in Proposition 3
that the output distribution of the simulator is correct. In Proposition 4, we
show that the expected running time of the simulation is at most poly(mdrd).
Throughout this proof we assume without loss of generality the adversary veriﬁer
V ∗ is deterministic (as it can always get its random coins as part of the auxiliary
input).
Simulation never fails
Claim 18. For every x ∈ L, SV ∗(x, z) never halts outputting fail.
Proof: As a ﬁrst step, we show that for every partial view h and depth `, if the
simulation at depth ` starts simulating from view h and reaches the opening of the
last slot corresponding to a session i that starts after h, then it must be the case
that the simulator extracted a witness corresponding to session i.
Fix a particular history h, depth ` and session i that starts after h and completes
r−1 slots. Furthermore, let us assume that the simulator has extracted the witness
of all sessions that complete r−1 session before session i does. We show inductively
that the simulator extracts a witness for session i.
Recall that if at depth `, the current view is not `-good then the simulation is
cut oﬀ. So, if the simulation reaches the opening of the last or rth slot of session
i, then at this instant, the current view is `-good and there is some slot s in the
ﬁrst r − 1 slots that has fewer than m
(r−1)`+1 new sessions started within, i.e. s is
`+1-good. This slot is chosen by the simulator to be recursively rewound at depth
` + 1. Furthermore, the simulator obtains m partial views from depth ` + 1. We
claim that in this case, the simulator should have obtained a view stored in H so
that the current view h′ along with H would yield a witness for session i through
the special-soundness extractor. This is because, if any of the m views returned
from depth `+ 1 does not contain a second challenge-response pair for slot s, then
it must end in the closing of the last slot of a session j 6= i for which a witness has
not yet been extracted. Furthermore, session j must have started after h, since
otherwise the simulator returns the view to a higher recursive call.
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Now, we claim that, no two views among the m views returned can end on
the last slot of the same session j. It follows from our inductive hypothesis that
session j could not have completed r − 1 slots before opening of s; in this case, it
was assumed that a witness was extracted. Therefore, the view returned contains
the closing of the r− 1th slot. This in turn implies that the view also contains the
challenge-response pair of the last slot; this is stored in H. This means that, if at
any instant afterward in the recursive simulation from s if session j completes r
slots, the current view contains a new challenge-response pair for the last slot of
session j that is diﬀerent from the one stored inH; In this case, the simulator would
have applied the special-soundness extractor on the current view with the stored
view in H to extract a witness for session j and continued simulation. Therefore,
no two views returned in the recursive simulation from s can end in the same
session.
Finally, observe that there are at most m − 1 sessions other than session i;
so, if m views are returned it must be the case that one view contains a second
challenge-response pair for slot s and a witness extracted for session i.
To conclude the proof, we observe that if the simulator fails on session i at
depth ` simulating from h, then it must be the case that session i starts after h,
since otherwise, the simulator returns the view to a higher-recursive call where the
session started. However, if session i starts after h and completes r − 1 slots, as
proved above in our preliminary step, it must have extracted a witness for session
i and thus cannot fail.
Indistinguishability of the simulation
Proposition 3. The following ensembles are identical
• {viewV ∗ (〈P (w), V ∗(z)〉(x))}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
• {SV ∗(x, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
Proof: Consider the following hybrid simulator S˜V
∗
that receives the real witness
w to the statement x. S˜V
∗
on input x,w, and z proceeds just like SV
∗
in order
to generate the prover messages in Stage 1, but proceeds as the honest prover
using the witness w in order to generate messages in Stage 2 (instead of using the
fake witness as SV
∗
would have). Using the same proof as in Claim 18, we can
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show that S˜V
∗
(x, (w, z)) never aborts outputting ⊥. Furthermore, as the prover
messages in Stage 1 are chosen uniformly and S˜V
∗
behaves like an honest prover
in Stage 2. Therefore, we obtain the following claim.
Claim 19. The following ensembles are identical
• {viewV ∗ (〈P (w), V ∗(z)〉(x))}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
• {S˜V ∗(x, (w, z))}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
Next we compare S˜V
∗
with SV
∗
. The proof of the proposition follows using the
standard hybrid argument by combining Claim 19 with the following claim.
Claim 20. The following ensembles are identical
• {S˜V ∗(x, (w, z))}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
• {SV ∗(x, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
Proof: The proof of this claim essentially follows from the perfect-WI property
of Stage 2 of the protocols, since the only diﬀerence between the simulators S˜V
∗
and SV
∗
is the choice of witness used. For completeness, we provide a proof below.
To prove the claim we will rely on the fact that the running time of the simulator
is bounded. This holds since S stops executing SOLVE whenever it performs more
than 2n queries and continues the simulation in a straight-line fashion, extracting
fake witnesses using brute-force search. Assume, for contradiction, that the claim
is false, i.e. there exists a deterministic veriﬁer V ∗ (we assume w.l.o.g that V ∗ is
deterministic, as its random-tape can be ﬁxed) such that the ensembles are not
identical.
We consider several hybrid simulators, Si for i = 0 to N , where N is an upper-
bound on the running time of the simulator. Si receives the real witness w to the
statement x and behaves exactly like S, with the exception that Stage 2 messages
in the ﬁrst i proofs are generated using the honest prover strategy (and the witness
w). By construction, S0 = S˜ and SN = S. Since, by assumption, the outputs of
S0 and SN are not identically distributed, there must exist some j such that the
output of Sj and Sj+1 are diﬀerent. Furthermore, since Sj proceeds exactly as Sj+1
in the ﬁrst j sessions, and also the same in Stage 1 of the j + 1'th session, there
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exists a partial view vwhich deﬁnes an instance x′ ∈ L ∨ L′ for Stage 2 of the
j+1'th sessionsuch that outputs of Sj and Sj+1 are not identical conditioned on
the event that Sj and Sj+1 feed V
∗ the view v. Since the only diﬀerence between
the view of V ∗ in Sj and Sj+1 is the choice of the witness used for the statement
x′ used in Stage 2 of the j + 1'the session, we contradict the perfect-WI property
of Stage 2.
Running-time of S
We consider the hybrid simulator S˜V
∗
constructed in proof of Proposition 3. It
follows by the same proof as in Claim 20 that the running time distributions of S˜
and S are identical. Therefore, it suﬃces to analyze the expected running time of
S˜.
Proposition 4. For all x ∈ L, z ∈ {0, 1}∗, and all V ∗ such that V ∗(x, z) opens up
at most m sessions, E[timeS˜V ∗ (x,z)] ≤ poly(mdrd)
Proof: Recall that in the simulation by S˜V
∗
(x, z), if at any point the simulator
queries more than 2n queries to V ∗, it instead continues in a straight-line simulation
using a brute-force search. By linearity of expectation, the expected running time
of S is
poly(E[# queries made to V ∗]) + E[time spent in straight-line simulation]
In Claim 21 below, we show that expected time spent in straight-line simulation
is negligible. In Claim 22 we show that the expected number of queries made to
V ∗ is at most m2(d+1−`)(2r)d+1−`. The proof of the proposition follows.
Claim 21. The expected time spent by S˜V
∗
in straight-line simulation is less than
1.
Proof: The straight-line simulation takes at most p(2n) steps for some function
p ∈ PQT since it takes O(2n) steps to extract a fake witness. Recall that,
the simulator runs the brute-force search only if it picks the same challenge (β)
twice. Since, the simulator is cut-oﬀ after 2n steps, it could have picked at most
2n challenges. Therefore, by the union bound, the probability that it obtains the
same challenge twice is at most 2
n
2n2
. Thus, the expected time spent by SV
∗
in
straight-line simulation is at most 2
n
2n2
p(2n) < 1.
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Claim 22. For all partial view h, depth `, such that SV
∗
(1n, `, h,H) never outputs
fail, E[# queries by SV
∗
(1n, `, h,H)] ≤ (2m2r)d−`+1
Proof: We prove the claim by reverse induction on `. To simplify notation let
α(`) = (2m2r)d−`+1. When ` = d the claim follows since SOLVE does not perform
any recursive calls and the number of queries made by SOLVE can be at most the
total number of messages, which is mr.
Assume the claim is true for ` = `′ + 1. We show that it holds also for ` = `′.
Fix a particular history h and views H such that SV ∗(1n, `′, h,H) never outputs
fail. We show that
E[# queries by SV
∗
(1n, `′, h,H)] ≤ (2m2r)d−`′+1 = α(`′)
Towards this goal we introduce some additional notation. Given a view h′ extend-
ing the view h,
• Let q`(h′; ŝ) denote the probability that the view h′ occurs in the main-line
session of SV
∗
(1n, `, h) and that slot ŝ opens immediately after h′.
• Let Γŝ denote the set of views such that q`′(h′; ŝ) > 0.
We bound the number of queries made by SV
∗
(1n, `, h) as the sum of the queries
it makes on depth `, and the queries made by recursive calls. The number of queries
made by the simulator on depth ` is at most the total number of messages in a
session, i.e. mr. The number of queries made on recursive calls is computed
by summing the queries made by recursive calls on over every slot ŝ and taking
expectation over every view h′ (such that q`(h′; ŝ) > 0).
More precisely,
E[# queries by SV
∗
(1n, `, h)] ≤ mr +∑ŝ∑h′∈Γŝ q`(h′; ŝ)E(h′; ŝ)
where E(h′; ŝ) denotes the expected number of queries made by the simulator from
the view h′ on ŝ. There are two steps involved in computing E(h′; ŝ). The ﬁrst
step involves ﬁnding the expected number of times SOLVE is run on a slot and
the second step, using the induction hypothesis, computing a bound for E(h′; ŝ).
Step 1: Recall that the simulator at depth ` is restarted either if the current view
h′ is not `-good or if the simulation reaches the Stage 2 of a session that starts
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at a preﬁx of h. We show below that, in expectation the former causes SV
∗
to
restart at depth `+1 at most O(1) times. Then we argue that the latter can occur
without SV
∗
returning to a higher recursive call at most m times. Therefore, using
linearity of expectation, we get that the expected number of times SV
∗
is restarted
before it obtains a second challenge-response pair for the slot ŝ is at most O(m).
First, we consider the probabilities of the following events (all conditioned on
SV
∗
never outputs ⊥). Given a view h′ from where slot ŝ opens, let p` denote
the probability that SV
∗
rewinds slot ŝ from h′, i.e. p` is the probability that in
the simulation from h′ at depth `, V ∗ completes ŝ with an accepting proof while
opening fewer than m
(r−1)d−`+1 new sessions within the slot ŝ. Let y
` denote the
probability that when executing the simulator at depth `, SV
∗
either cuts oﬀ the
simulation or returns the current view h′. We clearly have that p` ≤ 1− y` (note
that equality does not necessarily hold since it might return h′ to a higher recursive
call). Recall that SV
∗
generates random Stage 1 messages, and uses the same (real)
witness to generate Stage 2 messages, independent of the depth of the recursion.
Conditioned on SV
∗
never failing or returning to a higher recursive call, we can
conclude that the view of V ∗ in the main-line simulation by SV
∗
on depth ` is
identically distributed to its view on depth ` + 1. Therefore, the probability it
aborts or opens too many new sessions at both the depths are identical. However,
it could stop and return to a higher recursive call more often in the simulation at
depth `+ 1 than at depth `. Thus, we have that y` ≤ y`+1.
Therefore, the expected number of times SV
∗
recursively executes ŝ at depth
`+1, before it either obtains a second challenge-response pair for the slot or returns
to a higher recursive call is at most 1
1−y`+1 ≤ 11−y` ≤ 1p` . Since, SV
∗
rewinds ŝ from
ĥ only with probability p`, the expected number of restarts at depth `+ 1 from h′
before which the rewinding is not cut-oﬀ is at most p` 1
p`
= 1. Since it is run until m
views are obtained, we have that by linearity of expectation, the expected number
of times the simulation at depth `+ 1 is carried out for each slot is bounded by m.
Step 2: From the induction hypothesis, we know that the expected number of
queries made by SV
∗
at depth `′+ 1 is at most α(`′+ 1). Therefore, if SV
∗
is run u
times on a slot, the expected total number of queries made by SOLVE is bounded
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by uα(`′ + 1). We conclude that
E(h′; ŝ) ≤
∑
u∈N
Pr
[
u recursive calls are made by SV
∗
from h′
]
uα(`′ + 1)
= α(`′ + 1)
∑
u∈N
u · Pr [u recursive calls are made by SV ∗ from h′]
≤ mα(`′ + 1)
Therefore, E[# queries by SV
∗
(1n, `′, h)] ≤
mr +
∑
ŝ
∑
h′∈Γŝ
q`
′
(h′; ŝ)E(h′; ŝ) ≤ mr +
∑
ŝ
mα(`′ + 1)
∑
h′∈Γŝ
q`
′
(h′; ŝ)
≤ mr +
∑
ŝ
mα(`′ + 1) ≤ mr + (mr)mα(`′ + 1) ≤ α(`′)
This completes the induction step and concludes the proof of Claim 4.
8.9 Concurrent Computational ZK Proof for NP
In the previous section, we constructed perfect concurrent ZK proofs assuming
the existence of claw-free permutations. In this section, we consider concurrent
computational ZK proofs.
Theorem 23 (restated). Assume the existence of one-way functions that are secure
w.r.t ω(PQT ) and collision-resistant hash function that are secure w.r.t ω(PQT ).
Then, every language language in NP has a constant-round concurrent computa-
tional black-box ZK proof w.r.t PQT .
Theorem 18 relies on a slight variant of the ZK proof of [56] (and is an in-
stantiation of the protocol of [70]). This protocol is described in Figure 8.3. We
assume the existence of honest-veriﬁer ZK proofs that are secure w.r.t ω(PQT ).
Such proofs exists if one-way functions that are secure w.r.t ω(PQT ) exists. Fur-
thermore, we require constant round statistically hiding commitments that are
computationally binding w.r.t ω(PQT ) adversaries. Such commitment schemes
can be constructed from collision resistant hash functions that are secure w.r.t
ω(PQT ) [23, 42]. Given these assumptions with some subtle changes, our proof
from the previous section works for this protocol as well.
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Let h(n) ∈ ω(npoly(logn)) be such that there exists OWFs and CRHs secure w.r.t
(h(n))2.
Description of the Simulator: We modify the simulator described in Sec-
tion 8.7 to work for this protocol. More precisely, we change the procedure SOLVE
as follows. To generate the prover message for Stage 1 of any execution, it picks
challenges uniformly at random as before, but to simulate the Stage 2 of an exe-
cution, on input the fake witness w = r, proceeds as follows5:
1. S generates a random-looking execution (m1, r
′,m2) of the parallelized
GMW protocol, where the veriﬁer query r′ = r. (This property of the GMW
protocol is sometimes called special honest-veriﬁer ZK.)6
2. S feeds m1 to V
∗.
3. If V ∗ decommits to r, S feeds m2 to V ∗.
4. If V ∗ succeeds in decommit to a diﬀerent value than r, S outputs failbin and
halts.
In the event that the simulation runs for more than h(n) steps, S halts with output
failtime−out.
Analysis of the simulator
We analyze the correctness and running time of the simulator S. In the rest of
the proof, we write negligible for negligible w.r.t PQT .
First, we prove the following claim regarding S.
Claim 23. The probability that S outputs failbin is negligible w.r.t PQT .
Proof: Recall that S outputs failbin whenever the veriﬁer decommits to a value
that is diﬀerent from the one extracted from the Stage 1 proofs. Assume for
contradiction, SV
∗
outputs failbin with probability p(n) =
1
nlogd n
for inﬁnitely many
n. We show that S can be used to violate the computational-binding property of
Com and arrive at a contradiction.
5This is similar to the simulator constructed in [32]
6Note that this is possible since it is easy to commit to a coloring such that the two vertices
on a particular (predetermined) edge have diﬀerent colors.
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Protocol CompZKProof
Common Input: an instance x of a language L with witness relation RL.
Auxiliary Input for Prover: a witness w, such that (x,w) ∈ RL(x).
Stage 1:
V uniformly chooses r = r1, r2, ..., rn ∈ {0, 1}n, s ∈ {0, 1}poly(n).
V → P: c = Com(r; s), where Com is a statistically hiding com-
mitment, which has the property that the committer must com-
municate at least m bits in order to commit to m strings.
V → P: r ﬁrst messages α1, . . . , αr for WI special-sound proofs of
the statement. (called the start message)
there exists values r′, s′ s.t c = Com(r′; s′)
The proof of knowledge is with respect to the witness relation
R′L(c) = {(v, s)|c = Com(v; s)}.
For j = 1 to r do
P→ V: Second message βj ← {0, 1}n2 for jth WI special-sound
proof. (called the opening of slot j)
V → P: Third message γj for jth WI special-sound proof.
(called the closing of slot j)
Stage 2:
P ↔ V: P and V engage in n parallel executions of the GMW's
(3-round) Graph 3-Coloring protocol, where V uses the strings
r1, .., rn as its challenges:
1. P→ V: n (random) ﬁrst messages of the GMW proof system
for the statement x.
2. V ← P: V decommits to r = r1, .., rn.
3. P → V: For i = 1..n, P computes the answer (i.e., the 3rd
message of the GMW proof system) to the challenge ri and
sends all the answers to V.
Figure 8.3: Computational ZK Proof for NP
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Consider an eﬃcient cheating committer C∗ that runs SV
∗
internally. C∗ picks
a random Com committed by V ∗ in the simulation by S, and forwards the Com to
an outside honest receiver. This is possible, despite the fact that S (and therefore
C∗) internally rewinds A, because Com is a 2-round (non-interactive) commitment
scheme. Then C∗ also forwards the correct Com with probability p(n), of which it
obtains two valid openings: one extracted by S at the end of Stage 1, and one given
by V ∗ in Stage 2. Since there are at most h(n) proofs simulated by S, C∗ picks the
right one with probability at least 1
h(n)
. Since SV
∗
outputs failbin with probability
p(n), the probability that C∗ succeeds is at least p(n) 1
h(n)
. This contradicts the
computational binding property of Com (w.r.t (h(n))2).
Next, we consider two hybrid simulators S˜ and Ŝ that receives the real witness
w to the statement x. S˜ on input x,w, proceeds just like S in order to generate the
prover messages in Stage 1 in each execution, but proceeds as the honest prover
using the witness w instead of using the fake witness to generate messages in Stage
2. Additionally, S˜ aborts outputting ⊥ just as S does.7 However, S˜ does not fail if
the veriﬁer decommits to a diﬀerent value other than the one extracted (i.e. never
outputs failbin) or if its running time exceeds h(n) (i.e. never outputs failtime−out) .
The hybrid simulator Ŝ proceeds identical to S˜, with the only exception being, it
halts outputting failtime−out whenever it runs more than h(n) steps (where n = |x|).
It follows identically to Claim 18 and Proposition 4 that S˜ never aborts outputting
⊥ and its expected running time is bounded by nlogc n for some constant c. It also
follows from Claim 19 that the output of S˜ and the view of veriﬁer in a real-
interaction are identical. The running-time and correctness of S follows from the
next two claims.
Claim 24. For any x ∈ L,w ∈ RL(x), z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the expected running time of Ŝ
on input (x, (w, z)) is bounded by nlog
c n for some constant c ∈ N, where n = |x|
and the following two ensembles are statistically close w.r.t PQT .
• {S˜(x, (w, z))}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
• {Ŝ(x, (w, z))}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
Proof: Since Ŝ proceeds identically to S˜ with the exception that it outputs
failtime−out whenever it runs more than h(n) steps we have that the expected run-
ning time of Ŝ is bounded by the expected running time of S˜ which is nlog
c n. It
7This happens when it has not extracted a fake witness and reaches Stage 2 of that session.
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then follows using Markov-inequality that the probability that Ŝ outputs failtime−out
is at most n
logc n
h(n)
. Therefore, the outputs of S˜ and Ŝ are statistically-close w.r.t
PQT .
Claim 25. For any x ∈ L,w ∈ RL(x), z ∈ {0, 1}∗, the expected running time of S
on input (x, (w, z)) is bounded by n2 log
d n, where n = |x|, d is some constant and
the following two ensembles are indistinguishable w.r.t PQT over x ∈ L.
• {Ŝ(x, (w, z))}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
• {SV ∗(x, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
Proof:
First we prove that the expected running time of S is bounded by n2 log
c n. In
a run by S or Ŝ, the maximum number of proofs made as part of the Stage 2 of
an execution is bounded by the running time which is h(n).
Suppose, for contradiction, the expected running time of S is bigger than
n2 log
c n. We will consider the hybrid simulators, Si for i = 1 to h(n) as deﬁned
above. Therefore, there must exist a j such that the expected running time of Sj(n)
and Sj(n)+1 diﬀer by at least
n2 log
c n−nlogc n
h(n)
≥ nlogc n
h(n)
.
We construct a veriﬁer V ′ that violates the special honest-veriﬁer ZK prop-
erty of the protocol in Stage 2. More precisely, we will construct V ′, such that
the ensembles outputV ′(〈P (w), V ′〉(x)) and outputV ′(〈P (r), V ′〉(x)) are distin-
guishable, where w is the real witness, i.e. w ∈ RL(x) and r is a fake witness.
The veriﬁer V ′ does the following. It runs a simulator S∗ that behaves like
Sj(n)+1, except that it feeds the messages from the outside prover internally, when
the simulator needs to generate the (j(n) + 1) proof for the Stage 2 of some execu-
tion. Furthermore, V ′ computes the running time t of the simulator. Finally, V ′
tosses some random coins and outputs 1 with probability t
h(n)
. By construction,
the simulator S∗ behaves like Sj(n) when the external prover uses the fake wit-
ness and like Sj(n)+1 when it uses the real witness. Furthermore, V outputs 1 with
probability T
h(n)
where T is the expected running time of the simulation. Since,
the diﬀerence in the expected running time of Sj(n) and Sj(n)+1 is at least
nlog
c n
h(n)
,
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we have that
|Pr [outputV ′(〈P (w), V ′〉(x)) = 1]− Pr [outputV ′(〈P (r), V ′〉(x)) = 1]|
>
nlog
c n
h(n)
=
1
ω(npoly(logn))
which contradicts the special honest-veriﬁer ZK property of the protocol in Stage
2.
Next, we prove indistinguishability of Ŝ and S. Towards this, we consider a
diﬀerent sequence of hybrids to prove the indistinguishability of the output of the
simulation. We describe two sequences of hybrid simulators Si and S
+
i , 0 ≤ i ≤
h(n) that receive the witnesses of the statements. We order the sequence of proofs
in an output of S by the order in which Stage 1 is completed. The hybrid simulator
Si proceeds as follows.
1. Run the simulator S with veriﬁer V ∗ in its entirety. Output fail and failbin
if S outputs fail and failbin respectively. Otherwise, let V be the view output
by S.
2. Let Vi be the preﬁx of V up until the Stage 1 of the ith proof is completed.
Simulate an execution with V ∗ starting from view Vi in a straight-line man-
ner.
• Continue the simulation of the ﬁrst i proofs in the same manner as
S, i.e. using the fake witness extracted by S. This can be done in
a straight-line manner for the ﬁrst i proofs since the fake witnesses
extracted are still useful. However, similar to S, if V ∗ decommits to a
string diﬀerent from the fake witness, Si outputs failbin.
• Continue the simulation of the i+ 1st and later proofs by the following
the honest prover strategy using the given real witness.
3. Output the view generated.
We also deﬁne S+i that proceeds identically to Si except that in Step 2, it
simulates the ith proof using the honest prover strategy using the real witness. We
start with a claim bounding the failing probability of Si.
Subclaim 4. For all i, the probability that Si and S
+
i outputs fail or failbin is
negligible w.r.t PQT .
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Proof: Recall that Si and S
+
i output fail and failbin if S does and we know from
above and 23 this happens with probability negligible w.r.t PQT . Furthermore,
they output failbin if V
∗ decommits to a diﬀerent value in any of the ﬁrst i proofs.
Using the same proof as in Claim 23, we can show that this happens with proba-
bility negligible w.r.t PQT .
By Claim 4, the output of S0 is statistically close to the real view with V
∗ (they
only diﬀer when S0 aborts, which occurs with negligible probability). The output
of Sm, on the other hand, is identical to the output of simulator S. Indistinguisha-
bility follows from the next two claims:
Subclaim 5. For any i : N→ N, the ensembles
• {Si(|x|)(x,w, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗ and
• {S+i(|x|)(x,w, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
are computationally indistinguishable w.r.t PQT over x ∈ L.
Proof: Si and S
+
i diﬀers only in how the i
th execution is simulated (i.e. real or
fake witness), which is done in a straight line fashion by both hybrids. Further-
more, conditioned on not outputting failbin, the veriﬁer always reveals the correct
decommitment. Therefore, they are computationally indistinguishable by the wit-
ness indistinguishability property that follows from the special honest-veriﬁer ZK
property of the Stage 2 proof.
Subclaim 6. For any i : N→ N, the ensembles
• {S+i(|x|)(x, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗ and
• {Si(|x|)−1(x, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
are statistically close w.r.t PQT over x ∈ L.
Proof: Ignoring the fact that S+i and Si−1 may abort, their outputs are identical.
This is because S+i diﬀers from Si−1 only in that when generating the output view,
from the end of the Stage 1 of the i− 1st proof until the end of the Stage 1 of the
ith proof, S+i employs additional rewinds. However, these rewinds do not extract
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any new fake witnesses for use in the output view, and do not skew the output
distribution because the randomness used in the main thread is independent of
the rewinding. Since both machines abort at most with probability negligible
w.r.t PQT by Claim 4, their outputs are statistically close w.r.t PQT .
8.10 Concurrent ZK Arguments from OWFs
Using essentially the same protocol we get Theorem 19.
Theorem 24 (restated). Assume the existence of one-way function that are secure
w.r.t PQT . Then, every language in NP has an O(1)-round concurrent computa-
tional black-box ZK arguments w.r.t PQT .
Proof: The protocol is obtained by using a computational WI protocol w.r.t
PQT instead of the perfect WI protocol in Stage 2 described in Section 8.5.
Such proofs can be constructed based on the existence of OWF secure for PQT .
We consider the same simulator as in the previous section with the exception of
how the prover messages are generated, for which we rely on the original simulator
from Section 8.7. Then, following the same proof from the last section the theorem
holds.
8.11 Concurrent Perfect ZK Proofs for languages in NP
We provide unconditional constructions of perfect ZK proofs for certain speciﬁc
languages. Our constructions are essentially identical to the protocols in [56]. We
here present only a construction of GraphNonIso, but as in [56], the same paradigm
works also for QNR. The construction proceeds in the following steps:
1. As in [56], we ﬁrst recast (a variant, due to Benaloh [10], of) Goldreich, Micali
and Wigderson's protocol [35] for Graph Non-Isomorphism as an instance of
the Feige-Shamir protocol.
2. We then essentially rely on the same construction paradigm as in our previous
constructions; namely, we repeat the special-sound proof of knowledge in
Stage 1 r times.
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8.12 Unconditional WI Proof of Knowledge for Speciﬁc
Languages
We provide an example of a perfect-WI proof of knowledge for a GraphNonIso. As
mentioned above, this protocol will then be used in order to construct a perfect
ZK proof for GraphNonIso.
Consider the language 1of2GraphIso of triplets of graphs G0, G1, H, such that H
isomorphic to either G0 or G1, and the corresponding witness relation R1of2GraphIso
which describes the two isomorphism. The protocol (which is a variant of a protocol
implicit in [35] and the protocol of Benaloh [10]) is depicted in Figure 8.4 is a 3-
round special-sound WI proof for R1of2GraphIso.
Protocol 1of2GraphIsoProof
Common Input: an instance G0, G1, H of the language 1of2GraphIso.
Auxiliary Input for Prover: a witness w, such that ((GO, G1, H), w) ∈
R1of2GraphIso(x).
P uniformly selects a bit i, and lets Ci be a random isomorphic copy
of G0 and C1−i be a random isomorphic copy of G1.
P → V: C0, C1.
V → P: a random bit b.
P → V:
1. If b = 0, P sends the permutation from Ci, C1−i to G0, G1.
2. If b = 1, P sends the permutation from H to of Ci, C1−i.
V checks the validity of the permutations received.
Figure 8.4: WI Proof of Knowledge for 1of2GraphIso
Soundness and Completeness follow directly using the same proof as in [35].
Perfect-WI follows from the fact that protocol 1of2GraphIsoProof is honest-veriﬁer
perfect zero-knowledge (see [35]). By using parallel repetition and an appropriate
representation of the graphs, we thus obtains 3-round perfect-WI special-sound
proof system (P, V ) for 1of2GraphIso with witness relation R1of2GraphIso. Further-
more, the veriﬁer query in (P, V ) for a statement x ∈ {0, 1}n is of length n2.
145
8.13 Concurrent Perfect ZK Proof for Graph Non-
Isomorphism
Let GraphNonIso denote the language of non-isomorphic graphs.
Theorem 25 (restated). There exists a constant-round concurrent perfect ZK
proof w.r.t PQT for GraphNonIso.
Proof: Let 1of2GraphIso and R1of2GraphIso be deﬁned as in Section 8.12. Consider
the protocol depicted in Figure 8.5 for proving that x ∈ GraphNonIso. Soundness
and Completeness of the protocol follows as in [35]. Perfect concurrent simulation
follows from Proposition 3 and is obtained by using the simulator constructed in
Section 8.7. Furthermore, the expected running time of the simulator is npoly(logn)
if r is set to some constant (≥ 3).
Protocol PerfectZKGraphNonIso
Common Input: an instance G0, G1 of the language GraphNonIso.
Stage 1:
V uniformly chooses a bit i and let H be a random isomorphic copy
of Gi.
V → P: H.
V→ P: r ﬁrst messages α1, . . . , αr forWI Proof of Knowledge of the
statement (G0, G1, H) w.r.t NP-relation R1of2GraphIso.
For j = 1 to r do
P → V: Second message βj ← {0, 1}n2 for jth WI Proof.
V → P: Third message γj for jth WI Proof.
Stage 2:
P → V: The bit i′ such that H is isomorphic to Gi′ .
V accepts if i′ = i.
Figure 8.5: Perfect Concurrent ZK Proof for GraphNonIso
Theorem 26 (restated). For every ε > 0, there exists a O(nε)-round concurrent
perfect ZK proof for GraphNonIso.
Proof: This is directly obtained by relying on an n rounds version of the previous
protocol (instead of constant number of rounds).
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